OPINION AND ORDER
ANDREW J. PECK, United States Magistrate Judge:
Pro se plaintiff Nicholas Florio brings this § 1983 action alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights by defendants Deputy Warden Canty and Correction Officer Leach arising out of alleged conditions of his confinement at the Anna M. Kross Center ("AMKC") on Rikers Island. (Dkt. No. 2: Compl.) Presently before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 14: Notice of Motion.) The parties have consented to decision of this action by a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. No. 18.) For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is GRANTED and the case is dismissed.
FACTS
In April 2012, Florio was an inmate at AMKC where he occupied a cell on the lower level of Quad 9 ("9-lower"). (Dkt. No. 2: Compl. ¶¶ II.A-II.C.) On April 13, 2012 at 3:00 p.m. the toilet in Florio's cell and approximately twenty other toilets on 9-lower began "overflowing with human waste." (Compl. at p. 4;1 Compl. Ex. A: 4/21/12 Grievance; Compl. Ex. B: Ortega Aff. ¶ 1.) Florio yelled to be let out of his cell but ten to twenty minutes passed before an officer released him. (Compl. at p. 4 & Ex. B: Ortega Aff. ¶ 1: "The defendant... let plaintiff and about 25 other inmates out 10 to 20 min[utes] later.") Florio "was order[ed] to walk in the human waste that was ankle high so [his] pants, socks, and shoes became soaking wet with human waste." (Compl. at p. 4 & Ex. A: 4/21/12 Greivance; Compl. Ex. B: Ortega Aff. ¶ 1.) Florio was given "yellow gloves, dustpans, mopbuckets, and one vacuum cleaner" and was ordered "to clean the human waste up or live in th[e] unhealthy and unsafe conditions." (Compl. at p. 4 & Ex. B: Ortega Aff. ¶ 1.)
Florio twice requested to be moved to another housing unit but was told "there is a chain of command to move 31 inmates out [of] a whole housing unit" and "this is the weekend no one is moving out." (Compl. at p. 4 & Ex. B: Ortega Aff. ¶ 2.) Three days later, while Deputy Warden Canty was making rounds, Florio asked her if he could be moved "d[ue] to the inad[e]quate plum[]bing and [her] subordinates not doing something." (Compl. at p. 4.) Deputy Warden Canty "replied, with a smirk [that] if this happens again we will move 9-lower to 9-upper so you can flood them out with human waste." (Compl. at p. 4.)
On April 20, 2012, seven days after the first overflow incident, Florio's toilet and approximately twenty other toilets on 9-lower again overflowed with waste. (Compl. at pp. 2, 4 & Ex. A: 4/21/12 Grievance; Compl. Ex. B: Ortega Aff. ¶ 3; Compl. Ex. C: 4/26/12 Notice of Claim ¶ 3.) When Florio yelled to be let out, Officer Leach told him "to hold on." (Compl. at p. 4 & Ex. B: Ortega Aff. ¶ 3; Compl. Ex. C: 4/26/12 Notice of Claim ¶ 3.) "By the time [Officer Leach] let [Florio] out the tier was flooded again with human waste." (Compl. at p. 4 & Ex. B: Ortega Aff. ¶ 3; Compl. Ex. C: 4/26/12 Notice of Claim ¶ 3.)2 Florio again had to walk through the sewage to exit his cell, and then he and the other 9-lower inmates were moved to the gym. (Compl. at p. 4 & Ex. A: 4/21/12 Grievance; Compl. Ex. B: Ortega Aff. ¶ 3; Compl. Ex. C: 4/26/12 Notice of Claim ¶ 3.)3
Florio claims that as a result of these incidents he suffered a fungal infection on his feet and hypertrophy of his toenails. (Compl. ¶ III & Ex. C: 4/26/12 Notice of Claim ¶ 4; Compl. Exs. G & G2: 4/23/12 & 4/26/12 Health Servs. Reports.) Florio filed a grievance on April 21, 2012, complaining that his "feet [we]re itching and red" because he had been required "to step in feces and urine due to human waste water coming from back[ed] up toilets in Quad 9 Lower." (Compl. ¶ IV.E & Ex. A: 4/21/12 Grievance.) Two days later Florio saw a doctor who prescribed a topical cream for the foot fungus. (Compl. ¶ III & Exs. G & G2: 4/23/12 & 4/26/12 Health Servs. Reports.) Three days after that, the doctor referred Florio to a podiatrist for the hypertrophy. (Compl. ¶ III & Ex. G2: 4/26/12 Health Servs. Report.)
