Joseph F. Bianco, District Judge.
Presently before the Court are two competing motions requesting that the Court (1) consolidate three related securities class actions,
First, because the Court finds that the three class actions present common questions of law and fact, and consolidation would serve the interests of judicial economy, the Court grants the motions to consolidate. Second, based on its determination that the Cemtrex Investor Group has the largest financial interest, and that the presumption under the PSLRA that the Cemtrex Investor Group is "the most adequate plaintiff" to represent the class has not been rebutted, the Court appoints the Cemtrex Investor Group as lead plaintiff. Finally, the Court approves the Cemtrex Investor Group's selection of Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, as lead counsel. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
According to the complaints, Cemtrex is a technology company, or a self-described "world leading industrial and manufacturing company" that provides electronic manufacturing services for "advanced electric system assemblies, instruments & emission monitors for industrial processes, and industrial air filtration and environmental control systems." (ECF No. 1 ("Cullinan Compl.") ¶¶ 2, 19-20; Monteil, ECF No. 1 ("Monteil Compl.") ¶ 2; Guerrier, ECF No. 1 ("Guerrier Compl.") ¶¶ 7, 16.) Plaintiffs brought the instant actions on February 24, 2017, following the February 22, 2017 publication of a blog post entitled "Cemtrex: Documents And Photos, All Signs Point To Deception And Failure," on SeekingAlpha.com ("Seeking Alpha"), a popular investing website. (Cullinan Compl. ¶ 29; Monteil Compl. ¶ 28; Guerrier Compl. ¶ 20.) The Seeking Alpha post claimed that Cemtrex was involved in conduct that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") had previously found, with regard to other companies, to be fraudulent. (Id.) The post discussed problematic conduct and omissions including payments by "Cemtrex insiders" that were not disclosed to investors, and which had resulted in securities fraud suits in similar cases; the apparent failure to disclose insiders' sales of shares; and fraudulent conduct by Cemtrex's auditor. (Cullinan Compl. ¶ 29.) Plaintiffs allege that, "on this news" (or "in reaction to the shocking disclosures" in the Seeking Alpha post), the price of Cemtrex common stock fell $1.72 per share, or 33.5%, "on unusually heavy trading volume" that same day.
Plaintiffs filed their complaints in the three related actions on February 24, 2017, claiming in each that defendants violated the Exchange Act through their materially false and/or misleading statements and failure to disclose material adverse facts about Cemtrex's "business, operations, and prospects" during the class period, in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. (Cullinan Compl. ¶¶ 26, 49-59; Monteil Compl. ¶¶ 23, 53-63; Guerrier Compl. ¶¶ 19, 32-41.) Plaintiffs name the same defendants in all three actions. (Cullinan Compl. ¶¶ 14-17; Monteil Compl. ¶¶ 15-18; Guerrier Compl. ¶¶ 7-10.) In addition to their Exchange Act claim against all defendants, plaintiffs in the three actions bring a separate claim against the individual defendants, whom they allege acted as controlling persons and are liable for violating Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. (Cullinan Compl. ¶¶ 60-63; Monteil Compl. ¶¶ 64-67; Guerrier Compl. ¶¶ 42-47.) Plaintiffs in the three actions bring their claims on behalf of a putative class of investors (the "class") who had acquired Cemtrex securities during the class period and suffered damages as "a direct and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful conduct." (Cullinan Compl. ¶¶ 31, 56, 59; Monteil Compl. ¶¶ 32, 60, 63; Guerrier Compl. ¶¶ 23, 38, 40.)
Plaintiffs' factual allegations are largely similar. All three complaints describe the same alleged "scheme" to "deceive the investing public," through which defendants caused the class to purchase Cemtrex's common stock at artificially inflated prices. (Cullinan Compl. ¶ 50; Monteil Compl. ¶ 54; Guerrier Compl. ¶¶ 35, 38.) Among other overlapping allegations, the complaints all point to the same alleged failure to disclose:
(Cullinan Compl. ¶ 7; Monteil Compl. ¶ 3, 30; Guerrier Compl. ¶¶ 19, 20.)
On April 3, 2017, defendants filed a letter informing the Court of their intention to move to consolidate these three related actions. (ECF No. 11.) Defendants have not since moved for consolidation, but various plaintiff groups have filed or acquiesced to such a motion. Guerrier's counsel, for instance, submitted a letter in response to defendants' letter, stating that counsel was "puzzled by Defendants' request as consolidation is routinely sought in cases like this," and, "[h]ad Defendants reached out to the undersigned we (and likely the plaintiffs in the other related cases) would have consented to consolidation." (ECF No. 12 at 1.)
