PAMELA K. CHEN, District Judge.
Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. ("Plaintiff") brought this action against Defendants Sheraz Khan and Christine Lu, a/k/a Lu Chen, a/k/a Christine Chen, d/b/a Taipan Fusion Restaurant (collectively "Defendants"), alleging piracy of Plaintiff's satellite and cable transmission, in violation of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("Cable Act"), 47 U.S.C. §§ 553, 605, and seeking damages under § 605 of the Cable Act. (Complaint, ("Compl.") Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 1-3, 16-17). On November 29, 2017, Plaintiff moved for default judgment and requested damages in the amount of $25,525 and attorneys' fees. (Dkt. 9-1 at ECF 12.)
Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees for his counsel, Jon D. Jekielek, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii), in the amount of $3,640 in connection with 9.1 hours of work he states that he spent on this matter. (Fee Affidavit ("Fee Aff.")
Plaintiff additionally seeks $380 for 3.8 hours that Mr. Jekielek states Ms. Brubaker, a paralegal at his firm, spent on this matter. Ms. Brubaker's hourly rate is $100. (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 10, 11.) However, no time records have been provided for Ms. Brubaker.
Plaintiff finally requests an extra $10 in costs above the costs previously awarded in the Default Judgment (Dkt. 13) based on the cost of service that Plaintiff now claims was $135, versus $125, as previously claimed. (Compare Fee Aff., at ¶ 12 with Declaration of Jon D. Jekielek, dated 11/29/17 ("Jekielek Decl."), Dkt. 9-6, at ¶¶ 9, 11.) Mr. Jekielek provides no documentation to substantiate the extra $10 in service-related costs.
Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii), Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) (stating that the court "shall direct the recovery of full costs, including awarding reasonable attorneys' fees to an aggrieved party who prevails"); see also International Cablevision, Inc. v. Sykes, 997 F.2d 998, 1009 (2d Cir. 1993). Courts in the Second Circuit employ the "lodestar" method in calculating reasonable attorneys' fees, multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent by counsel on the matter by a reasonable hourly rate. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 546, 551-52 (2010); Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany ("Arbor Hill"), 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008). Although there is a "strong presumption that this amount represents a reasonable fee, the resulting lodestar figure may be adjusted based on certain other factors." Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Kings Point Rest., Inc. ("Kings Point Rest."), No. 17-CV-01870 (MKB) (CLP), 2017 WL 6611705, at *8-9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 6611571 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 1999).
As the court explained in Kings Point Rest., 2017 WL 60611705, at **8-9:
Id. at 187 n.3 (citation omitted).
The district court should also "examine the particular hours expended by counsel with a view to the value of the work product of the specific expenditures to the client's case." Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Blais, No. 11-CV-1214 (FB) (MDG), 2013 WL 5447391, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (citing Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1994); DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1985)). If any expenditure of time was unreasonable, the reviewing court should exclude these hours from the calculation. See Lunday, 42 F.3d at 133. "[E]xcessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours, as well as hours dedicated to severable unsuccessful claims" should, therefore, be excluded from the calculation of attorney's fees. Quaratino, 166 F.3d at 425.
Here, Mr. Jekielek requests attorney's fees of $3,640, in connection with 9.1 hours of work at a rate of $400/hour. However, the Court finds both the calculation of hours worked and the hourly rate of $400 to be unduly excessive, in light of the relevant factors, see Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 183-84, as well as similar default judgment cases that Mr. Jekielek has litigated. First, 9.1 hours "is unreasonable given the cumulative, `boilerplate' nature of Cable Act cases." Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Terranova, No. 12-CV-3830 (FB) (VVP), 2014 WL 1028943, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2014); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Zyller, No. 11-CV-03762 (NGG) (VVP), 2014 WL 59979, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2014) (finding 9.7 hours "unreasonable given the repetitive, `boilerplate' nature of Cable Act litigation"). In particular, the 1.4 hours Mr. Jekielek states that he spent on September 29, 2017 (Fee Aff., Ex. A, Itemized Time Record Hours, Dkt. 14-1) to prepare and file a "boilerplate" pro forma Request for Certificate of Default, appears unreasonable on its face. See Kings Point Rest., Inc., 2017 WL 6611705, at *8 ("default actions are relatively simple legal matters."). The Court thus excludes the 1.4 hours expended on this task from the total, bringing Mr. Jekielek's reasonable attorney hours' calculation to 7.7 hours total.
Moreover, a review of the Court's docket "reveals that the Jekielek & Janis, LLP firm has repeatedly provided the court with submissions in matters involving Joe Hand that are substantially similar." Terranova, 2014 WL 1028943, at *9 (citing Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd., v. Soluna Bar & Lounge, Inc., 06-CV-5066 (ILG) (MDG), 2008 WL 2673340, at *6-7 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2008) (counsel's charged hourly rate of $250 deemed excessive); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. 143-0894th Corp., No. 07-CV-2339 (RRM) (RLM), 2008 WL 3243886, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2008) (reducing counsel's fees and chastising counsel for his submissions)). Indeed, in prior cases, courts in this district have found that "[t]hese considerations render excessive [Plaintiff's] counsel's hourly rate of $300"; Terranova, 2014 WL 1028943, at *9; here, Plaintiff's counsel is seeking $400 per hour.
Given the minimal amount of time and labor required, the lack of complexity and repetitive "boilerplate" nature of litigating a default judgment in a Cable Act case (which Mr. Jekielek and his firm have done in numerous similar Cable Act cases), the excess hours billed, the relatively low default statutory damages award amount in this case ($1,313), and the fee awards granted in similar Cable Act default judgment cases litigated by Mr. Jekielek, the Court reduces the remaining attorney's fees of $3,080 (7.7 hours at $400/hour) by 40% to a total of $1,848.
Plaintiff also seeks $380 for 3.8 hours of work that, according to Mr. Jekielek, Ms. Brubaker, a paralegal at his firm, performed on this case. (Fee Aff. at ¶¶ 4, 10, 11.) "T]he Court may not award fees for hours requested where the requesting party has not provided adequate documentation." Kings Point Rest., Inc., 2017 WL 6611705 at *9 (citing, inter alia, Scott v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 130, 133-34 (2d Cir. 2010), and denying similar request for fees, including paralegal Brubaker's hours, based on inadequate documentation). Because Plaintiff fails to provide any contemporaneous billing records or other documentation of Ms. Brubaker's work on this case, the Court denies that request in its entirety.
As for Plaintiff's request for an extra $10 in costs for effectuating service of the complaint, the Court denies that request, given that Mr. Jekielek's prior declaration stated that the cost of service was $125, and Plaintiff fails to substantiate or document the source or reason for the extra $10 expenditure. See Kings Point Rest., Inc., 2017 WL 6611705, at *11 (denying reimbursement of service costs where no receipt or documentation was provided).
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that Plaintiff be awarded $1,848 in attorneys' fees and no additional costs. The case remains closed.
SO ORDERED.