FREDERICK J. SCULLIN, Jr., District Judge.
Plaintiff Elby Rodriguez brought this action pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) ("Act"), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner"), denying his application for benefits. See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 13. Currently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. Nos. 13, 14.
Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits ("DIB"), and supplemental security income ("SSI") on December 18, 2009, alleging disability beginning on January 31, 2008. See Administrative Record ("AR") at 187-192. The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's application on May 5, 2010. See id. at 91-106. Plaintiff timely filed a written request for a hearing, see id. at 107-08, which was held on August 5, 2011 in Syracuse, New York before Administrative Law Judge Bruce S. Fein ("ALJ"). See id. at 64-88. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing. See id. at 64.
On October 21, 2011, the ALJ issued a written decision in which he made the following findings "[a]fter careful consideration of the entire record. . . ."
See AR at 50-58 (citations omitted).
The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision on April 2, 2013, when the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff's request for review. See AR at 6-10. The Appeals Council thereafter extended Plaintiff's time to file a civil action. See id. at 2. It also reviewed new evidence which Plaintiff submitted, concluding that the new evidence did not warrant remanding Plaintiff's case. See id. at 1.
Plaintiff commenced this action on August 2, 2013, and filed a supporting brief on March 20, 2014. See Dkt Nos. 1, 13. Defendant filed a response brief on May 1, 2014. See Dkt. No. 14.
In support of his motion, Plaintiff advances four arguments. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh his physicians' opinions. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly assessed his credibility. Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the Medical-Vocational guidelines at step five of the disability analysis. Finally, Plaintiff urges the Court to remand on the basis of new evidence that he argues is material to the determination of disability. See generally Dkt. No. 13, Pl.'s Br.
Absent legal error, a court will uphold the Commissioner's final determination if there is substantial evidence to support it. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence to mean "`more than a mere scintilla'" of evidence and "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation omitted). To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must show that he suffers from a disability within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity ("SGA") by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to cause death or last for twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). To determine if a claimant has sustained a disability within the meaning of the Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process:
For this test, the burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps and on the Commissioner for the fifth step, if the analysis proceeds that far. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted).
Between steps three and four of the disability analysis, the ALJ must determine the claimant's residual functioning capacity ("RFC"), which is defined as "the most you can still do [in a work setting] despite your limitations." See 20 C.F.R. § 416,945(a)(1); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC analysis considers "all of your medically determinable impairments of which we are aware," even if they are not severe. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2). The ALJ is to consider "all of the relevant medical and other evidence" in assessing RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3).
The Commissioner's regulations instruct that
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, treating physician opinions are "`not afforded controlling weight where . . . the treating physician issued opinions that are not consistent with other substantial evidence in the record . . . .'" Petrie v. Astrue, 412 F. App'x 401, 405 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam)). "The report of a consultative physician may constitute such substantial evidence." Id. (quoting Mongeur, 722 F.2d at 1039). Additionally, an ALJ may properly afford less than controlling weight to a treating physician's medical source statement where the "medical source statement conflict[s] with his own treatment notes[.]" Cichocki v. Astrue, 534 F. App'x 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2013).
When affording a treating physician's opinion less than controlling weight, the ALJ "`will always give good reasons'" for doing so. Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). To that end,
Brickhouse v. Astrue, 331 F. App'x 875, 877 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 143 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6).
In this case, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by affording little weight to the opinions of Dr. Dron, his treating psychiatrist, while affording great weight to the opinion of consultative psychologist, Dr. Bornstein. In particular, the ALJ concluded that a lack of consistency between Dr. Dron's opinions and his treatment notes warranted affording his opinions little weight. See AR at 56.
