MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

PAUL G. GARDEPHE, District Judge:

Plaintiff James Preville, a former employee of The Pepsi Bottling Group, filed this action against the Pepsico Hourly Employees Retirement Plan pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., challenging Defendants' denial of his claim for early disability retirement benefits. Defendant contends that Plaintiff is not entitled to such benefits because his application was untimely.

The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion will be granted and Preville's motion will be denied.

BACKGROUND

I. PLAINTIFF'S DISABILITY CLAIMS

The following facts are undisputed.1 Between 1979 and his retirement on June 12, 2008, Preville was employed by Pepsi-Co, Inc. or one of its subsidiaries. (Joint Stipulation of Facts ("Joint Stip.") (Dkt. No. 24) ¶ 1; Affidavit of Chad Ryan in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Ryan Aff.") (Dkt. No. 26), Ex. A: Administrative Record ("AR") at 1) At the time of his retirement, Preville was a participant in the Pepsi Bottling Group Long-Term Disability Plan (the "LTD Plan"). (Joint Stip. (Dkt. No. 24) ¶ 2) The plan administrator for the LTD Plan determined that Preville was totally disabled and therefore entitled to long-term disability benefits under the LTD plan beginning on January 13, 2009. (Id. ¶ 3).

In 2009, Preville was also a participant in the PBG Hourly Pension Plan (the "Pension Plan"). (Id. ¶ 4) On June 17, 2009, Fidelity — on behalf of the plan administrator for the Pension Plan — sent a letter to Preville informing him that he might be eligible for an Immediate Disability pension benefit:

(Ryan Aff. (Dkt. No. 26), Ex. A: AR at 10 ("June 17, 2009 Fidelity Ltr.") (emphasis added)) Preville received Fidelity's letter on June 22, 2009, but did not contact Fidelity within thirty days. (Joint Stip. (Dkt. No. 24) ¶¶ 6, 9).

In July 2009, the Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied Preville's claim for disability benefits. (Id. ¶ 7) On July 23, 2010, however, the SSA reversed itself and approved Preville's claim retroactive to July 12, 2008. (Id. ¶ 9) In October 2011, Preville — for the first time — filed a claim for the Immediate Disability Pension. See id. ¶ 9; Ryan Aff. (Dkt. No. 26), Ex. A: AR at 15 (Oct. 6, 2011 Preville Ltr.). The plan administrator denied the claim on December 20, 2011, and an administrative appeal and this Complaint followed. (Joint Stip. (Dkt. No. 24) ¶¶ 10-12).

II. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE PENSION PLAN

Under the Pension Plan, an active eligible employee with ten years of credited service who becomes totally and permanently disabled may elect to receive an Immediate Disability Pension. Subsection 4.6(a) of the Pension Plan provides, in pertinent part:

(Defendant's Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Uncontested Facts ("Def. R. 56.1 Stmt.") (Dkt. No. 30) ¶ 5 (quoting AR at 4)).

Subsection 4.6(e) authorizes the Plan Administrator to extend the deadline by which some Pension Plan participants may elect an Immediate Disability Pension:

(Id. ¶ 6 (quoting AR at 6) (emphasis added)).

Subsection 2.1(uu) of the Pension Plan provides that a participant is "Totally and Permanently Disabled" if:

(Id. ¶ 8 (quoting AR at 7) (emphasis added)).

Pursuant to its authority under subsection 4.6(e), the plan administrator for the Pension Plan adopted the following rule:

(Id. ¶ 7 (quoting Ryan Aff. (Dkt. No. 26), Ex. B: 2009 Plan Administration Manual)).

The parties agree that the Pension Plan grants discretion to the plan administrator. (Joint Stip. (Dkt. No. 24) ¶ 13).