ANALYSIS
I. THE STANDARDS GOVERNING A MOTION TO DISMISS
A. The Twombly-Iqbal "Plausibility" Standard
In two decisions in 2007 and 2009, the Supreme Court significantly clarified the standard for a motion to dismiss, as follows:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As the Court held in Twombly, the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require "detailed factual allegations," but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement."
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of `entitlement to relief.'"
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not "show[n]" — "that the pleader is entitled to relief."
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted & emphasis added)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965-66, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)(retiring the Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), pleading standard that required denying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief')).4
Even after Twombly and Iqbal, the Court's role in deciding a motion to dismiss "is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Bison Capital Corp. v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp., 10 Civ. 0714, 2010 WL 2697121 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2010) (Peck, M.J.) (quotations omitted), report & rec. adopted, 2010 WL 3733927 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2010).5
The Court must construe a pro se complaint liberally and must use less stringent standards when reviewing a pro se complaint than if the complaint had been drafted by counsel. See, e.g., Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.2013); Cancel v. Home Depot, 488 Fed.Appx. at 521; Spataro v. Glenwood Supply, 479 Fed.Appx. at 404; Ercole v. LaHood, 472 Fed.Appx. 47, 48 (2d Cir.2012), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1479, 185 L.Ed.2d 380 (2013); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d at 72; LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.1991).6 However, "[d]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding an element necessary to obtain relief." 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 12.34[4][a] at 12-99 (2012). Thus, the "`duty to liberally construe a plaintiffs complaint [is not] the equivalent of a duty to re-write it.'" Id. § 12.34[l][b] at 12-79.7
B. Consideration Of Documents Attached To The Complaint
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenges only the face of the pleading. Thus, in deciding such a motion to dismiss, "the Court must limit its analysis to the four corners of the complaint." Vassilatos v. Ceram Tech Int'l, Ltd., 92 Civ. 4574, 1993 WL 177780 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1993) (citing Kopec v. Coughlin, 922 F.2d 152, 154-55 (2d Cir.1991)).8 The Court, however, may consider documents attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in the complaint by reference. E.g., ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir.2007); Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002) ("Because this standard has been misinterpreted on occasion, we reiterate here that a plaintiffs reliance on the terms and effect of a document in drafting the complaint is a necessary prerequisite to the court's consideration of the document on a dismissal motion; mere notice or possession is not enough."); Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir.2000) ("For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we have deemed a complaint to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference....").9
"However, before materials outside the record may become the basis for a dismissal, several conditions must be met. For example, even if a document is `integral' to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document. It must also be clear that there exists no material disputed issue of fact regarding the relevance of the document." Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d at 134 (citations omitted). In this case, the documents that Florio attached to his complaint may be considered on the motion to dismiss, subject to the Faulkner v. Beer proviso.
II. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS IS GRANTED
A. Legal Standards Governing § 1983 Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference To Prison Conditions Claims
To prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has been denied a constitutional or federal statutory right and that the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). "Section 1983 itself," however, "creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere." Sykes. v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1240, 114 S.Ct. 2749, 129 L.Ed.2d 867 (1994).
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from "cruel and unusual punishment" in the form of "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" at the hands of prison officials and conduct that offends "evolving standards of decency." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 998, 1000, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992).10
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on a claim that a prison official placed an inmate's health in danger because of prison conditions (such as exposure to waste or other unsanitary conditions), the inmate must show that the prison official acted with "deliberate indifference" to "a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering the next week or month or year." E.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 2480, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. at 291.11 "It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. at 32, 113 S.Ct. at 2480.
As the Second Circuit has explained, "the deliberate indifference standard embodies both an objective and a subjective prong." Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir.1996).12 The objective test as it applies to exposure to unsanitary or unsafe conditions has been expressed as follows:
Under the objective element of the test, the measure of a "sufficiently serious" deprivation is "contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency." ... "[F]or a claim ... based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." A prisoner need not show actual injury, as "the Eighth Amendment protects against sufficiently imminent dangers as well as current unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and suffering." ... [T]he Eighth Amendment inquiry in plaintiffs case focuses on the danger posed by the material itself — that is, whether the nature and levels of plaintiffs exposure to toxic or noxious substances was such as to pose "an unreasonable risk" of serious damage to the health of any inmate exposed to it. This requires a fact-finder to assess
the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that such injury to health will actually be caused by exposure to [the toxin] ... [and] whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.