The ALJ discussed Dr. Dron's opinions and his treatment notes at length throughout his written decision in arriving at that conclusion. Notably, the ALJ discussed three visits during 2010 in which Plaintiff essentially lacked symptoms that would tend to suggest any significant limitations in his ability to function. See id. at 51. For example, in January 2010, Dr. Dron noted that Plaintiff exhibited "no serious mental status abnormalities. He exhibits neither depression nor mood elevation." See id. (quoting AR at 435). The next month, Dr. Dron again noted that "[m]ood is euthymic with no signs of depression or elevation." See id. at 435. The ALJ further noted that, in December of 2010, Plaintiff denied all psychiatric problems. See id. at 51 (quoting AR at 439). Each of these visits noted no signs of psychotic process.
The ALJ further discussed Dr. Dron's treatment notes in depth with respect to Plaintiff's allegations of anxiety, mood swings, and lack of concentration, pointing out ways in which Dr. Dron's observations from treatment contradicted his opinion concerning the extent of Plaintiff's functional limitations. See AR at 55. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ gave sufficient reasoning to support his decision to afford Dr. Dron's opinions little weight. See Cichocki, 534 F. App'x at 75.
With respect to Dr. Bornstein's opinion, the ALJ noted that her opinion was consistent with both her own clinical findings regarding Plaintiff's affect and mood together with Dr. Dron's treatment observation of no serious mental status abnormalities. See AR at 55-56 (citing AR at 336-39). The ALJ further reasoned that Dr. Bornstein's opinion was consistent with Plaintiff's hearing testimony regarding his activities of daily living and interactions with others. See id. at 56. For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and offered sufficient reasons to support his weighing of the medical opinions. See Petrie, 412 F. App'x at 405; Cichocki, 534 F. App'x at 75. Accordingly, the Court declines to disturb the Commissioner's weighing of the conflicting evidence in this case. Cf. Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 504 (2d Cir. 1998).
When a claimant makes subjective allegations of symptoms limiting his ability to function, the regulations provide that
20 C.F.R. § 416.929(b); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). Accordingly, the Social Security Administration has adopted a two-step standard for assessing a claimant's credibility. See Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, *2 (July 2, 1996); Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App'x 179, 183 (2d Cir. 2010).
Meadors, 370 F. App'x at 183 (footnote omitted). The Commissioner has instructed that such a credibility inquiry considers the following factors:
SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3.
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms. See AR at 54. He then found that Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible. See id. The ALJ supported this finding in the following ways. First, the ALJ pointed to portions of Dr. Dron's treatment notes that contradicted Plaintiff's allegations regarding his anxiety, mood, swings, lack of concentration, and the side effects of his medications. See id. at 55. Additionally, with respect to Plaintiff's allegations regarding his lack of energy, the ALJ noted Plaintiff's activities of daily living, including volunteering, reading, listening to the radio, watching television, preparing simple meals, cleaning, caring for his personal needs, and attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. See id. at 55. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, the ALJ did not commit reversible error by declining to expressly address all of the relevant factors in his written decision. See Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App'x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) (instructing that "`[a]n ALJ does not have to state on the record every reason justifying a decision'" (quoting Brault, 683 F.3d at 448). Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ sufficiently analyzed Plaintiff's subjective allegations to the extent that they were not substantiated by objective medical evidence. See Meadors, 370 F. App'x at 183.
Ordinarily, the Commissioner meets her burden at step five of the disability analysis by resorting to the applicable Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 ("the grids"). See Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1999). However, "application of the grid guidelines and the necessity for expert testimony must be determined on a case-by-case basis." Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 1986). In particular, "if a claimant's nonexertional impairments `significantly limit the range of work permitted by his exertional limitations' then the grids obviously will not accurately determine disability status because they fail to take into account claimant's nonexertional impairments. . . ."
Accordingly, "[t]he grid regulations may not be relied upon as the exclusive determinant of disability status if a claimant also suffers from a significant non-exertional limitation." Correale-Englehart v. Astrue, 687 F.Supp.2d 396, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). A significant nonexertional limitation is one that results in "`additional loss of work capacity . . . that so narrows a claimant's possible range of work as to deprive him of a meaningful employment opportunity.'" Baldwin v. Astrue, No. 07 Civ. 6958(RJH)(MHD), 2009 WL 4931363, *27 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009) (quoting Bapp, 802 F.2d at 606).
