BRENDA K. SANNES, District Judge.
Rochelle Brooks, acting pro se, filed this action on behalf of her daughter F.B. under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") Benefits for F.B.
On December 5, 2014, the Appeals Council sent Ms. Brooks a letter notifying her that it had denied her request for review of the Administrative Law Judge's decision denying F.B.'s claim for SSI benefits. (Dkt. No. 11-3, at 2). The letter explained: "If you disagree with our action, you may ask for court review of the Administrative Law Judge's decision by filing a civil action" in United States District Court. (Id. at 3). The letter informed Ms. Brooks that she had "60 days," starting "the day after you receive this letter," which is assumed to be "5 days after the date" on the letter (December 5, 2014), to file a civil action. (Id.). The letter also explained that "[i]f you cannot file for court review within 60 days, you may ask the Appeals Council to extend your time to file." (Id.). Although Ms. Brooks could not recall when she received the Appeals Council letter, she does not dispute receiving it.
On December 5, 2014, the day the Appeals Council issued the denial letter, the City of Syracuse found Ms. Brooks' residence in Syracuse, New York, did not have adequate heat. (Dkt. No. 70-1, at 2). Ms. Brooks spent half that day in a homeless shelter with her children and then returned to her residence. (Dkt. No. 70-2, at 3, 17). On December 8, 2014, Ms. Brooks received a notice from the City stating that her residence had been "declared unfit for human habitation" and directing her "to begin planning to vacate the premises immediately." (Dkt. No. 70-1, at 1).
Sometime between December 17 and 19, 2014, Ms. Brooks moved to another residence in Syracuse. (Id. at 18). Although the residence passed inspection on December 26, 2014, (id. at 14), on January 7, 2015, Ms. Brooks and her two daughters suffered carbon monoxide poisoning, (Dkt. No. 72-1, at 70).
Ms. Brooks testified that during the time period after her receipt of the Appeals Council letter, she contacted the Legal Aid Society and at least one other attorney to try to obtain help with Social Security filings for her daughter, but was unsuccessful. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 70-3, at 1 (January 8, 2015 letter from legal aid society declining to represent Ms. Brooks in connection with her "daughter's SSI case")).
On January 9, 2015, Plaintiff spoke with an employee at the Social Security office about her daughter's eligibility for SSI benefits. (Dkt. No. 70-4, at 1). The same day, the Social Security office scheduled a January 23, 2015 telephone appointment with Ms. Brooks. (Id. at 3). On January 23, 2015, Ms. Brooks applied for SSI benefits on F.B.'s behalf via telephone. (Dkt. No. 70-4, at 2). Ms. Brooks testified that it was "during that time my house was messing up and I was trying to call [Social Security], and if I lost the piece of papers because I was moving back and forth, I would call in to get the information, they would read it off to me" or send forms to her in the mail. (T. 29). Ms. Brooks stated that she would try to return the forms as promptly as she could.
On February 9, 2015, a complaint was opened with the City regarding a bed bug infestation at Ms. Brooks' residence. (Dkt. No. 72-1, at 70; Dkt. No. 70-1, at 16). On February 10, 2015, the City found the residence to be in violation of various state and city codes due to a bed bug infestation and ordered professional extermination. (Dkt. No. 70-1, at 15). Ms. Brooks testified that in addition to having housing problems, she was experiencing breathing issues, fainting, and having difficulty moving. (T. 10-11). Ms. Brooks testified that she had experienced these symptoms for some time, but that it was not until October or November 2015 that a brain tumor was discovered. (Dkt. No. 70-2, at 1). In November 2015, Ms. Brooks underwent surgery and the tumor was removed. (Dkt. No. 70-2).
Ms. Brooks testified that she filed the Complaint on February 10, 2015 because her neighbor was able to give her a ride that day; she stated that was unable to walk to the courthouse because she "was passing out." (T. 31). Ms. Brooks stated that at the time she filed the Complaint, she did not know it was late. (T. 31).
"The sixty-day time limit is not jurisdictional, but rather a statute of limitations." Kesoglides v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-cv-4724, 2015 WL 1439862, at *2, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39921, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015) (citing Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 478 (1986)). The limitations period, however, is "a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus must be strictly construed." Bowen, 476 U.S. at 479. "Statute of limitations defenses are affirmative defenses, which normally cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss." In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F.Supp.2d 228, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). "However, an exception is made where the complaint facially shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the affirmative defense clearly appears on the face of the pleading." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As a statute of limitations, the 60-day time period is subject to equitable tolling. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 480-82.