Jackson v. Goord, 664 F.Supp.2d 307, 316 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d at 125 ("[P]rison officials violate the Constitution when they deprive an inmate of his `basic human needs' such as ... safe and sanitary living conditions.").
The subjective test as applied to unsanitary conditions is as follows:
Under the subjective test, a prison official must act with "`deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." This means that "a prison official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must ... be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that substantial risk of serious harm exists, ... draw the inference and fail to take reasonable measures to abate it." This element "entails something more than mere negligence ... but something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result." Plaintiff need not show actual knowledge of the risk of harm, but rather can
present [] evidence showing that a substantial risk ... was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it.
Jackson v. Goord, 664 F.Supp.2d at 316-17 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d at 125.
B. Application To Florio's Claims Against Warden Canty And Officer Leach
Florio claims that he: (1) was exposed to sewage for approximately twenty minutes on April 13, 2012 and had to walk through it to exit his cell; (2) was required to clean the sewage without adequate equipment or training; (3) was exposed to sewage for approximately thirty minutes on April 20, 2012 and again had to walk through it to exit; and (4) contracted a fungal infection on his feet as a result of walking through human waste. (See pages 1-3 & n. 2 above.)
1. The Eighth Amendment's Objective Requirement
"A Section 1983 claim will not lie for prison conditions that are merely unpleasant. However, chronic exposure to human waste will give rise to a colorable claim." Ortiz v. Dep't of Corr., 08 Civ. 2195, 2011 WL 2638137 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2011), report & rec. adopted, 2011 WL 2638140 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2011).13 "On the other hand, where exposure to such waste is intermittent or limited to a matter of hours, courts normally will not entertain such actions. `The Eighth Amendment is generally not violated ... where unsanitary conditions are temporary.'... Judges in this district have repeatedly declined to find that sporadic or brief exposures to waste represented cruel and unusual punishment." Ortiz v. Dep't of Corr., 2011 WL 2638137 at *7, *9.14
Florio was exposed to waste only for brief periods; it appears that his total exposure was less than a few hours. (See pages 1-2 & n. 2 above.) While no doubt unpleasant, these incidents are insufficiently continuous or chronic to withstand defendants' motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Myers v. City of N.Y., 2012 WL 3776707 at *6-7 ("The only place to sit in the cell was on `a urine and filth laden floor'.... [Plaintiff] alleges that his confinement in the holding cell lasted approximately 16 hours, and he makes no claim that the unsanitary conditions continue in the cell in which he is now placed. Discomfort of this short duration does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation."); Wyland v. Brownfield, Civ. No. 08-1601, 2011 WL 5445305 at *1, *5 (W.D.Pa. Nov. 9, 2011) ("Defendant ... required [plaintiff] to clean ... backed up sewage, without protective gloves, a mask and/or proper cleaning equipment. Plaintiff avers that this caused `severe skin irritation and pain.' ... With regard to the objective prong, simply stated, ... having to clean a moldy shower with backed up sewage without gloves or a mask on [one] single occasion simply do[es] not give rise to a substantial risk of serious harm or challenge common standards of decency."); Ortiz v. Dep't of Corr., 2011 WL 2638137 at *8 ("[P]laintiff alleges: (1) that he was exposed to a sewage overflow for an unspecified number of hours on December 3, 2007; (2) that he awoke to a second overflow on December 8, 2007, and was moved later that day, and (3) that a third overflow occurred on the night of December 13, 2007 which resulted in plaintiff being moved elsewhere. In each of these incidents, plaintiff was only exposed to waste for a relatively small number of hours; it appears that his total exposure was probably less than 24 hours. Although unpleasant, these incidents are simply too limited to withstand a motion to dismiss.").15 Moreover, the injury Florio alleges is simply too minor to state an Eighth Amendment claim.16
Accordingly, Florio's allegations do not rise to the level of a serious risk of substantial harm and are insufficient to satisfy the objective prong of an adequately pled Eighth Amendment violation.
2. The Eighth Amendment's Subjective Requirement
Even if Florio could satisfy the objective prong, which he cannot, his claim would nevertheless fail because he does not sufficiently allege that defendants were deliberately indifferent. Florio fails to allege that Deputy Warden Canty or Officer Leach knew of a substantial risk to Florio's health and safety, or were aware of facts from which they could have inferred that there was a substantial risk of serious harm, and that they failed to take reasonable actions to abate the risk.
