GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief District Judge.
Currently before the Court, in this pro se civil rights action filed by George John Kuchma ("Plaintiff") against the City of Utica, Police Sergeant John Abel, and the Utica Police Department ("Defendants"), are (1) United States Magistrate Judge Thérèse Wiley Dancks' Report-Recommendation recommending that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, and (2) Plaintiff's Objection to the Report-Recommendation. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 12.) For the reasons set forth below, the Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety.
Generally, in her Report-Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Dancks renders the following six findings of fact and conclusions of law: (1) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 9) should be deemed to be the operative pleading in this action because he has failed to respond to the Court's prior directive that he notify it if he wishes to proceed on his proposed Amended Complaint or file a revised Amended Complaint; (2) Plaintiff's claims against the Utica Police Department should be dismissed because a police department is merely an administrative arm of the municipality in which it exists and lacks a legal identity separate and apart from that municipality; (3) Plaintiff's false arrest claim should be dismissed because his factual allegations plausibly suggest that Defendant Abel had "at least arguable probable cause" to arrest him for criminal trespass; (4) Plaintiff's excessive force claim should be dismissed because Defendant Abel is protected from liability as a matter of law (with regard to that claim) by the doctrine of qualified immunity (given that the law regarding excessive force and handcuffs was not clearly established at the time the incident occurred); (5) Plaintiff's municipal liability claim against the Utica Police Department should be dismissed because it is supported by only conclusory allegations that the Department has a custom or policy of using excessive force; and (6) Plaintiff should not be given leave to amend his defective claims because he has already been given such leave, and because the defects in his claims are substantive and not merely formal. (Dkt. No. 11, at Part II.)
Generally, in his Objection, Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Dancks erred in recommending the dismissal of his excessive force claim because she construed that claim as being based on the way Defendants' "tightening" of the handcuffs caused his lacerations, while in fact that claim is based on the way Defendants' thrusting of those handcuffs "several hard [times] . . ., in an upward and outward direction" (without "any legitimate law enforcement purpose") caused those lacerations. (Dkt. No. 12.)
When a specific objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a de novo review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©). To be "specific," the objection must, with particularity, "identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection." N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c).
When only a general objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition; see also Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) [collecting cases], aff'd without opinion, 175 F.3d 1007 (2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, when an objection merely reiterates the same arguments made by the objecting party in its original papers submitted to the magistrate judge, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation challenged by those arguments to only a clear error review.
After conducting the appropriate review, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c).
After carefully reviewing the relevant papers in this action, including Magistrate Judge Dancks' thorough Report-Recommendation, the Court can find no error in the sole portion of the Report-Recommendation to which Plaintiff has specifically objected (i.e., Magistrate Judge Dancks' recommendation regarding Plaintiff's excessive force claims) and no clear error in the remaining portions of the Report-Recommendation: Magistrate Judge Dancks employed the proper standards, accurately recited the facts, and reasonably applied the law to those facts. As a result, the Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety for the reasons set forth therein. To those reasons, the Court adds only four brief points.
First, the Court rejects Plaintiff's argument that, as pled, his excessive-force claim is based on Defendants' thrusting of handcuffs "several hard [times] . . ., in an upward and outward direction" (without "any legitimate law enforcement purpose"). (Dkt. No. 12, at 2.) In fact, as pled, his excessive-force claim is based on the following factual allegations:
(Dkt. No. 9, at ¶¶ 12, 13, 16, 17, 26 [Plf.'s Am. Compl.].) Conspicuously missing from these factual allegations are any factual allegations plausibly suggesting that the thrusting occurred multiple times, in an outward direction, and/or without any legitimate law enforcement purpose.
Second, the Court perceives no material distinction (at least for the purpose of the application of the doctrine of qualified immunity) between a claim that is based on the way a defendant's alleged "tightening" of handcuffs caused a plaintiff's wrist lacerations and the way a defendant's alleged forceful thrusting of tight handcuffs in an upward fashion caused a plaintiff's wrist lacerations. This is particularly the case here, where also conspicuously missing from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are any factual allegations plausibly suggesting that, before or during the moment Defendant Abel was allegedly pulling up on Plaintiff's tight handcuffs, Plaintiff informed Defendant Abel that the handcuffs were too tight and/or were cutting into his wrists. (See generally Dkt. No. 9.)
Third, to the extent that Plaintiff's verification at the end of his Objection constitutes an attempt to introduce new evidence during the objection phase of the report-recommendation procedure (i.e., through converting that Objection into a declaration), the Court rejects that attempt for each of two reasons: (1) evidence is immaterial during a failure-to-state-a-claim analysis; and (2) even if such evidence were material, its introduction during the objection phase of the report-recommendation procedure would frustrate the purpose of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1968. See, supra, note 2 (and accompanying text) of this Decision and Order.
Fourth, and finally, to the extent that Plaintiff's "several" and "outward" allegations in his Objection are intended to amend the allegations of his Amended Complaint, the Court rejects that attempt also for each of two reasons: (1) he has already been provided, and availed himself of, a reasonable opportunity to amend his operative pleading in this action; and (2) in any event, the new factual allegations are not consistent with the factual allegations of his Amended Complaint.
