PAMELA K. CHEN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Mark Belli, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Defendants seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Belli alleges that Defendant Plumbers Local No. 1's practice of "slate voting" violates Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (the "LMRDA"). For the reasons stated herein, the Court sua sponte dismisses this case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Beginning in 2012, Plumbers Local No. 1 instituted "slate voting", which allows a group of ten or more nominees who meet the election eligibility requirements to be grouped together on the ballot in the union's General Elections. (Complaint ("Compl."), Dkt. 1, at ¶ 33.) Plaintiff alleges that these slates consist "primarily" of "`the Administration Team candidates' or incumbents" and that the slates are permitted "to choose their ballot position prior to the independent candidates." (Id. at ¶ 4.) According to Plaintiff, all of the slate candidates are "automatically" listed in "Row A"
Plaintiff argues that slate voting violates Defendant's constitution and by-laws, which require that "any and all candidates running for office must pick for their position on the ballot", because the slate candidates are automatically listed in the Row A, i.e., the first column, of the General Election ballot. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 62-66.) Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that "the inequalities of the nominating process and the change that slate voting has made to ballot positions provide an unfair advantage to the Administration Team candidates" by "skew[ing] the election process toward incumbent candidates and toward those who are `approved' by the Administration" and by "deterr[ing] independent candidates from running for office". (Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.)
On May 29, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint and motion for preliminary injunction seeking to have the Court enjoin Defendant Plumbers Local No. 1 from using slate voting in the General Election scheduled for June 2, `, and in any future election. (Dkt. 1.) On May 30, 2018, the Court denied Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis and advised him that his case would be dismissed if he failed to pay the filing fee. (Dkt. 6.) That same day, Plaintiff paid the filing fee. (Dkt. 12.)
Title I of the LMRDA requires that union members "shall have equal rights and privileges. . . to nominate candidates" and "to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization . . . subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws." 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1); see also Members For a Better Union v. Bevona, 152 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Title I of the LMRDA has been called a `Bill of Rights' that guarantees union members the equal right to vote and participate in union decisions[.]"). Under the LMRDA, the district court has jurisdiction over cases alleging violations of Title I "when the provisions of the union constitution and by-laws are applied in such a way as to deprive union members of rights guaranteed by that Act." Commer v. McEntee, 121 F.Supp.2d 388, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd sub nom. Comer v. McEntee, 15 F. App'x 21 (2d Cir. 2001); 29 U.S.C. § 412. However, "the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has narrowly interpreted the supervisory powers given federal courts by [T]itle I to interfere in and to oversee union elections." O'Neill v. United Auto Workers Local Union No. 424, No. CIV-87-116E, 1987 WL 8049, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1987) (citing Robins v. Rarback, 325 F.2d 929, 930-31 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 974 (1965)). Additionally, "the Supreme Court has held that the existence of jurisdiction under [29 U.S.C. § 412] depends upon whether the specific allegations in the complaint reflect an infringement of rights protected under Title I [of] the LMRDA." Bevona, 152 F.3d at 62 (citing Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 138 (1964)).
Construing Plaintiff's complaint liberally
Although Plaintiff states, in a conclusory fashion, that slate voting unfairly advantages the incumbent candidates and "deter[s] independent candidates from running for office" (Compl., ¶¶ 11-13), he does not allege that union members are, in any way, prevented from nominating, or voting for, their preferred candidates (see id. at ¶ 33 (stating that "[i]ndividual and slate nominations [are] permitted" under the rules)). Nor does Plaintiff sufficiently allege facts to support the assertion that the positioning of the slate in the first column and the ease of one-click voting for the entire slate diminishes the chances of the independent candidates to be elected. Additionally, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that slate voting is discriminatory, e.g., that only Administration or incumbent candidates are permitted to run as a slate. While union members may have to expend an additional few seconds of effort to look at the second column to vote for specific independent candidates,
Fritsch v. Dist. Council No. 9 Bhd. of Painters, Decorators & Paper Hangers of Am., 493 F.2d 1061, 1063 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 139); see also Bernard v. Local 100, Transp. Workers Union of Am., 873 F.Supp. 824, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd sub nom. Bernard v. Local 100, Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 112 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Following Calhoon, courts consistently entertain challenges to [election] eligibility requirements [under Title I] only when the plaintiff alleges disparate application of those requirements resulting in the denial of members' equal rights to nominate or vote.") (collecting cases). Instead, Plaintiff's allegations boil down to allegations of misconduct by union officials regarding the ballot positions. (See Compl. ¶¶ 25-55; Affidavit of Mark Belli, Dkt. 11, ¶¶ 8-12.) But "[m]isconduct by union officials in administering an election does not provide this Court with a basis for exercising subject matter jurisdiction under the LMRDA in the absence of discrimination." Barry v. Fishman, No. 02-CV-6895 (DC), 2002 WL 31729502, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2002); see also Bevona, 152 F.3d at 62-63 (finding no jurisdiction under Title I where a union vote was allegedly tainted by union officials' misconduct). As the court held in O'Neill, "[h]owever invidious the manipulation of ballot positions to favor certain candidates may have been, it has not resulted either in the deletion of any candidate from the ballot or in the denial of any member's right to vote. Thus, the allegation that the procedures used to select ballot positions [were] fraudulent fails to state a claim under [T]itle I of the LMRDA." 1987 WL 8049, at *1 ("To lodge tenably a violation of [T]itle I, a plaintiff must allege a direct, rather than an indirect attack, on the right to vote.").
In the absence of a colorable claim "that provisions of the [Plumbers Local No. 1's] constitution and by-laws are being applied in such a way as to deny equality in voting," this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim.
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close this case accordingly. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.