CAROL BAGLEY AMON, District Judge.
Plaintiffs brought this collective action against Defendants Long Island Business Institute, Inc. ("LIBI"), Monica Foote, and William Dantiva, alleging wage and discrimination claims under federal, state, and city law.
Following discovery, Defendants moved to decertify the collective action as to Yu and to dismiss Yu's claims from the action. (D.E. # 223.) This Court referred Defendants' motion to the Honorable Vera M. Scanlon, United States Magistrate Judge, (D.E. # 232), who thereafter issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") recommending that the Court grant Defendants' motion to decertify Plaintiffs' conditionally certified class as to Yu and grant Defendants' motion to dismiss Yu without prejudice, (D.E. # 238). Plaintiffs have filed objections to the R&R, (D.E. #s 240, 241 ("Pls. Obj.")), and Defendants have responded to Plaintiffs' objections, (D.E. # 248 ("Defs. Resp.")). For the reasons stated below, the Court overrules Plaintiffs' objections, adopts the well-reasoned R&R, and grants Defendants' motion.
When deciding whether to adopt a report and recommendation, a district court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When a party submits a timely objection to a proposed recommendation, the Court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made."
Plaintiffs argue that the R&R is subject to
Plaintiffs do not challenge the legal standard applied by Magistrate Judge Scanlon, but they contend that Magistrate Judge Scanlon misapplied the standard in determining whether the conditionally certified collective should be de-certified as to Yu. (Pls. Obj. at 1-5, 8-14.) The Court need not decide which standard of review applies to these challenges because it concludes, even under
At the decertification stage of a FLSA collective action, a court determines "whether the plaintiffs who have opted in are in fact `similarly situated' to the named plaintiffs. The action may be `de-certified' if the record reveals that they are not, and the opt-in plaintiffs' claims may be dismissed without prejudice."
Under the first factor, the Court agrees that the named plaintiffs and Yu present disparate factual and employment settings: there is no dispute that the named plaintiffs are non-exempt cleaning and maintenance workers, but the parties dispute whether Yu was an exempt or nonexempt employee. As Magistrate Judge Scanlon found, there is evidence that (1) Yu performed administrative tasks that named plaintiffs did not perform, (2) Yu directed and supervised the named plaintiffs' work, (3) LIBI classified and paid Yu as an exempt employee. (R&R at 5-8.) Plaintiffs contend that the R&R erroneously characterizes their position to be that Yu was misclassified as exempt; in fact, their position is that Yu—like the other named plaintiffs—is nonexempt. (Pls. Obj. at 8-10.) Regardless of how Plaintiffs seek to characterize their legal theory, the fact remains that adjudicating Yu's claim at trial would involve an analysis of her daily duties, job responsibilities, and wage payments (including any overtime payments) to determine whether she is exempt or non-exempt—an analysis that would not be required for any of the named plaintiffs.
Under the second factor, the Court agrees that there are key distinctions in the defenses available against the named plaintiffs and Yu. (R&R at 8-9.) Defendants maintain that Yu is exempt, but they do not contend that any other named plaintiffs are exempt. In addition, Yu is expected to testify about her direction and supervision of the named plaintiffs' employment, creating a clear potential conflict between her claim and those of the named plaintiffs.
Under the third factor, the Court agrees—in light of its evaluation of the first two factors— that fairness and procedural considerations counsel against collective treatment of Yu and the named plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend that it would disserve fairness and judicial economy to dismiss Yu from the collective action, because (1) she filed a document called "Consent to Become Party Plaintiff" early in the litigation in November 2015, (D.E. # 39) and (2) requiring her to re-file her FLSA and New York Labor Law ("NYLL") claims would present obstacles to recovery based on the statute of limitations. (Pls. Obj. at 12-14.) But the court evaluates fairness and procedural considerations as these factors pertain to collective treatment—not simply as general notions.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that all three factors favor decertification and grants LIBI's motion to decertify the FLSA collective action as to plaintiff Yu.
Plaintiffs do not challenge the legal standard applied by Magistrate Judge Scanlon, but appear to raise the same objections to Yu's dismissal that they raised under the third factor for decertification: that it would disserve fairness and judicial economy to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Yu's state law claims, because she has long been a party to this suit and the statute of limitations would hamper recovery if she is required to refile. (
A district court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Under § 1367(a), "once it is determined that a supplemental claim is related to the claim within the court's original jurisdiction such that they form the same case or controversy, supplemental jurisdiction over the related claim is mandatory," and "`the discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction is available only if founded upon an enumerated category of subsection 1367(c).'"
The Court agrees that the balance of factors counsels against exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Yu's NYLL claims.
Plaintiffs suggest that this Court has long-recognized Yu as a party to this case and that it would be unfair to dismiss her claims now, citing her "Consent to Become Party Plaintiff" form filed in November 2015 indicating that she opted into claims "under state and/or federal law including the Fair Labor Standards Act." (D.E. # 39.) But unlike FLSA claims, the NYLL "does not have a provision for collective actions"—instead, "plaintiffs may pursue a traditional `opt-out' class action through class certification for their state law claims" under Rule 23.
Because Yu has no remaining FLSA claims and her NYLL claims would differ from those of the named Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity would not be served by retaining supplemental jurisdiction over Yu's state law claims. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Yu's NYLL claims and dismisses her from this case.
For these reasons, the Court adopts the R&R, grants Defendants' motion to decertify the FLSA collective action as to Yu, and dismisses Yu's claims without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.