"[T]he doctrine of equitable tolling permits courts to deem filings timely where a litigant can show that `[s]he has been pursuing h[er] rights diligently' and that `some extraordinary circumstance stood in h[er] way.'" Torres v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). A plaintiff must demonstrate a "causal relationship between the extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of [the] filing." Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000). While generally equitable tolling is warranted only in "rare and exceptional circumstances," Molnar v. Legal Sea Foods, Inc., 473 F.Supp.2d 428, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), because "Congress intended [the Act] to be `unusually protective' of claimants," "[e]quitable tolling . . . is not infrequently appropriate" in Social Security cases. New York v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910, 917 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 480). "The burden of demonstrating the appropriateness of equitable tolling, however, lies with the plaintiff." Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2000).
The Court finds that Ms. Brooks pursued F.B.'s rights diligently. In the absence of evidence suggesting otherwise, the Court assumes Ms. Brooks received the Appeals Council decision on December 10, 2014, and that the 60-day period for filing an action expired on February 9, 2015. There is evidence that during this time period she was contacting local attorneys to request help in obtaining SSI benefits for F.B. (Dkt. No. 70-3, at 1). Ms. Brooks also contacted Social Security via telephone on January 9 and 23, 2015, regarding SSI benefits for F.B. (Dkt. No. 70-4, at 1-2). Employees in the Social Security office told Ms. Brooks she could "sue" the Commissioner concerning SSI benefits for F.B. and provided the form necessary to begin an action as well as assistance beginning a new application for SSI benefits on F.B.'s behalf. (T. 9).
The credible evidence also shows that extraordinary circumstances prevented Ms. Brooks from timely filing this action. She not only had a serious health issue—she was suffering from an undiagnosed brain tumor that caused her to faint and to have difficulty breathing and moving
At the hearing, the Commissioner argued that these circumstances do not justify the "truly extraordinary remedy" of equitable tolling and is not a case where a person had been "truly diligently pursuing their rights" but was thwarted from timely filing by "something extraordinary." (T. 39-40). The Court disagrees. There were ongoing extraordinarily difficult circumstances that interfered with Ms. Brooks' ability to file the Complaint. During the 60-day time period for filing, Ms. Brooks lived in a residence with inadequate heat that was ultimately "declared unfit for human habitation" and moved to a second residence where she and her two daughters suffered carbon monoxide poisoning and a bed bug infestation, all while she was having difficulty breathing, fainting, and having trouble with mobility due to an undiagnosed brain tumor. See Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Equitable tolling is generally considered appropriate . . . where a plaintiff's medical condition or mental impairment prevented her from proceeding in a timely fashion."). In the midst of this, Ms. Brooks attempted to procure legal assistance and was in contact with, and attempted to follow the instructions of, Social Security employees concerning her pursuit of benefits for F.B. Moreover, Ms. Brooks testified that she endeavored to act promptly in response to their instructions. Finally, unable to walk to the courthouse to file the Complaint because of her medical condition, she had to wait until a neighbor was available to drive her. (See T. 31 (explaining she could not "walk [to the courthouse] because [she] was passing out" and had to make an appointment with a neighbor for a ride)).
The Court is mindful that equitable tolling has been applied sparingly, even in Social Security cases. See, e.g., Kesoglides, 2015 WL 1439862, at *4, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39921, at *12 (finding the plaintiff's assertions regarding "an unspecified illness and the loss of an apartment," which left him confused and disoriented, to be insufficient to justify equitable tolling where there was no indication how "this condition . . . affected his ability to pursue his rights"); Twumwaa v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-5858, 2014 WL 1928381, at *4, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66419, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014) (finding the pro se plaintiff's allegations that she was "stressed" and "in pain" and relied on her attorney "to respond" to be insufficient to "invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling" where complaint was filed seven days after 60-day deadline). But under the specific circumstances present in this case, the Court finds equitable tolling by one day is appropriate. See Dillon v. Conway, 642 F.3d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining that, when considering equitable tolling, courts must "exercise judgment in light of prior precedent, but with awareness of the fact that specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case" (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650 (2010))). Accordingly, the Court deems the Complaint timely filed.
For these reasons, it is