On April 25, 2017, four separate plaintiffs or plaintiff groups filed motions (1) to consolidate the related actions, (2) for appointment as lead plaintiff, and (3) for approval of their selection of lead counsel. The following plaintiffs subsequently submitted letters withdrawing their motions, and expressing their support for another potential lead plaintiff: (1) Ajith Chennadi, Wei Cao, Mark Mitchell, Thanh Monat, and Ben Webb
On May 9, 2017, Nelson and the Cemtrex Investor Group filed their oppositions. (ECF No. 26 ("Nelson Opp."); ECF No. 27 ("Cemtrex Investor Group Opp.").) Both movants submitted replies on May 16, 2017. (ECF No. 28 ("Cemtrex Investor Group Reply"); ECF No. 30 ("Nelson Reply").) On July 17, 2017, Nelson submitted a notice of supplemental authority, bringing to the Court's attention the decision in Galmi v. Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd., No. 3:17-cv-558 (SRU), ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2017 WL 7261318 (D. Conn. July 11, 2017). (ECF No. 32 ("Nelson Supp. Auth.").) On December 20, 2017, the Cemtrex Investor Group submitted a notice of supplemental authority, bringing to the Court's attention the decision in In re Blue Apron Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 17-CV-4846-WFK-PK, 2017 WL 6403513 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2017). (ECF No. 36.) Nelson responded to the Cemtrex Investor Group's notice of supplemental authority on December 21, 2017. (ECF No. 37.)
The Court has fully considered the submissions of the parties.
Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[i]f actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may ... consolidate the actions; or ... issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). The district court has broad discretion to determine whether consolidation is appropriate. Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1285 (2d Cir. 1990). Although "considerations of judicial economy favor consolidation," on the other hand, "[c]onsiderations of convenience and economy must yield to a paramount concern for a fair and impartial trial." Id. at 1285. In determining whether consolidation is appropriate, the court must consider:
Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted). The Court has considered each of these factors and finds that, in light of the highly similar allegations and claims in the three class actions against Cemtrex, consolidation is appropriate in order to serve the interests of judicial economy. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Castillo, 612 F.Supp.2d 369, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Consolidation would further the goal of `judicial economy' because discovery in each case is likely to be identical, [and] motion practice and trial in the two cases would most likely cover the same facts and some identical issues of law."). In cases involving common questions of law or fact, courts favor consolidation "to avoid unnecessary costs or delay," Johnson, 899 F.2d at 1284, and to "expedite trial and eliminate unnecessary repetition and confusion," Devlin v. Transp. Commc'ns Int'l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
For these reasons, the Court agrees with the parties' determination that the cases present common questions of law and fact, and finds that consolidation would serve the interests of judicial economy. In light of the Court's independent determination that consolidation is appropriate, as well as the parties' support for consolidation, the Court grants the motions to consolidate.
The PSLRA sets forth the following standard for selecting a lead plaintiff in a federal securities class action: "the court... shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as the `most adequate plaintiff')." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). The PSLRA establishes that courts shall adopt a presumption that the "most adequate plaintiff" is the class member or group that:
Additionally, the PSLRA provides that (1) the plaintiff(s) who filed the complaint shall publish a notice advising members of the purported class of the pendency of the action "[n]ot later than 20 days after the date on which the complaint is filed," and (2) "not later than 60 days after the date on which the notice is published, any member of the purported class" may move to serve as lead plaintiff. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i). In cases where multiple actions were filed, only the plaintiff or plaintiffs in the first-filed action are required to publish a notice. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(ii).
As a threshold matter, the notice of pendency and motions for appointment as lead plaintiff were timely filed in the instant action. Cullinan, as the plaintiff in the first-filed action, was the only plaintiff required to publish a notice, and he satisfied the requirement to publish within 20 days of filing the complaint. (ECF Nos. 1, 22-1.) Then, as required, the Cemtrex Investor Group and Nelson both moved for appointment as lead plaintiff within 60 days of the date counsel for Cullinan published the notice. (ECF Nos. 20, 23.)
The Cemtrex Investor Group and Nelson both satisfied the first requirement for a lead plaintiff by timely moving for appointment. Thus, the Court must next determine which of the two has "the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii). Before turning to the method of assessing financial interest, the Court addresses the issue of whether the Cemtrex Investor Group should be permitted to aggregate individual members' financial losses for purposes of appointment as lead plaintiff — the main issue that Nelson disputes. The Court finds that the Cemtrex Investor Group's proposed aggregation is appropriate.
Nelson argues that the Cemtrex Investor Group "is an assortment of unrelated plaintiffs cobbled together as a group by the law firm" and "is not cohesive," and that the Court, therefore, should not permit the proposed aggregation. (Nelson Opp. at 2; see also Nelson Supp. Auth. ("[C]ourts will not permit aggregation of [a proposed lead plaintiff group's] financial interests if it is apparent that the group `has been assembled as a makeshift by attorneys for the purpose of [obtaining lead plaintiff status].'" (quoting Teva, ___ F.Supp.3d at ___, 2017 WL 7261318, at *4)).) Nelson points to case law requiring that a plaintiff group demonstrate that "such a grouping would best serve the class," and in which courts have considered the following factors: "(1) the existence of a pre-litigation relationship between group members; (2) involvement of the group members in the litigation thus far; (3) plans for cooperation; (4) the sophistication of its members; and (5) whether the members chose outside counsel, and not vice versa." (Nelson Opp. at 2 (quoting Khunt v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., 102 F.Supp.3d 523, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)).)
Although the PSLRA clearly allows a group of class members to join together for selection as lead plaintiff, Nelson correctly notes that courts have been resistant to appointing lead plaintiff groups that appear to lack a pre-litigation relationship and plans for coordination, or to be lawyer-driven, among other factors weighing against aggregation. (Nelson
Id. at *7 (citation omitted).
This Court recognizes the risk of approving lead plaintiff groups without evidence of their cohesion and plans for involvement in the litigation, but finds that the Cemtrex Investor Group is not the type of lawyer-driven group that other courts have cautioned against approving. Based on the Court's review of the Cemtrex Investor Group's submissions, the Court finds that the Cemtrex Investor Group has sufficiently demonstrated its group members' plans for cooperation and involvement in the litigation. The Cemtrex Investor Group submitted a joint declaration along with their opposition to Nelson's competing motion, in which they stated the following:
(ECF No. 27-1 ("Cemtrex Investor Group Decl. in Supp. of Opp.") ¶¶ 9, 11, 12.) In these and other affirmations, the Cemtrex Investor Group members discuss past communications, plans for future collaboration — including specific procedures to ensure that they are able to "make timely decisions" — and their commitment to overseeing counsel's activities.
In arguing that the Court should reject the Cemtrex Investor Group's motion, Nelson urges that a proposed lead plaintiff group must present evidence that the members of the group "chose outside counsel, and not vice versa" (Nelson Opp. at 3 (quoting Khunt, 102 F.Supp.3d at 533)), and that the Cemtrex Investor Group has failed to do so. This purported requirement is, however, simply one of the factors some courts have considered in deciding these motions; it is not an actual requirement. In Blue Apron, for instance, the
Based on its review of the record, the Court finds that the Cemtrex Investor Group is far from the type of makeshift, lawyer-driven group Nelson describes. The Cemtrex Investor Group members have even attested to their willingness to personally travel to and participate in litigation proceedings. The Cemtrex Investor Group has more than adequately demonstrated that its members "will be able to function cohesively and to effectively manage the litigation apart from their lawyers." Id. (quoting Varghese, 589 F.Supp.2d at 392). The Court, therefore, accepts Cemtrex Investor Group's proposed aggregation for purposes of appointing lead plaintiff.
Although the PSLRA does not provide guidance as to how to determine which movant has the largest financial interest, courts in the Second Circuit typically apply the "Lax factors," or "Lax/Olsten factors" in making this assessment. See, e.g., Varghese, 589 F.Supp.2d at 395 (citing Lax v. First Merch. Acceptance Corp., Nos. 97 C 2715, et al., 1997 WL 461036, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 1997); In re Olsten Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F.Supp.2d 286, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)); Blue Apron, 2017 WL 6403513, at *3. Under Lax/Olsten, courts consider the following factors: "(1) the number of shares purchased during the class period; (2) the number of net shares purchased during the class period; (3) the total net funds expended during the class period; and (4) the approximate losses suffered during the class period." In re Olsten Corp., 3 F.Supp.2d at 295 (citing Lax, 1997 WL 461036, at *5). The last factor, losses suffered during the class period, is considered to be the most important. Blue Apron, 2017 WL 6403513, at *3 (citing Khunt, 102 F.Supp.3d at 530); In re Fuwei Films Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 432, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). This Court will also utilize this framework in the instant case.
