DECISION and ORDER

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief District Judge.

Currently before the Court, in this action by Mary Jones ("Plaintiff") against the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or "the Commissioner") for Social Security benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3) and 405(g), are (1) the Report-Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge William B. Carter, issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(d) of the Local Rules of Practice for this Court, recommending that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed and Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed; and (2) Plaintiff's Objection to the Report-Recommendation. (Dkt. Nos. 13, 14.) For the reasons set forth below, Magistrate Judge Carter's Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety; the Commissioner's decision is affirmed; and Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Procedural History

On September 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and disability benefits under the Social Security Act. (Administrative Transcript ["T."] at 147.)1 Plaintiff alleges a disability onset date of August 16, 2008, which left her unable to work. (Id.)2 Plaintiff's application was initially denied by the Social Security Administration and Plaintiff timely appealed the decision. (T. at 14.) On April 11, 2013, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") of the Social Security Administration. (T. at 33-59.)

On May 3, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding as follows: (1) Plaintiff did not have an impairment that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P. Appendix 1; (2) Plaintiff has the physical and mental residual functioning capacity ("RFC") to perform light duty work; and (3) Plaintiff is not entitled to disability benefits. (T. at 11-32.) Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's decision to the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council; and on February 24, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for further review, rendering the ALJ's decision final. (T. at 1-6.) On April 10, 2015, Plaintiff commenced this action in federal court. (Dkt. No. 1.)

Generally, in her brief in support of her Complaint, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence for the following five reasons: (1) the ALJ's mental RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the ALJ's physical RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the ALJ erred by giving "great weight" to, and basing the RFC determination on, the opinion of non-examining state agency medical examiner Dr. Howard Bronstein, M.D.; (4) the ALJ erred by giving "reduced weight" to the opinion of treating physician Dr. Thomas Martin, D.O.; and (5) the ALJ erred by giving "very little weight" to the opinion of Dr. Lawrence Weisner, D.O. (Dkt. No. 10, at Point 1.)

Generally, in her response to Plaintiff's brief, Defendant argues that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, because the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinion evidence in determining Plaintiff's RFC. (Dkt. No. 11.)

B. Summary of Magistrate Judge Carter's Report-Recommendation

Generally, in his Report-Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Carter recommends that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) the ALJ properly weighed the opinions of Plaintiff's treating physician Dr. Mafuzar Rahman, M.D., and state agency medical examiners Drs. Sara Long, Ph.D., and T. Harding, Ph.D., in determining Plaintiff's mental RFC; and (2) the ALJ properly weighed the medical evidence and resolved conflicts within the record to determine Plaintiff's physical RFC, properly lending "great weight" and "significant weight" to the opinions of state agency medical examiners Drs. Bronstein and Mathew George, M.D. (because those opinions were, inter alia, consistent with the entire medical record). (Dkt. No. 13, at Part IV.)

C. Summary of Plaintiff's Objections to the Report-Recommendation

Generally, in her Objections, Plaintiff asserts the following arguments: (1) Magistrate Judge Carter failed to find that the ALJ erred with respect to his physical RFC determination and specifically with respect to the weight given to the opinion of the Commissioner's consultative examiner, Dr. Bronstein, which was based on incorrect information (in that it was rendered without records of Plaintiff's knee injury, without an awareness of Plaintiff's surgery for lateral epicondylitis in 2010, without an explanation of the basis for his opinions, and in contradiction of the other opinions of record); and (2) Magistrate Judge Carter did not properly assess the ALJ's mental RFC determination, which was incorrect in that it improperly considered Plaintiff's "ability to go to a doctor's office for 5 minutes" in assessing her limitations in interacting with others. (Dkt. No. 14, at Points I and II.)

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard of Review of Magistrate Judge Carter's Report-Recommendation

When a specific objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's reportrecommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a de novo review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To be "specific," the objection must, with particularity, "identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection." N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c).3 When performing such a de novo review, "[t]he judge may . . . receive further evidence. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court will ordinarily refuse to consider evidentiary material that could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance.4 Similarly, a district court will ordinarily refuse to consider argument that could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance. See Zhao v. State Univ. of N.Y., 04-CV-0210, 2011 WL 3610717, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2011) ("[I]t is established law that a district judge will not consider new arguments raised in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that could have been raised before the magistrate but were not.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Hubbard v. Kelley, 752 F.Supp.2d 311, 312-13 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) ("In this circuit, it is established law that a district judge will not consider new arguments raised in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that could have been raised before the magistrate but were not.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

When only a general objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition; see also Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) [collecting cases], aff'd without opinion, 175 F.3d 1007 (2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, when an objection merely reiterates the same arguments made by the objecting party in its original papers submitted to the magistrate judge, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation challenged by those arguments to only a clear error review.5 Finally, when no objection is made to a portion of a report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition. When performing such a "clear error" review, "the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Id.6

After conducing the appropriate review, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

B. Standard Governing Judicial Review of Defendant's Decision

In Part III.A. of his Report-Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Carter correctly recited the legal standard governing judicial review of Defendant's decision. (Dkt. No. 13, at Part III.A.) As a result, this standard is incorporated by reference in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for the review of the parties.

III. ANALYSIS

After carefully reviewing all of the papers in this action, including Magistrate Judge Carter's Report-Recommendation, the Court concludes that Magistrate Judge Carter's thorough Report-Recommendation is correct in all respects. (Dkt. No. 13.) Magistrate Judge Carter employed the proper standards, accurately recited the facts, and reasonably applied the law to those facts. (Id.) As a result, the Court accepts and adopts the Report-Recommendation in its entirety for the reasons stated therein. To those reasons, the Court would add only two points.

First, Plaintiff's arguments for rejecting the Report-Recommendation (described above in Part I.C. of this Decision and Order) consist simply of a reiteration of arguments asserted in the brief she submitted to Magistrate Judge Carter. (Compare Dkt. No. 14, at Points I and II [Objection] with Dkt. No. 10, at Point 1 [Plaintiff's Brief].) For example, Plaintiff's first argument (regarding the ALJ's physical RFC determination) asserts errors in Dr. Bronstein's opinion (i.e., that it was rendered without records of Plaintiff's knee injury, without an awareness of Plaintiff's surgery for lateral epicondylitis in 2010, without an explanation of the basis for his opinions, and in contradiction of the other opinions of record) that were asserted in Plaintiff's underlying brief. (Compare Dkt. No. 14, at Point I [Objection] with Dkt. No. 10, at 21-24 [attaching pages "19" through "22" of Plaintiff's Brief].) Similarly, Plaintiff's second argument (regarding the ALJ's mental RFC determination) expressly attempts to incorporate by reference the arguments asserted on pages 9 and 10 of her underlying brief. (Dkt. No. 14, at Point II [Objection].) Although it characterizes her "doctor's office" argument as being "[i]n addition" to those arguments, that argument is actually one of those arguments. (Compare id. [challenging the ALJ's reliance on record evidence that Plaintiff "interacts appropriately with medical personnel during examinations"] with Dkt. No. 10, at 13 [attaching page "11" of Plaintiff's Brief, in which she challenges the ALJ's reliance on record evidence that Plaintiff "interacts appropriately with medical personnel during examinations"].) As a result, the "challenged" portions of the Report-Recommendation are entitled to only a clear-error review, which they easily survive. See, supra, Part II.A. of this Decision and Order.

Second, even if the Court were to subject the "challenged" portions of the Report-Recommendation to a de novo review (which it declines to do),7 it would find that those portions survive such a review: Magistrate Judge Carter committed no error with regard to either the ALJ's physical RFC determination or his mental RFC determination. The Court would add only that the ALJ's mental RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence other than merely a finding (based on a review of 76 pages of medical records) that Plaintiff "interacts appropriately with medical personnel during examinations." (Dkt. No. 8, Attach. 2, at 20.)

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Carter's Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 13) is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the Commissioner's determination is AFFIRMED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED.