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Guerra v. Colvin, 8:13-CV-1215 (DEP). (2015)

Court: District Court, N.D. New York Number: infdco20150108c62 Visitors: 18
Filed: Jan. 07, 2015
Latest Update: Jan. 07, 2015
Summary: ORDER DAVID E. PEEBLES, Magistrate Judge. Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings. 1 Oral argument was heard in connection with those motions on December 12, 2014, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which,
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ORDER

DAVID E. PEEBLES, Magistrate Judge.

Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.1 Oral argument was heard in connection with those motions on December 12, 2014, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Commissioner's determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the court's oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

1) Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings sis GRANTED.

2) The Commissioner's determination that the plaintiff was not disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, is AFFIRMED.

3) The clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this determination, DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.

THE COURT: I have before me an application by the plaintiff to set aside a commissioner's determination of no disability under 42, United States Code, Section 405(g).

The background in this case is as follows: The plaintiff was born in September of 1969 and is currently 45 years of age. She was 42 at the time of the administrative hearing in this matter.

She lives in Ticonderoga, New York with her son, her son's father, her son's wife and her daughter-in-law. She last worked in July of 2010 as an attendant/supervisor in a laundromat. She also has prior work history as a cashier, a census taker and having responsibility for school fundraisers. She has an associates degree in business management.

She stopped working due to pain in her lower back and legs, according to her testimony, and has been drawing or was drawing since then unemployment benefits.

She has been taking online courses through a New York 599 program.

She suffers from diagnosed conditions including obesity. She is 4 foot 9 and was 205 pounds, plus or minus, although had been as high as 258 pounds. She suffers from back and neck pain radiating down her legs, diabetes, sleep apnea, polycystic ovary syndrome — or POS — and depression, although she has not undergone any treatment for depression.

She is on various medications, including Vicodin and Wellbutrin®, which she was on initially to stop smoking or help her stop smoking but at the direction of her treating physician, continued with Wellbutrin®.

She applied on July 15, 2010, for disability insurance benefits and on the following day for SSI benefits alleging a disability onset date of July 7, 2010.

A hearing was conducted by administrative law judge or ALJ Michelle Marcus on April 12, 2012. ALJ Marcus rendered a decision on August 14, 2012. The Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review on September 17, 2013.

In her decision, ALJ Marcus first noted that the plaintiff was insured through December 31, 2015, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 7, 2010.

She found that the plaintiff suffers from several severe — at step two — impairments, including cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease, sleep apnea, asthma, diabetes, and obesity. She noted at step two that plaintiff had never been diagnosed formally and treated for depression or any other mental disorder.

At step three she considered several listings, including 1.04, and rejected that because there was no evidence of nerve root compromise. She considered 3.03 and 3.10 with regard to asthma and 9.00 in connection with diabetes and found that plaintiff's condition did not meet or medically equal any of those listings.

In terms of residual functional capacity, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff retains the ability to perform sedentary work as defined by regulations, except that, while she can lift and carry 10 pounds occasionally and stand or walk for up to two hours total and sit for up to a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday, she must avoid concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants and avoid exposure to vibrations.

In arriving at that determination, she did consider the plaintiff's credibility and concluded that, although she does suffer from impairments that could cause the symptoms complained of, her testimony was not entirely credible and went through an analysis at Page 27 of the record concerning that.

At step four she concluded that plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant work as a school fundraiser consultant but went on at step five to conclude, in any event, that, first, plaintiff's non-exertional limitations have little or no effect on the job base on which the grids are predicated and concluded, using Rule 201.28, that she is not disabled.

As you know, the scope of review is extremely generous. I am tasked with determining whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. The courts, including the Supreme Court, have defined "substantial evidence" as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

In this case it's clear to me that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. She considered the combination of plaintiff's impairments and the limitations associated with them. There really isn't any evidence from a medical source in the record that is contrary to the RFC finding.

I know that plaintiff has suggested that nurse practitioner Wilkinson does not believe she can work but at Page 432, nurse practitioner Wilkinson stated that plaintiff has no limitation in sitting. She does say that she is limited in her ability to lift, carry, stand and walk but was not able to specifically quantify those limitations.

There is, as plaintiff noted in the brief, an indication at Page 438 that nurse practitioner Wilkinson, quote, "gave the plaintiff a note for work" but there's no indication there as to what that note said, whether it said light duty only, whether it said she can't work at all, but in that same notation, she indicated that the plaintiff was not in acute distress and was ambulating normally.

The consultative report of Dr. Welch supports the ALJ's decision. Dr. Welch concluded at Page 547 by stating, the reality is that physically, she — meaning the plaintiff — has few limitations. Dr. Welch's report supports the RFC in all respects.

The commissioner's determination is also supported by nurse practitioner Wilkinson's notes. Dr. Paolano's report, albeit that dates back a couple years, he found normal range of motion, for example. Dr. Welch found basically normal range of motion with some limitation but a negative leg raise. Dr. Greenspan's consultative report also supports the ALJ.

Clearly, obesity is an issue. But there is nothing from anyone, including the consultative reports and nurse practitioner Wilkinson, that suggests that the obesity, in combination with the degenerative disc disease, poses a limitation that is inconsistent with the residual functional capacity. So the nurse practitioner Wilkinson, for example, already indicated at 438, also 440, indicates that plaintiff has no acute distress and ambulates normally.

Certainly the ALJ is obligated to make a credibility assessment and adequately explain it.

I reject the notion that the finding has to be supported by clear and convincing evidence. I think what the cases say is that it needs to be clearly explained.

At Page 27 I think the ALJ did a minimally good job at explaining her rationale. She went through several factors, including the receipt of unemployment benefits and the certification she's willing to work, the time she spent taking online courses, her ability to sit for extended periods and ambulate normally, her ability to take care of her personal needs and shop, prepare meals, drive, keep appointments, use of the computer, watching television. So I think that that was adequately explained and is supported by substantial evidence.

I know the plaintiff has raised questions about the new evidence submitted to the Social Security Appeals Council. It was, in my view, considered and it does not undermine the ALJ's determination.

The fact of the matter is that it was plaintiff's burden at step four to establish that she cannot perform work as a school fundraiser and she failed to carry that burden.

There's no question in my mind that the plaintiff suffers from several diagnosed conditions and that her back condition is progressively worsening, there is no doubt, and, ultimately, she may become disabled. But my task is determining whether as of the date of the ALJ's decision she was disabled and I find substantial evidence supports the conclusion that she was not.

So I will award judgment on the pleadings to the defendant.

I'll send out a short form order shortly.

Thank you both for excellent written and oral presentations. Happy holidays.

MS. MYERS: Thanks, your Honor.

MR. SCHNEIDER: Thank you.

(Proceedings were adjourned.)

FootNotes


1. This matter, which is before me on consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), has been treated in accordance with the procedures set forth in General Order No. 18 (formerly, General Order No. 43) which was issued by the Hon. Ralph W. Smith, Jr., Chief United States Magistrate Judge, on January 28, 1998, and subsequently amended and reissued by Chief District Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., on September 12, 2003. Under that General Order an action such as this is considered procedurally, once issue has been joined, as if cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings had been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Source:  Leagle

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