GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief District Judge.
Currently before the Court, in this pro se prisoner civil rights action filed by Darrell Nickelson ("Plaintiff") against the three above-captioned employees of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("Defendants") pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et seq. ("ADA") and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are (1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and (2) United States Magistrate Judge Thérèse Wiley Dancks' Report-Recommendation recommending that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted and that this action be dismissed with prejudice due to the fact that it has become impossible for Plaintiff to now exhaust his administrative remedies. (Dkt. Nos. 82, 89.) None of the parties have filed objections to the Report-Recommendation, and the deadline in which to do so has expired. (See generally Docket Sheet.) After carefully reviewing the relevant papers herein, including Magistrate Judge Dancks' thorough Report-Recommendation, the Court can find no clear-error in the Report-Recommendation.
To those reasons, the Court would add only two points. First, in addition to the cases cited by Magistrate Judge Dancks in support of her conclusion that the dismissal of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice, the Court relies on the fact that, under the circumstances, it is not possible for Plaintiff to obtain a waiver to file a late appeal to CORC. See 7 N.Y.C.R.R. § 701.6(g) (2007) ("An inmate may request an exception to the time limit for filing a grievance, or for filing an appeal to the superintendent or to CORC. Such a request shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the grievance clerk with the grievance or appeal the inmate wishes to file. . . . The IGP supervisor may grant an exception to the time limit for filing an appeal of an IGRC or superintendent's decision based on mitigating circumstances (e.g., failure to implement action required by the IGRC or superintendent's decision within 45 days, etc.). An exception to the time limit may not be granted if the request was made more than 45 days after the date of the decision unless the late appeal asserts a failure to implement the decision.").
Second, out of special solicitude to Plaintiff, he was granted a generous extension of the deadline by which to file an Objection to the Report-Recommendation (specifically, from December 10, 2018, to January 15, 2019). (Dkt. No. 89; Text Order filed Dec. 21, 2018.) Plaintiff did not meet that extended deadline. Instead, one day before the expiration of that extended deadline, he requested the appointment of counsel. (Dkt. No. 92.) Despite having been previously requested counsel six times (Dkt. Nos. 31, 38, 45, 61, 68, 85), and having been advised four times the requirements of such a request (Dkt. Nos. 34, 47, 62, 70; cf. Dkt. Nos. 40, 86), Plaintiff did not meet those requirements in his most-recent request. (Dkt. No. 92.) As a result, his seventh request for the appointment of counsel is denied as unsupported by a showing of cause for the reasons stated in Dkt. Nos. 34, 40, 47, 62, 70 and 86.