Along these lines, the regulations provide that where a claimant's limitations "only affect [his] ability to perform the nonexertional aspects of work-related activities, the [grids] do not direct factual conclusions of disabled or not disabled." See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(c)(2); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(e)(1). Thus, "[i]n the evaluation of a disability where the individual has solely a nonexertional type of impairment, determination as to whether disability exists shall be based on the principles in the appropriate sections of the regulations, giving consideration to the rules for specific case situations in [the grids]." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(e)(1).
In this case, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the grids at step five of the disability analysis after finding that he had moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence or pace at step two of the disability analysis. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ's RFC findings, including limitation to very short and simple instructions, occasional complex tasks with supervision, no more than occasional contact with others, and limitation to low-stress work, amounted to significant nonexertional limitations that precluded the ALJ from relying solely on the grids in finding him not to be disabled. See Dkt. No. 13, Pl.'s Br., at 20.
The ALJ's step-five analysis acknowledged that Plaintiff's ability work was "compromised by nonexertional limitations." See AR at 58. However, the ALJ further concluded that "these limitations have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all exertional levels." See id. As noted, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from "moderate difficulties" with respect to concentration, persistence or pace. See id. at 52. However, he did so at step two of the disability analysis. See id. As the ALJ correctly noted, the criteria under which he made such finding related to the severity of Plaintiff's impairments at step two, not Plaintiff's RFC. See id. By contrast, the cases Plaintiff cites on this point are distinguishable because, in those cases, the ALJ erred by relying on the grids at step five after finding significant nonexertional limitations in the RFC analysis. See, e.g., Correale-Englehart, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
The remainder of the ALJ's RFC findings roughly track the Commissioner's guidance regarding the requirements of unskilled work. The Commissioner's guidance provides that, as here,
SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, *4 (Jan. 1, 1985) (emphasis added). In this case, as noted, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was limited to very short and simple instructions, occasional complex tasks with supervision, no more than occasional contact with others, and limitation to low-stress work. See AR at 54. The ALJ defined low-stress as dealing primarily with objects, rather than with data or people, and including the ability to adapt to routine changes in the workplace. See id. This comports with the Commissioner's guidance on this point. See SSR 85-15, at *4 (providing that unskilled jobs at all levels of exertion "ordinarily involve dealing primarily with objects, rather than with data or people, and they generally provide substantial vocational opportunity for persons with solely mental impairments who retain the capacity to meet the intellectual and emotional demands of such jobs on a sustained basis").
For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff's nonexertional limitations had little to no effect on the occupational base, see SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 5687, at *4, and further that his step-5 analysis was "based on the principles in the appropriate sections of the regulations, giving consideration to the rules for specific case situations in [the grids]." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(e)(1).
"When the Appeals Council denies review after considering new evidence, we simply review the entire administrative record, which includes the new evidence, and determine, as in every case, whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the Secretary." Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996). In this case, Plaintiff offered the assessment of Nurse Practitioner Joyce Behling. The Appeals Council considered her opinion and rejected it. See AR at 1. NP Behling opined that Plaintiff was markedly limited with respect to the ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended period, the ability to complete a normal workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, and the ability to accept instructions and respond appropriate to criticism from supervisors. See id. at 33-36. However, to the extent that Plaintiff points to evidence in the Administrative Record, including NP Behling's opinion, that reasonably might support a different conclusion in his favor, "whether there is substantial evidence supporting the appellant's view is not the question" on appeal. Bonet, 523 F. App'x at 59.
In summary, for the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the appropriate legal standards and further that there is substantial evidence supporting his findings with respect to the severity of Plaintiff's impairments and his RFC. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401.
Having reviewed the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
