MEMORANDUM OPINION
LEWIS A. KAPLAN, J.
Plaintiff Andrew Orkin sues to recover possession of a Vincent van Gogh drawing that his great-grandmother allegedly sold "under duress during the Nazi era in Germany for a fraction of its fair value."1 The Court assumes familiarity with the evidence, pleadings, and its prior opinion.2 Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.3
Facts
I. The Drawing
The pertinent allegations are as follows.
Plaintiff's great-grandmother, Margarethe Mauthner, was a German of Jewish descent born in 1863.4 In 1906, she purchased Les Saintes-Maries de la Mar, a Van Gogh pen-and-ink drawing.5 In 1933, she sold the drawing to Swiss art collector Oskar Reinhart for 8,000 Reichsmarks to help fund her family's escape from the Nazis' persecution of German Jews.6 Mauthner's family fled to South Africa as early as 1933. She followed in 1939.7
In or around 1945, Reinhart created the Foundation as a non-profit organization and donated part of his art collection to it, but not the Van Gogh drawing.8 The Foundation has displayed those works since 1951.9 Upon Reinhart's death in 1965, the rest of his collection—including the Van Gogh drawing—passed to the Swiss Confederation as part of a bequest by Reinhart.10 The Swiss Confederation has owned the drawing ever since and, for many years, displayed it at a museum owned by it and referred to here as the Collection.11
II. This Action
In December 2009, plaintiff brought this action to recover the drawing from whichever of the defendant Swiss entities acquired it from Reinhart.
The amended complaint premises subject matter jurisdiction on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"). It alleges that the Swiss Confederation is a foreign state and that the Collection and Foundation are among its agencies and instrumentalities.12 It asserts also—and, as will be seen, inconsistently—that the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") is an alternate source of subject matter jurisdiction.
The amended complaint evidences much confusion as to how the three alleged defendants are related and which one owns or controls the drawing.13 Plaintiff's theory of recovery as to each, however, is the same: Reinhart allegedly took advantage of Mauthner's plight and desperation as a Jew in Nazi Germany to purchase the drawing at an artificially low price14 and, years later, donated or bequeathed the drawing to one of the defendants. As Reinhart's purchase was invalid, the theory goes, so too was receipt and retention of the drawing.
III. The Foundation
The Foundation never possessed the drawing.15 It therefore would not be a proper defendant to this action, quite apart from questions of jurisdiction.16 Nevertheless, in a declaration purportedly submitted pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56(d), formerly Rule 56(f), plaintiff asserts that discovery is necessary "to ascertain the accuracy of" defendants' evidence on this issue and "to enable [him] to uncover the extent of the Foundation's involvement" in the pertinent events.17 He has shown no basis for such discovery on this record.18
In any case, there is no need to resolve this issue because, in the last analysis, the Court would not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the Foundation even if the Foundation were in possession of the drawing.
Discussion
An action or claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the Court "lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate" it.19 Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.20 Although he may satisfy that burden, prior to discovery, with legally sufficient allegations,21 the Court is not bound by conclusory assertions of fact or law.22
I. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The Court assumes arguendo, as plaintiff alleges, that the Swiss Confederation is a foreign state and that the Collection and Foundation are among its agencies and instrumentalities as those terms are used in the FSIA.23 On those assumptions, the FSIA, which "codifies several exceptions to the long-established doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity,"24 is the only possible source of subject matter jurisdiction over these claims.
Plaintiff contends that the claims come within the "takings" exception to foreign sovereign immunity articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).25 "To establish subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the `takings' exception of the FSIA, a plaintiff must demonstrate each of four elements:
"(1) that rights in property are at issue;
"(2) that the property was `taken';
"(3) that the taking was in violation of international law; and either
"(4)(a) `that property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state,' or
"(4)(b) `that property . . . is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States[.]'"26
As used in Section 1605(a)(3), "the term `taken' . . . refers to acts of a sovereign, not a private enterprise, that deprive a plaintiff of property without adequate compensation."27 In consequence, "takings" jurisdiction exists only where the property at issue passed in the first instance from the plaintiff—or, as here, the plaintiff's predecessor—to a sovereign or to some person or entity acting on a sovereign's behalf. Here, however, the drawing passed from Mauthner to Reinhart. Plaintiff does not allege that Reinhart acted in any capacity other than as a private individual.
Plaintiff ignores the significance of this fact. He argues only that it is "irrelevant that the defendants here were not the ones who acquired the [d]rawing in violation of law."28 But the few decisions supporting that proposition, which in any event are not binding on this Court, involved suits against sovereigns for property initially taken or expropriated by other sovereigns.29 As this case involves an acquisition by a private individual, there is no subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA's "takings" clause.
II. The Alien Tort Statute
As stated, the FSIA is the only source of subject matter jurisdiction over claims against foreign sovereigns and their agencies and instrumentalities. Given plaintiff's unequivocal assertions that each defendant is a foreign sovereign or an agency or instrumentality thereof,30 that is dispositive. Nonetheless, plaintiff attempts to preserve his claims against the Foundation by asserting, contrary to his own allegations, that the Foundation is a private entity.31 But the ATS would have no bearing here even if it were.32
The ATS applies only to "(1) tort actions, (2) brought by aliens (only), (3) for violations of the law of nations (also called `customary international law')."33 As stated in Orkin I, "plaintiff has alleged no cognizable tort against the Foundation."34 Plaintiff incorrectly argues to the contrary.35 Even if he were right, however, this Court still would lack jurisdiction.
For purposes of the ATS, the violated international law must be a "`specific, universal, and obligatory' norm" that has "attained a discernible, . . . universal, acceptance among nations of the world."36 One cannot cogently cast the Foundation as "`hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind'" guilty of one of the "`handful of heinous actions'" that meets this standard.37 Like the other defendants, it is alleged to have done nothing more than accept a bequest or donation of artwork from a collector who purchased it, however opportunistically, many years prior.38 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that passive receipt of an item acquired in the circumstances of the Mauthner-Reinhart transaction could amount to a violation of any international (or, for that matter, American) law, let alone the subset of laws implicating the ATS.
Conclusion
Defendants' motions [DI 14, 16] are granted and the amended complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the case.
SO ORDERED.