ORDER

DAVID E. PEEBLES, Magistrate Judge.

Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.1 Oral argument was heard in connection with those motions on May 29, 2014, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the court's oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

1) Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

2) The Commissioner's determination that the plaintiff was not disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, is AFFIRMED.

3) The clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this determination, DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.

THE COURT: Thank you. I'll have to let that be the last word.

I've reviewed carefully the Administrative Transcript, the arguments of the parties, both written and verbal. I have before me a request for review of an Administrative Determination pursuant to 42, United States Code, Section 405(g).

The claimant or plaintiff in this case was born in November of 1968. He was 42 years of age at the time of the Administrative Hearing in this case. He has a high school degree. He has worked in several positions, including in various food service positions as well as landscaping. He has apparently had two work-related type injuries, one in 2007 involving a shoulder injury for which he received a 20 percent scheduled permanent loss, and some sort of a groin injury, which it turns out has been treated and diagnosed as some sort of a nerve entrapment. He treats primarily with Dr. Francis Chabot, as well as Dr. Richard Chmielewski.

He also suffers from diagnosed mental impairments for which he treats with Licensed Clinical Social Worker Kathryn Muller. He has also seen many other specialists, including pain specialists and consultants, in an effort to control his pain. For medications he receives Gabapentin 600 milligrams, Tramadol 50 milligrams, and Cymbalta 50 milligrams.

He applied for disability insurance benefits in February of 2010 alleging anxiety, ADD, a shoulder injury, and the ilioinguinal nerve entrapment as disabilities and an onset date of November 20th, 2009. An Administrative Hearing was conducted on March 29, 2011 by Administrative Law Judge Edward Pitts. ALJ Pitts issued a decision on July 5, 2011, in which he applied the well-known five-step test for determining disability and concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled.

At step two he did find that plaintiff suffers from a severe impairment that restricts his ability to perform basic work functions. Although he rejected the claim that the lumbar condition and shoulder condition and psychological conditions were also severe, he found that the nerve entrapment did not meet or equal medically any of the listed presumptively disabling conditions set forth in the regulations.

He then concluded that after surveying the medical evidence, that plaintiff retains the ability to perform light work with the additional non-exertional restriction of unskilled work due to the difficulties in concentrating relating to his chronic groin pain. He then applied the grids, and particularly Rule 202.21, and found that the pain did not sufficiently erode the job based on which the grids were predicated, particularly since it was taking into account the unskilled portion of the RFC finding, and concluded that there was no disability.

That determination became final when the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review.

This is a close case, and my role is to ensure that the proper legal principles were applied by the ALJ and that his decision is supported by substantial evidence. The question of whether I would arrive at the same conclusion based on the evidence before the Court is not the inquiry. The term substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

I've carefully reviewed the evidence and arguments at step two. I think the ALJ properly rejected the shoulder injury as a severe impairment. The claimant admitted at the hearing at page 55 of the Administrative Transcript that he was not receiving treatment for his shoulder injury. Dr. David Kerschner, a chiropractor, indicated in his report that there was no restriction due to the accident and that after ten months of chiropractic treatment he should have been returned to his pre-accident condition. That's at 466.

The Dr. Johnson consultative exam in April of 2010 showed some minimal restriction but no limitation in range of motion. That's at page 373.

Similarly, the ALJ properly rejected the psychological conditions that were cited by the plaintiff as being disabling or sufficiently severe to interfere with work-related activities. When plaintiff treated much earlier, he was released in July of 2005 with a Global Assessment of Functioning, or GAF, score of 65. That's at page 428 of the Administrative Transcript. It appears that he is doing well. And the medical records from that care provider indicate that they lost contact with the plaintiff. He only began treatment one month — resumed treatment, I should say, one month before the hearing and began taking medication for his condition two days before the hearing. That's at page 57 of the Transcript.

So, plaintiff's burden to establish those two conditions as sufficiently severe in step two was not met.

In terms of the Residual Functional Capacity determination, which is pivotal, of course, I find that substantial evidence does support the RFC determination. A Functional Capacity Evaluation was conducted in February of 2011 and that certainly can constitute a part of the body of evidence that is substantial and supports that determination. That's at page 528 et seq. of the record.

Clearly it's plaintiff's burden at this step to establish that he doesn't have the RFC that was noted by the ALJ. As I indicated, Dr. Chabot, his own treating physician, in April 2011 indicated that plaintiff should go to work and can perform light work. That's at page 627.

Consultative examiner Dr. Johnson, her examination supports that plaintiff can lift 15 to 20 pounds, which is consistent with light weight. And she found no limitation at sitting, standing or walking. That's at pages 371 to 376 of the Administrative Transcript.

The record indicates that plaintiff was responding fairly well to his nerve injections at page 61, according to his testimony, and at page 307.

In terms of credibility, it was incumbent on the Administrative Law Judge to meet the regulations and consider the plaintiff's daily activities, the medications that he is on, the side effects, if any, of the medications. He went through the analysis. He focused on Dr. Lukose's statement, admittedly an isolated statement, of August 13, 2010 that plaintiff's pain did not seem to be commensurate with the physical findings. That's at page 468. He went through daily activities. There are many indicators that plaintiff was doing better. Page 307 of the record, for example. Page 308 shows that he was active. He reported to his care providers he could perform lawn work. He was planting flowers. He was riding his bicycle. At page 308 it also indicates that the severe testicular pain was essentially gone. This was in June of 2010. In October of 2010, at 306, he indicates marked improvement. Dr. Chabot also noted improvement in the groin pain from nerve blocks at page 477.

I find that the Administrative Law Judge did make a proper credibility analysis and it was incumbent upon him to make that determination so long as it was supported by substantial evidence. It does not provide a basis to set aside the Commissioner's determination.

So, although there is clearly conflicting evidence in the record, it is nonetheless my finding that the determination resulted from proper legal principles being applied and is supported by substantial evidence. So I will grant judgment on the pleadings to the Commissioner and issue an order incorporating by reference this determination.

Thank you both for excellent presentations and arguments.

MR. MYERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. ANTONOWICZ: Thank you, Your Honor.