MAE A. D'AGOSTINO, District Judge.
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
Currently pending before the Court is Donald John Insel's ("Claimant") counsel's motion for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). See Dkt. No. 27. The Commissioner has not opposed this motion. See Dkt. No. 31 at 2. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), a court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a successful claimant's attorney, provided that those fees do not exceed twenty-five percent of the amount of past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002); Wells v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1990). "[B]ecause a successful social security claimant evaluates and pays his own attorney, a court's primary focus should be on the reasonableness of the contingency agreement in the context of the particular case." Wells, 907 F.2d at 371. Section 406(b) does not displace any contingent-fee arrangement between the claimant and the attorney, but rather sets the ceiling for an award under any such agreement at twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 792-93. Where fee awards are made under both § 406(b) and the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), the claimant's attorney must refund the smaller amount to the claimant. See id. at 796.
Here, in accordance with the fee agreement, counsel seeks payment of twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits owed. See Dkt. No. 27-1 at ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 26-3 at ¶ 2. Claimant's past-due benefits amount to $64,656.00, twenty-five percent of which is $16,164.00. See Dkt. No. 27-1 at ¶ 5. Pursuant to a consent order, Claimant was previously awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $6,458.41 under the EAJA. See Dkt. No. 26 at 1. Counsel has indicated that he will refund the smaller of the awards to Claimant in the event that the Court awards fees pursuant to § 406(b). See Dkt. No. 27-1 at ¶ 7; see also Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 794-95.
Counsel has provided an itemized summary documenting 38.8 hours of attorney work, which amounts to a de facto hourly rate of $416.60. See Dkt. No. 22-1 at 6. The Court finds that $16,164.00 is reasonable, given the hours expended, the fact that counsel secured a favorable outcome for Claimant, and the Commissioner's lack of opposition to the request. There is no evidence of fraud or overreaching, and an hourly rate of $416.60 would not be a windfall to counsel. See, e.g., Devaux v. Astrue, 932 F.Supp.2d 349, 351 (E.D.N.Y. —) (holding that $386.00 per hour was reasonable); Patel v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-1437, 2012 WL 5904333, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012) (holding that an hourly rate of $650 was reasonable); Filipkowski v. Barnhart, No. 05-CV-01449, 2009 WL 2426008, *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2009) (rejecting the government's claim that an hourly rate of $743.30 amounted to a windfall). Thus, counsel's motion for attorney's fees pursuant to § 406(b) is granted.
Accordingly, after carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby