ROBERT E. LITTLEFIELD, JR., Bankruptcy Judge.
Stanley Lawrence DiStefano, Jr. ("DiStefano" or "Debtor") objects to Endurance American Insurance Company's ("Endurance" or "Creditor") claim. The Court held a hearing on the objection January 9, 2019 and took the matter under advisement on August 9, 2019. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), (b)(1), (b)(2)(A), and (b)(2)(B).
Endurance filed a claim for $1,769,317 flowing from an indemnification agreement ("the Agreement") dated September 22, 2011. (Claim 13-1.) The Debtor argues that the claim is flawed because Endurance paid certain creditors barred by the statute of limitations, charged unauthorized or unreasonable attorneys' fees, and failed to retrieve and liquidate equipment purloined by another indemnitor. DiStefano also states that the Court should estimate the recovery of a state court action assigned to Endurance and withhold any action pending decisions on Debtor Laurie Todd's objection to Endurance's claim and multiple cases in state court.
Endurance responds that the Debtor offers nothing indicating a lack of good faith as required by Section 4.3 of the Agreement
After lengthy arguments, the Court indicated its inclination to overrule the objection and does so now for the reasons stated on the record at the hearing on January 9, 2019 and those summarized here.
At the hearing, Debtor's counsel conceded that bad faith, not mere negligence, would have to be shown for the Debtor to prevail on this issue. Counsel requested limited discovery and the opportunity to depose Endurance to explore the bad faith question. The Court agreed to the request and entered an interim order providing that relief on January 31, 2019. For whatever reason, the Debtor decided against trying to establish Endurance's alleged bad faith through discovery. At the parties' request on August 9, 2019, the Court vacated the interim order for limited discovery and the matter became fully submitted. Thus, with no evidence establishing the necessary bad faith, there is no basis to reduce Endurance's claim on this ground.
Endurance's position is sound. The Debtor misconstrues Endurance's stance on the requested fees. The requested fees relate to Endurance's unsecured claim, thus § 506(b) is not implicated. As the Creditor points out, while unmatured interest is prohibited by § 502, "the Code does not prohibit an unsecured creditor from collecting post-petition attorneys' fees pursuant to an otherwise enforceable pre-petition contract of indemnity." Ogle v. Fidelity &, Deposit Co., 586 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1092 (2010). Additionally, the fees are reasonable in scope and amount. Creditor counsel has vigorously represented its client against multiple defendants and debtors in various locations in state and federal court involving numerous hearings, briefings, and appeals. The Creditor's attorneys' hourly rates are considerably less than Debtor's counsel's rates, thus benefitting both Endurance and DiStefano. Also, since the Debtor did not establish bad faith, the attorneys' fees are not subject to reduction on that ground. The fees are allowed.
The Debtor requests that the Court estimate, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(c), the value of a New York State Court of Claims action and apply that amount against Endurance's claim.
The Debtor advances inconsistent positions on when this Court should decide this claim objection. The Debtor is the moving party but his own submissions request that this Court defer and let the New York State Supreme Court determine his liability to Endurance. Flying in the face of his filings, the Debtor filed a letter on August 2, 2019 requesting "that the matter may be considered fully submitted for the Court's determination . . . ." This letter seems to conclusively abandon any request to delay a decision on this matter. However, to the extent the Debtor still argues that the Court should delay and defer to the state court, the objection to Endurance's claim is ripe here after briefing and argument. This case has been subjected to innumerable delays, some unavoidable, some not. It is ironic that the Debtor who filed this objection now requests that it be put into stasis. The Debtor simply cannot have it both ways. Additionally, as Endurance points out, the bankruptcy specific issues raised here will not be addressed in state court. The Court declines to delay any further.
The Debtor raises the specter of Ms. Todd's alleged defense to the Agreement and its effect on the Debtor and other indemnitors. As indicated earlier, Section 6.7 of the Agreement eliminates any safe harbor for the other indemnitors in the event of a problem with one of the indemnitor's liability. Thus, any issue regarding Ms. Todd's liability does not affect the Debtor's liability under the Agreement.
The Debtor argues that Endurance's claim should be reduced because Endurance failed to retrieve certain property taken by another indemnitor. As the Creditor highlights, it has no obligation under the Agreement to retrieve anything. This Court agrees and thus, Endurance's claim stands.
For all of the above reasons, as well as all of the reasons stated on the record at the hearing on January 9, 2019, the objection is overruled and Endurance's claim is allowed as filed.
It is SO ORDERED.
There shall be estimated for purpose of allowance under this section—