GARY L. SHARPE, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Patricia A. Dukett challenges defendant Commissioner of Social Security's denial of Supplemental Security Income (SSI), seeking review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
On August 28, 2012, Dukett filed an application for SSI under the Social Security Act ("the Act"). (Tr.
Dukett commenced the present action by filing a complaint on November 26, 2014, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's determination. (Compl.) After receiving the parties' briefs, Judge Stewart issued an R&R recommending the Commissioner's decision be affirmed. (See generally Dkt. No. 18.)
By statute and rule, district courts are authorized to refer social security appeals to magistrate judges for proposed findings and recommendations as to disposition. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), (B); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 40.1, 72.3(d); General Order No. 18. Before entering final judgment, this court reviews report and recommendation orders in cases it has referred to a magistrate judge. If a party properly objects to a specific element of the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations, this court reviews those findings and recommendations de novo. See Almonte v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No. Civ. 904CV484GLS, 2006 WL 149049, at *3, *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2006). In cases where no party has filed an objection, only vague or general objections are made, or a party resubmits the same papers and arguments already considered by the magistrate judge, this court reviews the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge for clear error. See id. at *4-5.
Dukett purports to object to the R&R on six grounds, only one of which warrants de novo review. That specific objection pertained to Judge Stewart's consideration of the weight assigned by the ALJ to certain medical evidence, and, in particular, his alleged reliance on grounds different from that considered by the ALJ. (Dkt. No. 19 at 2-3.) Because the substance of Dukett's other objections were either previously raised, considered, and rejected, (compare Dkt. No. 9 at 16-27, with Dkt. No. 18 at 6-15), or are raised for the first time now, (Dkt. No. 19 at 6), they are entitled to review for only clear error in the case of the former, or no review at all in the case of the latter. See Almonte, 2006 WL 149049 at *4; Tatta v. Wright, 616 F.Supp.2d 308, 313 (N.D.N.Y. 2007).
Turning to Dukett's only specific objection, she relies on a flawed factual premise. (Dk. No. 19 at 1-3.) According to Dukett, the ALJ never identified inconsistencies in his decision that were relevant to the weight given to Dukett's treating psychiatrist's opinion and, instead, Judge Stewart made new factual findings of such inconsistencies. (
Generally, great deference is given to the opinion of a treating physician provided that it is well-supported by medical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Opinions of treating physicians are not controlling where the opinion is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, including opinions of other medical experts. Vieno v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578,588 (2d Cir 2002). When an ALJ discounts the opinion of a treating physician he or she must provide "good reasons" by way of an explanation as to why the opinion was discounted. Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1998). The ALJ is to consider the following factors when discounting the treating physician's opinion: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and frequency of examinations, (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) the amount, nature, and credibility of the medical evidence accompanied with the opinion, (4) consistency of the opinion, (5) the specialization of the physician, and (6) any other factors relevant to the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c)(2) — (c)(6).
Here, the treating psychiatrist's opinion was widely contradicted by evidence in the record, including other medical experts' opinions and Dukett's own testimony and statements. Specifically, Dukett's treating psychiatrist reported that Dukett is moderately limited in her ability to understand and remember detailed instructions, but Dukett indicated in a "Function Report" completed as part of her examination for disability determination that she is able to follow both written and spoken instructions. (Tr. at 163, 515.) Further contradictions are indicated by the treating psychiatrist's report noting Dukett is moderately impaired in her ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors, while Dukett identified that, while she has not dealt with supervisors in "some time now," she has no difficultly getting along with them. (
Having addressed Dukett's specific objection de novo, and otherwise finding no clear error in the R&R, the court accepts and adopts Judge Stewart's R&R in its entirety.