Filed: Jun. 01, 2012
Latest Update: Jun. 01, 2012
Summary: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, District Judge. Pro se Plaintiff Makau Nzomo ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C 1983 against Defendant New York City ("Defendant") alleging violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Defendant has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for an order dismissing the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The
Summary: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, District Judge. Pro se Plaintiff Makau Nzomo ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C 1983 against Defendant New York City ("Defendant") alleging violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Defendant has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for an order dismissing the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The ..
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, District Judge.
Pro se Plaintiff Makau Nzomo ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 against Defendant New York City ("Defendant") alleging violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Defendant has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for an order dismissing the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court has thoroughly reviewed the parties' submissions and, for the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that on November 3, 2007, several New York City Police ("NYPD") Officers ("officers") — identified in the body of the Complaint by name and title — entered and searched his residence without a warrant. (Compl. ¶ III.C.) While inside his residence, the Officers "conducted a thorough search of the premises including kicking down locked doors." (Id.) Plaintiff was subsequently arrested, but the charges, which are unspecified in the Complaint, were dismissed in state court. (Id.) The Complaint alleges that the warrantless search and arrest was the culmination of months of harassment by these Officers, and that Plaintiff had reported the incidents of harassment to the Fifth Precinct, the New York City Police Department Internal Affairs Department, the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation "to no avail." (Id.)
Defendant now moves to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to allege adequately that his injuries were traceable to a municipal "policy or custom."
DISCUSSION
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as true the non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 501 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 1949. In the case of a pro se litigant, the Court reads pleadings leniently and construes them to raise "the strongest arguments that they suggest." McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999). However, the pleadings must still contain factual allegations that raise a "right to relief above the speculative level." Dawkins v. Gonvea, 646 F.Supp.2d 594, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a municipality cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, to "hold a city liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right." Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983)). A Plaintiff may satisfy the "policy or custom" prong by showing that the municipality was "deliberately indifferent" to the need for better training or supervision. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (deliberate indifference requires a showing that the "need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the [municipality] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need"). "Deliberate indifference may be inferred if ... [repeated complaints of civil rights violations] are followed by no meaningful attempt on the part of the municipality to investigate or to forestall further incidents." Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff alleges only that he complained of repeated police harassment to municipal officials "to no avail." The Complaint does not proffer any factual details about the circumstances surrounding those complaints — e.g., the nature of the prior incidents, the substance of his complaints, when the complaints were made, and what, if any, response Plaintiff received. The Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to support the inference that Plaintiff notified municipal authorities of actual civil rights abuses or that municipal officials made "no meaningful attempt" to investigate or otherwise appropriately respond. As such, the Complaint fails to state a claim of municipal liability.
Accordingly, the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint alleging facts concerning the nature of the prior episodes of harassment, the substance of his complaints to municipal authorities, when those complaints were made, and what, if any, response he received.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint must be served on Defendant and filed with the Court no later than June 30, 2012. The Amended Complaint will completely replace the original complaint, so all relevant information and continuing claims must be included in the Amended Complaint. Failure to timely file such an amended pleading may result in dismissal with prejudice and without further advance notice. This Order resolves docket entry no. 22.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.