ORDER

DAVID E. PEEBLES, Chief Magistrate Judge.

Currently pending before the court in this action, in which plaintiff seeks judicial review of an adverse administrative determination by the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) are cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings.1 Oral argument was heard in connection with those motions on December 19, 2016, during a telephone conference conducted on the record. At the close of argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the requisite deferential review standard, I found that the Acting Commissioner's determination resulted from the application of proper legal principles and is supported by substantial evidence, providing further detail regarding my reasoning and addressing the specific issues raised by the plaintiff in this appeal.

After due deliberation, and based upon the court's oral bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby

ORDERED, as follows:

1) Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

2) The Acting Commissioner's determination that the plaintiff was not disabled at the relevant times, and thus is not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act, is AFFIRMED.

3) The clerk is respectfully directed to enter judgment, based upon this determination, DISMISSING plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.

Transcript of a Decision held on December 19, 2016, at the James Hanley Federal Building, 100 South Clinton Street, Syracuse, New York, the HONORABLE DAVID E. PEEBLES, United States Magistrate Judge, Presiding.

(In Chambers, Counsel present by telephone.)

THE COURT: All right, thank you both for excellent presentations. I have before me a request for judicial review of an adverse determination by the Commissioner pursuant to 42 United States Code Sections 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).

The background is as follows: Plaintiff was born in March of 1956 and is currently 60 years old, was 58 years old at the time of the hearing in this matter, and 56 years old at the time of the alleged onset of his disability. The plaintiff is divorced, lives alone in Red Hook, New York. He has — there is equivocal testimony as to whether or not he has an associate's degree in agriculture engineering. He told Dr. Cohen no, at 361, he testified yes at page 34 of the administrative transcript. He last worked in September of 2012. He left that position due to a seizure. He was working on a farm operating and repairing heavy equipment and also picking up milk with a truck and testing milk. He has served in several other positions, they're listed at page 203 of the administrative transcript. They generally fall into similar categories of past relevant work.

Medically, plaintiff suffered a traumatic brain injury in 2007 when he fell while under the influence of alcohol in a creek and hit his head on some rocks. That's at page 427. He received disability for a closed period from May 2007 to April 30th, 2009. That's at page 59 through 65 of the administrative transcript. He resumed working in May of 2009, and worked until 2012 as I indicated. He suffered a second fall in July of 2012 and suffered a suspected concussion. The CT scan of his head showed no acute intracranial injury although it did show evidence of a prior injury. CT scan of the cervical spine showed no fracture, although evidence of a lytic lesion. CT scan of the chest showed no thoracic injury. Plaintiff was in the hospital at that time for four days and he was discharged to alcohol rehabilitation. According to the notes, he's not undergone any seizures since that time. He's been on Keppra, K-e-p-p-r-a, to control his seizures.

Plaintiff suffers from a history of alcohol abuse. He lost his driver's license due to a driving while intoxicated conviction. Testimony and evidence is equivocal as to whether he still consumes alcohol. He testified at page 43 that he consumed one beer at a Superbowl party but he has not otherwise consumed alcohol since 2007. On April 13, however — in April of 2013 he told Dr. Cohen that he drinks beer four times per week, that's at page 362. Plaintiff has not undergone any medical health treatment, and as defendant's counsel noted, plaintiff testified at page 37 and also told Dr. Cohen at page 361 that the reason he is currently unemployed is lack of transportation.

Historically, as I indicated, plaintiff had a prior period of — closed period of disability benefits. Insofar as this matter is concerned, plaintiff applied on January 31, 2013, for Title II and Title XVI benefits, alleging an onset date of July 20, 2012. A hearing was conducted on April 15, 2014, by Administrative Law Judge Vincent Cascio. ALJ Cascio issued a decision on June 26, 2014, in which he found that the defendant — the plaintiff, I'm sorry, was not disabled at the relevant times. That became a final determination of the agency on December 9, 2015, when the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied plaintiff's application for review.

In his decision, ALJ Cascio applied the five-step sequential well-known test for determining disability; at step one, concluded plaintiff is not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date.

At step two, he found that the plaintiff suffers from severe impairments, including traumatic brain injury and a seizure disorder.

At step three, however, ALJ Cascio concluded that plaintiff did not meet or medically equal any of the listed presumptively disabling conditions set forth in the regulations.

At step four, applying an RFC finding as follows: The — plaintiff retains the functional capacity to perform a full range of work, except — at all exertional levels except claimant can have no exposure to unprotected heights or hazardous machines, cannot operate motor vehicles. Further, he can understand, remember, and carry out simple unskilled work and can frequently interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public.

Applying that RFC at step four, ALJ Cascio concluded that plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work as a farmworker, or as a farm equipment mechanic, both of which are skilled positions.

At step five, ALJ Cascio concluded that the job base on which the grids or Medical Vocational Guidelines are predicated were compromised by plaintiff's nonexertional limitations, and after receiving testimony from a vocational expert, concluded that the grids could be used as a framework for finding disability and concluded that the defendant — sorry, the plaintiff, was not disabled.

The vocational expert testified that the plaintiff would be able to perform several jobs that are available in the national, regional economy including as a packer, hand, as an assembler, small products, and a final assembler, and concluded that plaintiff was not disabled at the relevant times.

As you know, my task is limited, the scope of review is extremely deferential. I must determine whether correct legal principles were applied and the decision is supported by substantial evidence.

In my view, the residual functional capacity is supported. I agree with the Acting Commissioner's counsel that the fact that the administrative law judge has given great weight to opinions by the examining consultative psychologist Dr. Cohen and also the nonexamining expert Dr. Tatar does not mean that he accepts all of the opinions that they've rendered verbatim. He has looked at, obviously, and stated in his decision the totality of the available medical evidence. Dr. Cohen's medical source statement supports the RFC finding as does Dr. Tatar's, and as does — do the opinions of the Department of Health through the Belvedere Health Services at 419 to 420 and 438.

The one area of concern, of course, is Dr. Tatar's statement that plaintiff's condition has not been the subject of medical improvement, and I think that that alone is not sufficient to dictate a different result because it really doesn't provide context. I know that that's at page 374. It doesn't flesh out what type of medical improvement has occurred and what limitations remain.

Again, I think that the RFC finding is well supported by Dr. Cohen's opinions. I understand what counsel is arguing about the fact that the opinions might not be supported by the results of the examination but essentially I'm being asked to make a medical opinion to override the opinion of the expert, and I'm not prepared to do that.

So, I also conclude that the ALJ properly rejected plaintiff's statements concerning his limitations, and explained that rejection thoroughly at — in his opinion at pages 19 and 20.

So for these reasons, I will grant judgment on the pleadings to the defendant, and order dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

Thank you for excellent presentations, hope everyone has a happy holiday, and new year. Thank you.