DECISION and ORDER

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief District Judge.

Currently before the Court, in this Social Security action filed by Kindra Marie Gagne ("Plaintiff") against the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or "Commissioner") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), are (1) the Report-Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge William B. Mitchell Carter recommending that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed and that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed, and (2) Plaintiff's Objection to the Report-Recommendation. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 12.) For the reasons set forth below, the Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Magistrate Judge Carter's Report-Recommendation

Generally, in his Report-Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Carter rendered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: (1) the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") did not err in his Step Three determination because, inter alia, (a) the ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff had moderate restrictions in activities of daily living based on the medical evidence, (b) the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in social functioning was supported by substantial evidence, and (c) setting aside the fact that the ALJ did not "dismiss" the opinions of Dr. Sung Hyon, M.D., and Dr. Thomas Osika, Ph.D., the fact remains that neither opinion pertained to whether or not Plaintiff's impairment may meet or equal a Listing but to Plaintiff's ultimate ability to work (which finding is reserved to the Commissioner); and (2) the ALJ did not err in his residual functioning capacity ("RFC") determination because, inter alia, (a) he gave appropriate weight to the opinions of Drs. Hyon and Osika based on the evidence and law, (b) he properly assessed Plaintiff's credibility under the governing legal standard, and (c) he properly considered the combined effects of Plaintiff's mental and physical impairments. (Dkt. No. 11, at Part IV.)

B. Plaintiff's Objections to the Report-Recommendation

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff's Objections to the Report-Recommendation assert the following three arguments: (1) that the medical evidence of record and testimony of Plaintiff support a finding that her mental impairments in combination meet or equal the Listings found that Sections 12.04 (for Affective Disorders) and 12.06 (for Anxiety Related Disorders); (2) that the evidence of record supports a finding that Plaintiff's RFC is so compromised by her mental and physical impairments that she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity at any exertional level; and (3) that the little weight provided by the ALJ to the opinions of Drs. Hyon and Osika constitutes legal error and undermines a finding that substantial evidence supports a denial. (Dkt. No. 12, at "Argument.")

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard of Review of Magistrate Judge Carter's Report-Recommendation

When a specific objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's reportrecommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a de novo review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To be "specific," the objection must, with particularity, "identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection." N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c).1 When performing such a de novo review, "[t]he judge may . . . receive further evidence. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court will ordinarily refuse to consider evidentiary material that could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance.2 Similarly, a district court will ordinarily refuse to consider argument that could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance. See Zhao v. State Univ. of N.Y., 04-CV-0210, 2011 WL 3610717, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2011) ("[I]t is established law that a district judge will not consider new arguments raised in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that could have been raised before the magistrate but were not.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Hubbard v. Kelley, 752 F.Supp.2d 311, 312-13 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) ("In this circuit, it is established law that a district judge will not consider new arguments raised in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that could have been raised before the magistrate but were not.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

When only a general objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition; see also Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) [collecting cases], aff'd without opinion, 175 F.3d 1007 (2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, when an objection merely reiterates the same arguments made by the objecting party in its original papers submitted to the magistrate judge, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation challenged by those arguments to only a clear error review.3 Finally, when no objection is made to a portion of a report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition. When performing such a "clear error" review, "the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Id.4

After conducing the appropriate review, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

B. Standard Governing Judicial Review of Defendant's Decision

In Part III.A. of his Report-Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Carter correctly recited the legal standard governing judicial review of Defendant's decision. (Dkt. No. 11, at Part III.A.) As a result, this standard is incorporated by reference in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for the review of the parties.

III. ANALYSIS

As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Objections (even when liberally construed) are merely reiterations of arguments previously asserted in her underlying brief. (Compare Dkt. No. 12, at "Argument" [Plf.'s Obj.] with Dkt. No. 9, at Parts I-III [Plf.'s Brief].)

More specifically, in her underlying brief, Plaintiff asserted the following three arguments: (1) that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to find Plaintiff's depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and attention deficit disorder meet or equal the Listings at Section 12.04 (for Affective Disorders) and Section 12.06 (for Anxiety Disorders); (2) that ALJ committed reversible error by finding Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work despite her chronic low back pain, progressive idiopathic neuropathy, headaches, and chronic fatigue in combination with her mental health impairments; and (3) that the ALJ's findings are not supported by substantial evidence because of (a) the ALJ's failure to properly weigh the opinions of Drs. Hyon and Osika, Plaintiff's complaints of chronic low back pain, progressive idiopathic neuropathy, headaches, and chronic fatigue, and (b) the ALJ's failure to properly consider the combined effects of Plaintiff's physical and mental impairments. (Dkt. No. 9, at Parts I-III.)

As a result, the "challenged" portions of the Report-Recommendation are entitled to only a clear-error review (see, supra, Part II.A. of this Decision and Order), which they easily survive for the reasons stated in the Report-Recommendation.

In the alternative, even if the "challenged" portions of the Report-Recommendation were entitled to a de novo review, the Court would find that those portions survive that review for the reasons stated in the Report-Recommendation and Defendant's underlying brief. (Dkt. Nos. 10, 11.) Magistrate Judge Carter employed the proper standards, accurately recited the facts, and reasonably applied the law to those facts. (Id.)

For all of these reasons, the Court accepts and adopts the Report-Recommendation in its entirety.

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Carter's Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 11) is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision denying Social Security benefits is AFFIRMED, and Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED.