PAMELA K. CHEN, District Judge.
On July 29, 2016, Defendant Brayan Jiménez ("Defendant" or "Jiménez") entered a guilty plea before the Honorable Robert M. Levy, United States Magistrate Judge, to one count of racketeering conspiracy (Count 1) and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud (Count 42). (See Dkt. 390.) The Honorable Raymond J. Dearie accepted Defendant's guilty plea on August 3, 2016. (See Dkt. 400.) Defendant was sentenced on February 5, 2019, though the Court deferred ruling on restitution pending further briefing and submissions by the government, Defendant, and putative victims. (See February 5, 2019 Minute Entry.) The Court held oral argument regarding restitution on April 4, 2019. (See April 4, 2019 Minute Entry.)
Before the Court are the restitution requests of the government and putative victim the Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football ("CONCACAF"), which submits its restitution request on behalf of itself and one of its member federations, the National Football Federation of Guatemala ("FENAFUTG"). Pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("MVRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, the government and CONCACAF seek a restitution order awarding: (1) attorneys' fees and investigative expenses incurred by CONCACAF in responding to government requests during the investigation and prosecution of Defendant and his co-Defendants; (2) attorneys' fees and investigative expenses incurred by CONCACAF in preparing and litigating its restitution requests as to Defendant and his co-Defendants; and (3) disgorgement of bribes that Defendant agreed to receive in connection with Defendant's authorization, in his role as President of FENAFUTG, of friendly matches involving the Guatemalan national men's soccer team.
The Court finds that CONCACAF and FENAFUTG
First, CONCACAF requests that Defendant be ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $1,478,204.70, which represents the attorneys' fees and investigative expenses that CONCACAF incurred in assisting the government with the investigation and prosecution of this case. (Dkt. 1207, at 2-3.) The government supports CONCACAF's request. (Dkt. 1212, at 2; Dkt. 1221, at 2-3.) Defendant opposes CONCACAF's request on the basis that his conduct did not proximately cause CONCACAF's losses and that CONCACAF is requesting restitution for attorneys' fees that it incurred to protect itself from liability. (Dkt. 1213, at 4-6.)
The Court rejects Defendant's argument. Defendant has pleaded guilty to participating in the racketeering conspiracy charged in Count I of the Superseding Indictment. (See Dkt. 400.) Thus, like his co-conspirators, Jiménez is responsible for all reasonably foreseeable losses incurred by victims as a result of the conspiracy. These reasonably foreseeable losses include the fees and costs incurred by CONCACAF in assisting the government, at its specific request, with the investigation and prosecution of that conspiracy. (See Marin & Napout Order, Dkt. 1084, at 16 n.13 (citing United States v. Smith, 513 F. App'x 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2013)); Li & Salguero Order, Dkt. 1209, at 5 & n.4.) Therefore, Defendant is jointly and severally liable with all convicted coconspirators for $1,478,204.70 in restitution for the attorneys' fees and investigative expenses incurred by CONCACAF to respond to specific government requests.
CONCACAF also requests restitution in the amount of $39,680, which reflects the attorneys' fees and related expenses that CONCACAF has incurred in preparing its restitution requests and participating in restitution proceedings relating to Defendant and his co-conspirators. (Dkt. 1207, at 2-3.) This amount is the same as the restitution liability that the Court imposed on Napout, Marin, Li, and Salguero for CONCACAF's restitution-related attorneys' fees and expenses, and it reflects a 20% discount to offset the excessive hourly rates charged by CONCACAF's counsel. The government supports CONCACAF's request. (Dkt. 1212, at 2; Dkt. 1221, at 2-3.) Jiménez objects to this request for the same reasons that he objects to the restitution requested by CONCACAF in connection with its investigative expenses. (Dkt. 1213, at 7.)
The Court finds that CONCACAF has sufficiently justified its fees and expenses relating to its request for restitution as to Jiménez and his co-conspirators. (See Marin & Napout Order, Dkt. 1084, at 15-18; Li & Salguero Order, Dkt. 1209, at 6.) Therefore, Defendant is jointly and severally liable with all convicted co-conspirators to CONCACAF for $39,680 in attorneys' fees and expenses relating to CONCACAF's restitution requests.
On behalf of its constituent federation FENAFUTG, CONCACAF requests an order of restitution to FENAFUTG in the amount of $20,000. (Dkt. 1207, at 1-2.) This amount reflects lost revenue to FENAFUTG that resulted from Jiménez's agreement to accept $20,000 in bribes from Fabio Tordin and an unnamed co-conspirator in exchange for authorizing friendly matches between the Guatemalan men's national team and the teams of other FIFA member associations ("Friendly Matches") in 2014 and 2015.
As an initial matter, Defendant argues that "[b]ecause CONCACAF lacks authority to act on behalf of FENAFUTG, it should not be permitted to make restitution claims on [FENAFUTG's] behalf." (Dkt. 1213, at 2.) The Court disagrees.
Defendant's argument ignores the fact that the MVRA, as interpreted by the Second Circuit, makes restitution to all victims mandatory, whether or not a victim actually participates in restitution proceedings. See United States v. Johnson, 378 F.3d 230, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[A] district court may—indeed, must—impose orders of restitution on defendants convicted of crimes identified in the MVRA even if their victims decline restitution."). But see United States v. Speakman, 594 F.3d 1165, 1177 (10th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he MVRA is expressly made subject to the victim accepting restitution."). The fact that FENAFUTG has not opted to file, or cannot file,
Defendant also objects on the merits to CONCACAF's request for restitution on behalf of FENAFUTG, arguing that CONCACAF's use of the $20,000 in bribes promised to Defendant as a proxy measure of FENAFUTG's losses is impermissible. (Dkt. 1213, at 2.) According to CONCACAF and the government, the agreement by Tordin and his co-conspirator to pay $20,000 to Defendant in addition to the officially negotiated contract with FENAFUTG demonstrates that the contracts were worth at least $20,000 more to Tordin and his co-conspirator than they ultimately paid to FENAFUTG. (See Dkt. 1207, at 2; Dkt. 1212, at 2; Dkt. 1221, at 2.) It follows then, they contend, that in an honest transaction resulting in a "clean contract," Tordin and his coconspirator would have paid the additional $20,000 amount to FENAFUTG, such that the promised bribes are a sound measure of the minimum amount of FENAFUTG's lost revenue. (Dkt. 1207, at 2 ("$20,000 is an appropriate minimum measure of the loss that FENAFUTG suffered as a result of Jiménez's offense" (emphasis added)); Dkt. 1212, at 2 ("FENAFUTG suffered
As the Court stated in its previous restitution orders, "a sentencing court ordering restitution under the MVRA may not substitute a defendant's ill-gotten gains for the victim's actual loss." United States v. Zangari, 677 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 2012); (see also Marin & Napout Order, Dkt. 1084, at 19 (quoting Zangari).). Nevertheless, "where there is a direct correlation between [the defendant's] gain and [the victim's] loss," kickbacks to a defendant "can act as a measure of . . . the victim's loss." Id. Thus, where "every dollar gained by the defendant was necessarily lost by [the] victim[]," a court may award restitution equal to the amount of the defendant's gain. United States v. Finazzo, 850 F.3d 94, 118 (2d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).
Contrary to CONCACAF's and the government's arguments, it is far from clear that a $20,000 loss to FENAFUTG is the "necessary consequence" of "every dollar" promised to Defendant. See id. The entire amount of the bribes offered by Tordin and his co-conspirator to Defendant is not necessarily drawn from an underpriced contract. Rather, some or all of the $5,000 promised for each Friendly Match could have been intended as compensation to Defendant for defraying transaction costs that Tordin and his co-conspirator would normally have incurred in negotiating contracts for a Friendly Match—e.g., fees paid to lawyers and consultants to help induce a soccer association to participate in a friendly match through an honest, arms-length transaction.
At the April 4, 2019 oral argument on restitution, the government sought to distinguish the bribery scenario presented in Finazzo from the one presented here, respectively: (1) a windfall
While the government may be correct that a bribe is a more reliable measure of a victim's loss in the discount scenario than in the windfall scenario, that distinction does not relieve the government of its burden to prove by a preponderance that the amount of the promised bribes is, dollar-for-dollar, directly correlated with the victim's losses. Finazzo, 850 F.3d at 118. Regardless of the differences in the mechanics of the two bribery schemes—windfall versus discount—the problem with the government's and CONCACAF's arguments is that they do not demonstrate that the bribes promised or paid to Jiménez came out of the contract price that would have been offered to FENAFUTG in a clean contract. CONCACAF and the government have not sufficiently ruled out the plausible inference that the bribe amounts offered to Jiménez represented amounts that Tordin and his co-conspirator anticipated paying above the fair market value of the contract—e.g., payments to facilitate the negotiation of an honest contract or to induce a long-term relationship with Jiménez—rather than a direct discount taken out of the fair market value of the contract for each Friendly Match that Defendant negotiated. The government and CONCACAF have failed to show that the bribe amount is money that would have gone to FENAFUTG absent the bribery scheme, i.e., that "every dollar gained by [Jiménez] was necessarily lost by [FENAFUTG]." Finazzo, 850 F.3d at 118 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court finds that FENAFUTG is not entitled to restitution in the amount of the promised bribes.
As a final backstop, Jiménez argues that the imposition of any restitution amount "not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt . . . violates [his] rights under the Sixth and Seventh Amendments." (Dkt. 1213, at 7.) However, the Second Circuit has repeatedly held that "there is no constitutional requirement that the facts needed for [a] district court's fashioning of a restitution order be found by a jury or found beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 116 (2d Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Reifler holds that judicial factfinding relevant to an MVRA restitution order does not implicate Sixth Amendment rights."); United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 476 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that a defendant's argument that a district court's determination of restitution under the MVRA violated his alleged constitutional right to have that determination made by a jury was foreclosed by Reifler); cf. Hester v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 509, 509-11 (Jan. 7, 2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Court should decide whether the Sixth and Seventh Amendments require a jury to find facts necessary to support a restitution order). Because Second Circuit precedent forecloses Defendant's argument, the Court finds no violation of a constitutional right in awarding restitution to CONCACAF.
For the reasons stated herein, the government's motion for restitution is granted in part and denied in part. The Court awards restitution to CONCACAF in the amount of $1,517,884.70, with Defendant Jiménez to be jointly and severally liable with Defendants Marin, Napout, Li, and Salguero and any other convicted co-conspirators. Defendant shall make payments on his restitution obligations according to the following schedule:
Once Defendant's restitution obligations have been satisfied, he will continue to make payments on the same schedule until his previously ordered forfeiture obligation
SO ORDERED.
Finazzo, 850 F.3d at 118 (emphasis in original).