LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, District Judge.
On October 19, 2009, Matthew Weitzman ("Defendant" or "Weitzman") pleaded guilty to an Information charging him with several counts of investment advisor fraud, securities fraud, and wire fraud. On June 30, 2010, this Court sentenced Weitzman to 97 months in prison. At the sentencing hearing, the Court also entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture and, on June 24, 2011, the Court entered a Final Order of Forfeiture, granting the Government title to the property listed in the forfeiture order pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(7). Now before the Court is the Government's motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(e) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), for the entry of a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Substitute Assets. The Court has reviewed carefully all of the parties' submissions and, for the following reasons, the Government's application is granted.
On or about June 30, 2010, the Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture pertaining to Weitzman's right, title, and interest in property ranging from proceeds of the sale of real property to jewelry purchased at J. Brown Jewelry. The Consent Order of Forfeiture included the entry of a money judgment against Weitzman in the amount of $7,082,032.
On February 15, 2013, the Government moved for a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Substitute Assets, contending
Where, as a result of the defendant's actions or omissions, initially forfeited property that is subject to money judgment is unavailable, the Court may issue an order forfeiting substitute assets up to the value of that property. 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)
Weitzman does, however, object to the forfeiture of all other substitute assets identified by the Government, contending that: (1) assets unrelated to any of his illegal activities cannot be forfeited, (2) assets in Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) cannot be forfeited, and (3) third parties may have interests in these assets. If the Court nevertheless finds that these additional assets may be forfeited as substitute assets, Weitzman requests that funds be reserved to cover any tax liabilities or early withdrawal penalties that may be incurred as a result of such forfeiture.
Whether an asset is linked to a defendant's illegal activity is not relevant to determining whether 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) permits its forfeiture as a substitute asset. See, e.g., United States v. Rosario, No. 94-1516, 1996 WL 868385, at *4 (2d Cir. Apr. 14, 1997) ("[W]e find that there is no requirement under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) that the government demonstrate that substitute assets are traceable to criminal activity.... The purpose of § 853(p) is to substitute non-tainted assets for tainted assets that are not able to be located for forfeiture."); United States v. Smith, 656 F.3d 821, 828 (8th Cir.2011) (there is no "constitutional nexus requirement" mandating that forfeited property be connected to the defendant's offense; any property of the defendant, including that which the defendant may acquire in the future, may be forfeited). The fact that Weitzman's additional assets originated from legal sources is, therefore, not a barrier to the forfeiture of those assets.
Weitzman suggests that some of the additional assets the Government has located, such as the Weitzman Environmental Fund Investment and the Weitzman Family Schwab Account, may be IRAs and asserts that IRAs are protected from forfeiture. This contention is unfounded. "Any other property of the defendant" may potentially be forfeited as substitute assets. 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (emphasis added). There is no exemption for IRAs. See United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 423 (4th Cir.2001) (federal law pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), which allows for the forfeiture of all funds in the defendant's IRA, supersedes any state law protecting such funds). Whether or not Weitzman's funds are held in IRAs is immaterial to determining whether those funds may be forfeited.
Weitzman next objects to the forfeiture of his additional assets on the ground that third parties, such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (to whom Weitzman may owe taxes) and a trustee of the Ellen Weitzman TIAA CREF Trust (to whom Weitzman's deceased sister owed money), may have interests in these assets. Weitzman, however, lacks standing to assert third-party interests. See, e.g., United States v. Tremblay, No. S1 05 CR.783, 2008 WL 4571548, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2008) (even if third parties such as the defendant's clients owned the funds in the defendant's offshore bank accounts, the defendant lacked standing to object to forfeiture on the basis of such third-party interests). Protection for third parties' interests comes in the form of ancillary hearings following the entry of a preliminary order forfeiting a defendant's substitute assets. Once such an order is entered, the Government must serve notice to known interested parties and publish notice of the forfeiture in order to provide third parties with the opportunity to challenge the Government's claim to the property. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n); see also Rule 32.2(e)(2). If the IRS, the Ellen Weitzman TIAA CREF Trust trustee, or any other third party claims an interest in the substitute assets here, it can properly do so after the entry of a preliminary order forfeiting Weitzman's interests in the assets.
Although Weitzman does not know what, if any, tax liabilities and withdrawal penalties he may incur if the substitute
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Government's application for the entry of a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Substitute Assets. The Court denies Weitzman's request to reserve funds sufficient to pay any tax liabilities or withdrawal penalties incurred. This Memorandum Order resolves docket entry no. 85.
SO ORDERED.