DECISION and ORDER

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief District Judge.

Currently before the Court, in this pro se civil rights action filed by Kennard D. Wellington ("Plaintiff") against 16 individuals ("Defendants"), are the following: (1) Defendant Thomas' motion for judgment on the pleadings; (2) United States Magistrate Judge Miroslav Lovric's Report-Recommendation recommending that certain of the claims in Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with leave to replead within thirty days, certain of the Complaint's claims be dismissed without leave to replead, and the Complaint's remaining claims be consolidated with another action that Plaintiff currently has pending before this Court; and (3) Plaintiff's Objections to the Report-Recommendation. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 12, 13.) For the reasons set forth below, the Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety, and Defendant Thomas' motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Defendant Thomas' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Generally, in his motion for judgment on the pleadings, Defendant Thomas argues that Plaintiff's claims against him should be dismissed because, based on Plaintiff's own factual allegations, Thomas is protected from liability as a matter of law by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity as a matter of law. (Dkt. No. 7.)

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant Thomas' motion argues that (1) Judge Thomas is not entitled to judicial immunity because (during the time in question) he was acting outside the scope of his job description, and (2) for the same reason, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Dellapenna (also a judge) should not be dismissed. (Dkt. No. 9.)

Generally, in his reply to Plaintiff's opposition, Defendant Thomas argues that (1) Plaintiff's claims against him should be dismissed because (during the time in question) he was performing a function typically performed by a judge, (2) Plaintiff's Complaint does not identify Dellapenna as a Defendant, and (3) in any event, Plaintiff's claims against Dellapenna should be dismissed because (during the time in question) he was also performing a function typically performed by a judge. (Dkt. No. 11.)

B. Magistrate Judge Lovric's Report-Recommendation

Generally, in his Report-Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Lovric rendered the following three findings of fact and/or conclusions of law: (1) that Plaintiff's First, Fourth, Ninth and Twelfth Claims, and his claims against Defendants Bailey, Dodge and Peers, should be sua sponte dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) with leave to replead within 30 days of the date of the Decision and Order adopting the Report-Recommendation; (2) that Plaintiff's Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Claims, and his claims against Defendant Thomas, should be sua sponte dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) without leave to replead; and (3) that Plaintiff's remaining claims (i.e., his Second, Third and Fifth Claims against Defendants Foland, Smith, Hepler, Shaver, Crandall, Peets, Gavin, Bilek, Williams and Douglas) should be consolidated with his other action pending in this Court (i.e., Wellington v. Foland, et al., 19-CV-0615). (Dkt. No. 12, at Parts V and VI.)

C. Plaintiff's Objections to the Report-Recommendation

Generally, liberally construed, Plaintiff's Objections assert the following three arguments: (1) Plaintiff's claims should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim because he has alleged facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants violated his fundamental rights to travel (and possess personal property on the highways) under the Constitution; (2) the Court should help Plaintiff obtain videotape evidence from both incidents giving rise to his action; and (3) the Court should grant Plaintiff both injunctive and declaratory relief. (Dkt. No. 13.)

Generally, in their opposition to Plaintiff's Objections, Defendants assert the following two arguments: (1) Plaintiff's first objection should be rejected because the fundamental right to travel does not prohibit states from regulating traffic in the public interest; and (2) the second and third of Plaintiff's objections should be rejected because they are premature and lack specificity. (Dkt. No. 16, at Points I-II.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a specific objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a de novo review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©)). To be "specific," the objection must, with particularity, "identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection." N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1©)).2 When performing such a de novo review, "[t]he judge may. . . receive further evidence. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court will ordinarily refuse to consider evidentiary material that could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance.3 Similarly, a district court will ordinarily refuse to consider argument that could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first instance. See Zhao v. State Univ. of N.Y., 04-CV-0210, 2011 WL 3610717, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2011) ("[I]t is established law that a district judge will not consider new arguments raised in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that could have been raised before the magistrate but were not.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Hubbard v. Kelley, 752 F.Supp.2d 311, 312-13 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) ("In this circuit, it is established law that a district judge will not consider new arguments raised in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that could have been raised before the magistrate but were not.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

When only a general objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition; see also Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) [collecting cases], aff'd without opinion, 175 F.3d 1007 (2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, when an objection merely reiterates the same arguments made by the objecting party in its original papers submitted to the magistrate judge, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation challenged by those arguments to only a clear error review.4 Finally, when no objection is made to a portion of a report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition. When performing such a "clear error" review, "the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Id.5

After conducting the appropriate review, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

III. ANALYSIS

After carefully reviewing the relevant papers herein, including Magistrate Judge Lovric's thorough Report-Recommendation, the Court can find no error in those parts of the Report-Recommendation to which Plaintiff has specifically objected and no clear error in the remaining parts of the Report-Recommendation: Magistrate Judge Lovric employed the proper standards, accurately recited the facts, and reasonably applied the law to those facts. As a result, the Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety, and Defendant Thomas' motion to dismiss is granted, for the reasons set forth therein. See, supra, Parts I.A. and I.B. of this Decision and Order. To those reasons, the Court would add only that it declines to consider (when evaluating Plaintiff's Objections to the Report-Recommendation) materials that were not presented to Magistrate Judge Lovric when he conducted his review of the Complaint (Dkt. Nos. 15, 17), as a waste of judicial resources and a violation of the Federal Magistrates Act. See, supra, Part II of this Decision and Order.

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that, in accordance with note 1 of this Decision and Order, the Clerk of the Court is directed to CORRECT the caption of the docket sheet in this action so as to (1) add Patrolman Peets, Brian R. Bailey, Michael W. Hepler and Thomas Dellapenna as Defendants, and (2) change the name of Defendant "Nicholas Crandoll" to Defendant "Nicholas Crandall"; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant Thomas' motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 7) is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Lovric's Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 12) is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's First, Fourth, Ninth, and Twelfth Claims, and his claims asserted against Defendants Bailey, Dodge, Peers and Ketchum, are sua sponte DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) with leave to replead within THIRTY (30) DAYS of the date of this Decision and Order; and it is further

ORDERED that, should Plaintiff choose to file an Amended Complaint within 30 days of the date of this Decision and Order, the Amended Complaint must be a complete pleading that does not incorporate by reference any portion of the original Complaint; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Claims, and his claims against Defendants Thomas and Dellapenna are sua sponte DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) without leave to replead; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Second, Third and Fifth Claims against Defendants Foland, Smith, Hepler, Shaver, Crandoll, Peets, Gavin, Bilek, Williams and Douglas, shall be CONSOLIDATED with Wellington v. Foland, et al, 19-CV-0615 (N.D.N.Y.), with this action being designated as the Lead Case, the latter action being designated as the Member Case, and all future filings being made in the Lead Case only.