Florio claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his health and safety by waiting approximately ten to thirty minutes after being alerted of the overflow to release him from his cell. (See pages 1-2 & n. 2 above.) Florio also claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent by having him clean the cell with inadequate cleaning gear and without training. (Dkt. No. 2: Compl. at p. 5.)17 Florio's allegations are insufficient to establish deliberate indifference as his own description of the events shows that prison officials acted reasonably to alleviate the unsanitary conditions. See Ortiz v. Dep't of Corr., 2011 WL 2638137 at *9 ("There is a clear difference between cases where defendants allegedly knew about unsanitary conditions but did nothing and cases where officials actually acted to resolve or alleviate the problem, as they are alleged to have done here. The complaint's specific factual allegations demonstrate that defendants repeatedly took steps to alleviate plaintiffs exposure to the overflowing toilet." (citation omitted)).
Specifically, as to the duration of time he spent in his cell with sewage overflow, Florio alleges that in both incidents he was released ten to thirty minutes after the overflow began and officers were alerted. (See pages 1-2 & n. 2 above.) This brief period is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference, as courts have found that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent when they took hours to release prisoners from cells with overflowing toilets, or provided plungers and cleaning supplies but never released the prisoners at all. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Dep't of Corr., 2011 WL 2638137 at *9 ("The complaint's specific factual allegations demonstrate that defendants repeatedly took steps to alleviate plaintiffs exposure to the overflowing toilet.... [W]ithin hours of the first incident, plaintiff was moved.... In the second incident plaintiff describes, the entire unit was moved to the gym.").18 Further, given that Florio claims there were overflowing toilets in approximately twenty other cells on 9-lower (see pages 1-2 above), Florio fails to allege any facts to show that the ten to thirty minute delay was intended to prolong his exposure to the sewage, as opposed to avoiding the security risks that undoubtedly would be caused by simultaneously releasing over twenty prisoners immediately upon learning their toilets were overflowing, without for example "securing the area." (Compl. at p. 4.)19
As to the inadequate cleanup supplies and lack of training after the first overflow, Florio states that he and the other 9-lower inmates were furnished with "gloves, dustpans, mopbuckets, and one vacuum cleaner" to clean their cells. (Compl. at p. 4.) Again, these factual allegations are insufficient to establish deliberate indifference; rather, they establish that prison officials did not require Florio to occupy a sewage-filled cell, but instead allowed him to clean the cell before reoccupying it and facilitated the cleanup by providing limited supplies. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Dep't of Corr., 2011 WL 2638137 at *1, *9 (finding plaintiff failed to "sufficiently allege that defendants were deliberately indifferent" where, on two occasions, plaintiff was permitted to clean his cell but "was not given appropriate equipment (an unspecified `mask' and gloves)" after "sewage overflow had flooded his cell" and "the sewage touched his feet"); Odom v. Keane, 1997 WL 576088 at *4 ("Defendants' same day response belies plaintiffs assertion that his complaints fell on deaf ears. Plaintiff acknowledges that he cleaned his cell himself on [the day of the incident], using soap and personal clothing.").20 Indeed, courts regularly reject Eighth Amendment claims based on allegedly inadequate cleaning supplies. See, e.g., Wyland v. Brownfield, Civ. No. 08-1601, 2011 WL 5445305 at *5 (W.D.Pa. Nov. 9, 2011); Ortiz v. Dep't of Corr., 2011 WL 2638137 at *9; Wesolowski v. Kamas, 590 F.Supp.2d at 435.
Finally, with regard to the foot fungus Florio alleges was caused by his exposure to the sewage, there is no allegation that Florio was prevented from bathing or washing his clothes and shoes after either incident, or that the fungal infection went untreated. To the contrary, Florio saw a doctor just three days after the April 20, 2012 incident. (Compl. Ex. G: 4/23/12 Health Servs. Report; see also page 3 above.) See, e.g., Wyland v. Brownfield, 2011 WL 5445305 at *1, *5 ("Plaintiff also alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when, on one occasion, Defendant... required him to clean ... backed up sewage, without protective gloves, a mask and/or proper cleaning equipment. Plaintiff avers that this caused `severe skin irritation and pain.'... Plaintiff does not allege that he was prevented from ... washing his hands after cleaning the shower, or that the allegedly painful rash was untreated.").21
Accordingly, Florio's complaint does not sufficiently plead deliberate indifference and thus fails to satisfy the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim.22
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 14) is GRANTED and the case is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
