GARY L. SHARPE, Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff Thomas Sheffield challenges the Commissioner of Social Security's determination that he was no longer entitled to Supplemental Security Income (SSI),
Sheffield, born January 8, 1990, filed an application for SSI childhood disability under the Social Security Act ("the Act") in December 1996, and was subsequently found disabled with an onset date of November 25, 1997. (See Tr.
Sheffield commenced the present action by filing his Complaint on October 3, 2011 wherein he sought review of the Commissioner's determination. (See generally Compl.) The Commissioner filed an answer and a certified copy of the administrative transcript. (See Dkt. Nos. 8, 9.) Each party, seeking judgment on the pleadings, filed a brief. (See Dkt. Nos. 12, 14.)
Sheffield contends that the Commissioner's decision is tainted by errors of law and is not supported by substantial evidence. (See Dkt. No. 12 at 5-12.) Specifically, Sheffield claims that the ALJ: (1) erred in finding that he had no limitations in his abilities to deal with others and stress; and
(2) erred in failing to obtain testimony from a vocational expert (VE). (See id.) The Commissioner counters that the appropriate legal standards were used by the ALJ and his decision is also supported by substantial evidence. (See Dkt. No. 14 at 11-19.)
The court adopts the parties' undisputed factual recitations. (See Dkt. No. 12 at 2-5; Dkt. No. 14 at 2-11.)
The standard for reviewing the Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
The ALJ found that, as of March 31, 2009, Sheffield "maintain[ed] the abilities (on a sustained basis) to understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions; respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and deal with changes in a routine work setting."
Sheffield is correct in that the RFC does not include any stress limitations. (See Tr. at 30.) However, several medical and non-medical sources have found that Sheffield does indeed experience limitations in his ability to handle stress. For example, in March 2009, Mary Ann Moore, the state agency consultative examining psychologist, found that Sheffield "appear[ed] to have difficulty in dealing with stress. With stress, he bec[ame] easily overwhelmed and exhibit[ed] anxiety and depression." (Id. at 532, 537.) Dr. Nobel, the state agency review psychiatrist, noted in April 2009, that Sheffield "d[id] have some difficulty modulating stress. Under stressful conditions he can become overwhelmed, impulsive and make poor decisions." (Id. at 539.) Sheffield's teacher, Kelly Davies, similarly noted that he "ha[d] a hard time staying on task when he [wa]s frustrated." (Id. at 401.)
Sheffield and his mother also both testified that he has difficulties dealing with stress. For example, Sheffield stated that he did not finish his cosmetology class at BOCES because "the stress for [him] was just getting too much." (Id. at 567.) Sheffield's mother stated that "he really gets stressed out if he gets a lot of responsibility and he can loose [sic] his temper at times and he does have problems listening to directions." (Id. at 574.) She further testified that Sheffield has "a problem with anger also when he's over stressed with things." (Id. at 576.)
SSR 85-15 emphasizes the need to carefully evaluate a claimant's ability to deal with stress in the workplace. See SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at * 5-6 (1985). While Sheffield's limitations regarding stress may not be debilitating, the ALJ's failure to discuss why no stress limitations were included in the RFC, in light of the above cited evidence, necessitates remand. See Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984) (requiring the Commissioner to set forth "the crucial factors in [his] determination . . . with sufficient specificity to enable [the court] to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence.") (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, the court finds that the ALJ failed to adequately evaluate Sheffield's ability to handle stress in making his RFC determination. Because Sheffield's remaining contentions may be impacted by the subsequent proceedings directed by this Order, it would be improper for the court to consider them at this juncture.