ORDER

DAVID E. PEEBLES, Magistrate Judge.

Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.1 Oral argument was heard in connection with those motions on November 8, 2013, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the court's oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

1) Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

2) The Commissioner's determination that the plaintiff was not disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, is AFFIRMED.

3) The clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this determination, DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.

(In chambers, via telephone:)

THE COURT: I have before me a request for judicial review pursuant to 42, United States Code, Section 405(g) of an adverse determination of the Commissioner.

The plaintiff's background is as follows: He was born in February 1990. He is currently 24 years of age. If my math serves me correctly, he was 22 years old at the time of the hearing in this matter. At the time of the hearing, he was married with two children ages five and one. There is some conflict in the record as to where he lives. At the hearing he testified he lives with his grandparents. That's at Page 48 of the administrative transcript. He told Dr. Liotta that he lives with his wife's parents. That's at Page 608 of the administrative transcript.

He has a tenth grade education. While in school he was in special education classes with the notation of a previous diagnosis of attention disorder, hyperactivity disorder or ADHD. He did not achieve a GED degree. He last worked in or about June of 2010. His prior work includes packing plastic bottles, remodeling, roofing, delivering water and being involved in Christmas tree sales and working at a fast food restaurant.

He suffers from many issues including anxiety. He has complained over time of pinched nerves in his neck and shoulders causing pain, stomach bulge, decreased vision, right knee and right ankle pain, a bad heart, daily headaches, dizziness and vertigo.

Procedurally, he applied on September 30th, 2010, for supplemental security income or SSI benefits alleging an onset date of June 1, 2010. A hearing was conducted by Administrative Law Judge Robert Wright on May 4, 2012. ALJ Wright issued a decision on June 14, 2012. The Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review of the decision on May 11, 2013, making the ALJ's decision a final determination of the agency.

In his decision, ALJ Wright concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date, that he had severe impairments at Step 2, including mild to moderate amount of denervation potentials in left C5 distribution, as well as anxiety and a history of ADHD.

The ALJ concluded, however, that the plaintiff did not meet or medically equal any of the listings. He considered, specifically, Listings 12.02, 12.04 and 12.06. He specifically found in connection with the B criteria associated with 12.06, that the plaintiff suffered from only mild limitations in the activity of daily living; moderate in social functioning; and moderate limitation in concentration, persistence and pace.

He next concluded that, despite his conditions, plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity, or RFC, to perform light work, except he can perform simple and routine work with a specific vocational preparation of one or two and only occasional decision-making, changes in work setting and interaction with others.

The ALJ then went on to find that plaintiff is incapable of performing his past relevant work and applied the grids as a framework, noted that Rule 202.17 of the grids would indicate a no disability finding. However, finding that the job base on which the grids were predicated was sufficiently eroded by non-exertional limitations experienced, elicited testimony from a vocational expert who concluded that there were jobs in the national and regional economy that plaintiff was capable of performing.

My review is limited. I am tasked with determining whether the ALJ applied proper legal principles and his determination is supported by substantial evidence. The term "substantial evidence" being defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The first issue raised is whether plaintiff meets or medically equals any of the listings, particularly listings 12.06 applicable to anxiety disorders or 12.07 related to somatoform disorders. In both of those cases, the plaintiff must meet the B listings, meaning he must demonstrate his burden of proof that he suffers from marked limitations in two of the three categories or, obviously, repeated episodes of decompensation, which is not at issue in this case, or an extreme limitation of one.

There doesn't seem to be any indication that there is an extreme limitation, which is an impairment that interferes very seriously with the claimant's ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete activities. A marked limitation is defined in the regulations as one which impairs seriously with the claimant's ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete activities. It is noted that a marked limitation may arise when several activities or functions are impaired or even when only one is impaired, as long as the degree of limitation is such as to interfere seriously with the ability to function based on age appropriate expectations, independently, appropriately, effectively and on a sustained basis.

I find that the ALJ's determination regarding the B criteria is supported by substantial evidence. Very clearly, the ALJ misspoke when he concluded that Dr. Liotta had ruled out somatoform disorder. Nonetheless, I find that that's a harmless error because somatoform disorder, which has never been diagnosed by any treating source, to meet or equal 12.07 requires meeting the B criteria, which the ALJ concluded that he did not when he considered 12.06.

The only evidence that would even suggest a marked limitation is the GAF score of 42. Dr. Marks concluded that plaintiff at 412 has a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence and pace, moderate limitation in social functioning and a mild limitation in daily activities — daily living. These determinations are supported by Dr. Hartman's conclusions and Dr. Liotta.

I reviewed Mr. Schneider's case citations that deal with differences of opinions between Dr. Liotta and Dr. Hartman. There apparently are several of those cases. But this case appears to be very different because, with the exception of the GAF 42 score, I read — and the commissioner, the ALJ, read — Dr. Liotta's report is basically consistent with or not markedly inconsistent with the conclusions of Dr. Hartman. So, I would say that because he did not meet the B criteria, that finding is supported by substantial evidence. That issue does not warrant reversal.

Clearly, as Mr. Schneider correctly states, the ALJ was required to consider the combination of plaintiff's physical and mental conditions — and there are clearly several — but the ALJ's decision, in my view, did consider the totality and his RFC determination is well-supported. The vocational expert testified at Step 5 pursuant to a hypothetical that replicated the RFC finding which I find is supported by substantial evidence and concluded no disability.

I reviewed carefully the records to determine whether there was any cognitive deficit. Clearly, there was a reference in Dr. Hartman's, I believe, report to rule out borderline intellectual functioning but there's no medical evidence to suggest that he suffers from borderline intellectual functioning. It was never alleged and Dr. Marks, I will note, did review the school records that were relied on to support a claim of learning disability and borderline intellectual functioning. I'll also note that Mr. Liotta made no diagnosis of learning disability. He made no Axis II diagnosis in his report.

In terms of credibility, that is a matter reserved to the administrative law judge, provided that he considers the relevant factors and explains his decision, which I find that he did. He noted several issues with regard to plaintiff's credibility: His overblown claim concerning his vision impairment; his inconsistent statements about the frequency of playing video games; his inconsistency in stating that he is unable to sit when, in fact, his disability report made no indication in that regard. It was for the ALJ to weigh credibility and I find that his explanation is adequate and supported.

I've already spoken about Dr. Liotta versus Dr. Hartman. The GAF, I agree with the Commissioner and the Commissioner's argument. GAF is of limited value. Certainly a person with a GAF score of 42 experiences serious symptoms such as suicidal ideation, severe obsession, rituals and frequent shoplifting, and any serious impairment in social occupational or school functioning, such as lack of friends or an inability to maintain employment.

But Dr. Liotta's GAF score is based exclusively on plaintiff's own statements and is a single determination based on only one examination. The ALJ was certainly obligated to address that and he did and I don't have any quarrel with his ability to discount that in light of the overall record.

In terms of reliance on lack of treatment, that seems to be a fairly minor point and, as I indicated previously, I think it is a relevant consideration, as long as it isn't the sole basis for the determination. The section cited, 20 CFR Section 416.930 seems to relate to a situation where there is a disability. There's a clear indication that a prescribed treatment could ameliorate or eliminate the disability and the plaintiff fails to follow that treatment. We don't really have that situation here.

So, for all of those reasons, I find that the Commissioner's determination is supported by substantial evidence and resulted from proper legal principles being applied. I will, therefore, grant defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

I appreciate excellent submissions. This was an interesting and difficult case, frankly. Thank you both.