FREDERICK J. SCULLIN, Jr., Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Derek M. Edwards brought this action pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) ("Act"), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner"), denying his application for benefits. See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 13. Currently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. Nos. 13, 14.
Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income ("SSI") on October 8, 2010, alleging disability beginning on April 20, 2004. See Administrative Record ("AR") at 110-13. The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's application on January 13, 2011. See id. at 65-67. Plaintiff timely filed a written request for a hearing, see id. at 69-71, which was held on February 9, 2012 in Utica, New York, before Administrative Law Judge Edward I. Pitts ("ALJ"). See id. at 25-57. Attorney Cindy Hendrickson represented Plaintiff at the hearing. See id. at 64.
On April 6, 2012, the ALJ issued a written decision in which he made the following findings "[a]fter careful consideration of the entire record. . . ."
See AR at 12-20 (citations omitted).
The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision on August 6, 2013, when the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff's request for review. See AR at 1-6. Plaintiff then commenced this action on October 10, 2013, and filed a supporting brief on April 23, 2014. See Dkt Nos. 1, 13. Defendant filed a response brief on May 30, 2014. See Dkt. No. 14.
In support of his motion, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's findings with respect to his residual functional capacity and the availability of jobs in the national economy. In particular Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions in the record and improperly assessed his credibility. Relatedly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to seek further information from his physicians. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the Medical-Vocational guidelines even though, he argues, he had significant nonexertional impairments. See generally Dkt. No. 13, Pl.'s Br.
Absent legal error, a court will uphold the Commissioner's final determination if there is substantial evidence to support it. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence to mean "`more than a mere scintilla'" of evidence and "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation omitted). To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must show that he suffers from a disability within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity ("SGA") by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to cause death or last for twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). To determine if a claimant has sustained a disability within the meaning of the Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process:
For this test, the burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps and on the Commissioner for the fifth step, if the analysis proceeds that far. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted).
Between steps three and four of the disability analysis, the ALJ must determine the claimant's residual functioning capacity ("RFC"), which is defined as "the most you can still do [in a work setting] despite your limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC analysis considers "all of your medically determinable impairments of which we are aware," even if they are not severe. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2). The ALJ is to consider "all of the relevant medical and other evidence" in assessing RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3).
In this case, Plaintiff advances three arguments with respect to the ALJ's RFC finding. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not addressing his ability to understand and carry out simple instructions, respond appropriately to supervisors and co-workers and usual work situations, and deal appropriately with changes in routine, see Dkt. No. 13, Pl.'s Br., at 17, presumably in reference to the Commissioner's description of unskilled work. See Social Security Ruling 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, *4 (Jan. 1, 1985). In this respect, the regulations provide that "[a] limited ability to carry out certain mental activities, such as limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions, and in responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and work pressures in a work setting, may reduce your ability to do past work and other work." 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(c). However, it appears that Plaintiff has neither alleged nor produced objective medical evidence of any medically determinable medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce symptoms resulting in any such mental limitations, let alone evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as supporting a conclusion that Plaintiff's mental functioning was limited.
Second, Plaintiff argues that "[t]here was no analysis or recognition of Plaintiff's pain," see Dkt. No. 13 at 17 n.5, and that the ALJ improperly weighed his credibility. When a claimant makes subjective allegations of symptoms limiting his ability to function, the regulations provide that
20 C.F.R. § 416.929(b); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b). Accordingly, the Social Security Administration has adopted a two-step standard for assessing a claimant's credibility. See Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, *2 (July 2, 1996); Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App'x 179, 183 (2d Cir. 2010).
Meadors, 370 F. App'x at 183 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, an ALJ
SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7.
In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms. See AR at 16. He then concluded that Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible. See id. In so finding, the ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff's failure to seek medical treatment for his back between 2004 to 2010 suggested that his back problem was "not as severe as he alleges." See id. The ALJ further noted Plaintiff's lapse in treatment for his shoulder injury. See id. at 17. However, Plaintiff offered an explanation for this lapse in treatment at the hearing (questions by the ALJ):
See AR at 32.
To the extent that the ALJ did not expressly consider Plaintiff's explanation for his lapse in treatment before drawing a negative inference against him based upon such lapse, the Court finds this to be legal error. See SSR96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7. However, in light of the remainder of the ALJ's credibility analysis, including a thorough discussion of the objective medical evidence once Plaintiff did seek treatment, Plaintiff's activities of daily living, his presentation at the hearing, and his work history, the Court finds that any such error was harmless. See Karpova v. Snow, 497 F.3d 262, 269 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that remand is required "`only where there is a significant chance that but for the error, the agency might have reached a different result'" (quotation omitted)); see also Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (instructing that "`ALJ's failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that such evidence was not considered'" (quotation omitted)).
Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed his physicians' opinions. The Commissioner's regulations instruct that
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, treating physician opinions are "`not afforded controlling weight where . . . the treating physician issued opinions that are not consistent with other substantial evidence in the record. . . .'" Petrie v. Astrue, 412 F. App'x 401, 405 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam)). "The report of a consultative physician may constitute such substantial evidence." Id. (quoting Mongeur, 722 F.2d at 1039). Additionally, an ALJ may properly afford less than controlling weight to a treating physician's medical source statement where the "medical source statement conflict[s] with his own treatment notes[.]" Cichocki v. Astrue, 534 F. App'x 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2013).
When affording a treating physician's opinion less than controlling weight, the ALJ "`will always give good reasons'" for doing so. Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2). To that end,
Brickhouse v. Astrue, 331 F. App'x 875, 877 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 143 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1)-(6).
In this case, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by affording less than controlling weight to Dr. Bharti, his treating physician. The ALJ found that Dr. Bharti's opinion "is not entitled to controlling weight because it is not supported by his contemporaneous treatment notes or the objective medical evidence of record." See AR at 18. In particular, the ALJ noted Plaintiff's MRI results showing "only mild ankylosing spondylosis, mild disc herniation, mild or borderline stenosis at the L3-L4 and L4-L5 levels." See id. (citing AR at 224). He further noted that Dr. Bharti's treatment notes from November of 2011 showing that Plaintiff was able to touch his toes and twist his torso with little inhibition in addition to no strength, motor or sensory deficits. See id. (citing AR at 296-97). The ALJ also discussed the opinion of consultative examiner Dr. Shirley-Williams, who noted full range of motion in Plaintiff's lumbar spine and negative straight-leg raise tests bilaterally. See AR at 18 (citing AR at 215). For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and offered sufficient reasons to support his weighing of the medical opinions.
In summary, for the above-stated reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the appropriate legal standards in his RFC analysis and further that substantial evidence in the record supports his RFC findings. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401.
Ordinarily, the Commissioner meets her burden at step five of the disability analysis by applying the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 ("the grids"). See Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1999). However, "application of the grid guidelines and the necessity for expert testimony must be determined on a case-by-case basis." Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 1986). In particular, "if a claimant's nonexertional impairments `significantly limit the range of work permitted by his exertional limitations' then the grids obviously will not accurately determine disability status because they fail to take into account claimant's nonexertional impairments. . . ."
Accordingly, "[t]he grid regulations may not be relied upon as the exclusive determinant of disability status if a claimant also suffers from a significant non-exertional limitation." Correale-Englehart v. Astrue, 687 F.Supp.2d 396, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). A significant nonexertional limitation is one that results in "`additional loss of work capacity . . . that so narrows a claimant's possible range of work as to deprive him of a meaningful employment opportunity.'" Baldwin v. Astrue, No. 07 Civ. 6958(RJH)(MHD), 2009 WL 4931363, *27 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009) (quoting Bapp, 802 F.2d at 606).
In this case, Plaintiff essentially argues that his "left side non-exertional impairments are significant" and that, accordingly, the ALJ erred by relying solely on the grids at step five. See Dkt. No. 13, Pl.'s Br., at 16. The ALJ found the following nonexertional impairments: the ability to occasionally engage in all postural activities, the ability to reach in all directions without limitation with his right arm, the ability to frequently reach in all directions with his left arm, and the ability to frequently use his hands for twisting, turning, handling, grasping, fingering, feeling, and fine moto activity. See AR at 16. He further found that Plaintiff's nonexertional limitations "have little to no effect on the occupational base for sedentary work. See id. at 20. The Commissioner's guidance on this point provides that limitation to occasional postural activities, including stooping, generally will "only minimally erode the unskilled occupational base of sedentary work." See SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *8. For this reason, the ALJ correctly found that Plaintiff's non-exertional impairments were not "significant" and that, accordingly, the ALJ properly relied upon the Medical-Vocational Rules at step five of the disability analysis. Bapp, 802 F.2d at 605. Accordingly, the Court finds that the substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ's step-five finding. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401.
Having reviewed the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