Here, based on movants' submissions, it is clear that the Cemtrex Investor Group has the largest financial interest. The Cemtrex Investor Group alleges that it acquired more than 90,000 shares of Cemtrex securities during the class period, and suffered a loss of approximately $182,000 "as a result of the revelations of the fraud." (ECF No. 21 ("Cemtrex Investor Group Mem. of Law") at 6-7; ECF No. 22-3 ("Summary Loss Chart of the Cemtrex
In her opposition, Nelson argues that, due to the timing of movant Khetarpal's sales of some of his Cemtrex shares, movant Khetarpal's individual loss during the class period was actually $70,392.86 rather than $98,282.66, as the Cemtrex Investor Group alleges. (Nelson Opp. at 7-9 (arguing that, based on Dura Pharm. Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344-45, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005), the Court should discount any alleged losses from shares sold prior to the corrective disclosure).) Even if the Court were to accept Nelson's argument, the Court would still find the Cemtrex Investor Group's loss to be significantly greater than Nelson's. Additionally, directing the Court to the other Lax factors, the Cemtrex Investor Group submitted a table comparing movants' relative financial interests, and demonstrating that its interest is greater than Nelson's under all four metrics. (Cemtrex Investor Group Opp. at 1-2.) The Court finds that, based on its assessment of the fourth and most important factor, as well as the four Lax factors together, the Cemtrex Investor Group has the largest financial interest.
In addition to meeting the first two requirements, the Court finds that the Cemtrex Investor Group has made a preliminary prima facie showing that it otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is, therefore, presumptively the most adequate plaintiff. Rule 23 establishes that a class action may proceed only if:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). At this stage, movants seeking appointment as lead plaintiff need only make a "preliminary, prima facie showing" that the typicality and adequacy requirements would be met. Varghese, 589 F.Supp.2d at 397 (quoting In re Fuwei Films, 247 F.R.D. at 437); Blue Apron, 2017 WL 6403513, at *3.
The typicality requirement is met where "each class member's claim arises from the same course of events, and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's liability." In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Courts in this circuit have clarified, however, that a lead plaintiff's claims "need not be identical" to the claims of the class, and that "similarity of legal theory may control even in the face of differences of fact." Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Tr. v. LaBranche & Co., 229 F.R.D. 395, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citation omitted). The Cemtrex Investor Group argues that the
In order for a lead plaintiff to satisfy the Rule 23 adequacy requirement, "(1) there should be no conflict between the interests of the class and the named plaintiff nor should there be collusion among the litigants; and (2) the parties' attorney must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation." In re Fuwei Films, 247 F.R.D. at 436 (citation omitted). The lead plaintiff should also "have a sufficient interest in the outcome to ensure vigorous advocacy." Id. The Cemtrex Investor Group argues that it satisfies both of the aforementioned adequacy requirements because (1) it "has demonstrated its adequacy by retaining competent and experienced counsel with the resources and expertise to efficiently prosecute this action," and (2) it is unaware of any conflicts between its claims and those of the class. (Cemtrex Investor Group Mem. of Law at 8.) The Cemtrex Investor Group also asserts that the financial losses it suffered "ensure that it has sufficient incentive to ensure vigorous advocacy." (Id.) The Court finds that the Cemtrex Investor Group has made a sufficient showing at this stage of its adequacy to represent the class.
Nelson has not rebutted the presumption that the Cemtrex Investor Group is the most adequate plaintiff by demonstrating that the Cemtrex Investor Group would not "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii), as discussed supra. Nor has Nelson demonstrated that the Cemtrex Investor Group "is subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the class." Id. Nelson focuses primarily on the alleged issues with aggregating the individual plaintiffs in the Cemtrex Investor Group (discussed supra), and fails to provide any persuasive argument that Cemtrex Investor Group is not the most adequate plaintiff.
The PSLRA states that "[t]he most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class." Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v). As the Court now grants the Cemtrex Investor Group's motion for appointment as lead plaintiff, it also considers the Cemtrex Investor Group's selection of lead counsel, Levi & Korsinsky, LLP. The PSLRA provides no further instruction regarding the approval of lead counsel. Courts have correctly found that the PSLRA "evidences a strong presumption in favor of approving a properly-selected lead plaintiff's decisions as to counsel selection and counsel retention." In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp. Sec. & Derivative Litig., No. 03 MDL 1529 (LMM), 2008 WL 4128702, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Victor v. Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P.,
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the motions to consolidate Cullinan, Monteil, and Guerrier, appoints the Cemtrex Investor Group as lead plaintiff, and approves the Cemtrex Investor Group's selection of Levi & Korsinsky, LLP, as lead counsel.
SO ORDERED.
(ECF No. 27 ("Cemtrex Investor Group Opp.") at 6-7 n.5 (internal citations omitted).)