III. INITIAL DENIAL OF BENEFITS

As noted above, Preville first filed a claim for the Immediate Disability Pension benefit on October 6, 2011. See Ryan Aff. (Dkt. No. 26), Ex. A: AR at 15 (Oct. 6, 2011 Preville Ltr.). The Pension Plan determined that Preville was not eligible for an Immediate Disability Pension because he did not make an election within thirty days of the plan administrator's June 17, 2009 letter.3 In a December 20, 2011 letter to Preville, the plan administrator4 explained why he did not qualify for an Immediate Disability Pension:

(Id. at 23-24 (Pepsico Dec. 20, 2011 Ltr.)) The December 20, 2011 letter advised Preville of his right to appeal the denial of benefits and included instructions on how to appeal. (Id.)

IV. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL

On December 31, 2011, Preville appealed the initial denial of benefits. (Joint Stip. (Dkt. No. 24) ¶ 11, Ex. D) Preville did not cite to or rely on any Pension Plan document in making his appeal. Instead, he attached Appendix B and Appendix C from his union's collective bargaining agreement. Appendix B states, in relevant part:

(Ryan Aff. (Dkt. No. 26), Ex. A: AR at 28) Appendix C addresses, inter alia, the calculation of service credit and the effect of Social Security benefits on Pension Plan benefits. (Id. at 29).

On April 6, 2012, the plan administrator for the Pension Plan sent a letter to Preville informing him that his appeal had been denied. (Joint Stip. (Dkt. No. 24) ¶ 12, Ex. E) The plan administrator explained that

(Id., Ex. E (Pepsico Apr. 6, 2012 Ltr.) at 2-3)

V. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on July 23, 2013, in the Eastern District of Michigan. (Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 1)) On August 19, 2013, the case was transferred to this District. (Dkt. No. 5) The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 23-35).

DISCUSSION

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted when the moving party shows that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that that party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "A dispute about a `genuine issue' exists for summary judgment purposes where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could decide in the non-movant's favor." Beyer v. Cnty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir.2008) (citing Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007)). "As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In deciding a summary judgment motion, this Court "resolve[s] all ambiguities, and credit[s] all factual inferences that could rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Cifra v. Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir.2001) (citations omitted). "[A] party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment.... [M]ere conclusory allegations or denials ... cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact where none would otherwise exist.'" Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir.1995)). Instead, the non-moving party must "`offer some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful.'" Golden Pac. Bancorp v. FDIC, 375 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir.1998)).

"The same standard applies where, as here, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment...." Morales v. Quintel Entm't, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir.2001) (citing Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 206 F.3d 240, 244 (2d Cir.2000)). "[W]hen both parties move for summary judgment, asserting the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, a court need not enter judgment for either party. Rather, each party's motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration." Id. (citing Heublein, Inc. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1455, 1461 (2d Cir.1993); Schwabenbauer v. Bd. of Educ., 667 F.2d 305, 314 (2d Cir.1981)).

"It is appropriate for courts reviewing a challenge of denial of benefits under ERISA to do so on a motion for summary judgment, which `provides an appropriate vehicle whereby the Court can apply substantive ERISA law to the administrative record.'" Ramsteck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 08-CV-0012(JFB)(ETB), 2009 WL 1796999, *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (quoting Gannon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 05 Civ. 2160(JGK), 2007 WL 2844869, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2007)).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"[A] denial of benefits challenged under [ERISA] is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989): see also Krauss v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 517 F.3d 614, 622 (2d Cir.2008) (same). "If the insurer establishes that it has such discretion, the benefits decision is reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard." Krauss, 517 F.3d at 622 (citing Fay v. Oxford Health Plan, 287 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir.2002)).

"The plan administrator bears the burden of proving that the deferential standard of review applies." Fay, 287 F.3d at 104 (citing Kinstler v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir.1999)). "Ambiguities are construed in favor of the plan beneficiary." Krauss, 517 F.3d at 622 (citing Fay, 287 F.3d at 104 ("Although express use of the terms `deference' and `discretion' in the plan is not necessary to avoid a de novo standard of review, this Court will construe ambiguities in the plan's language against the insurer.")).

"Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, [a court] may overturn an administrator's decision to deny ERISA benefits `only if it was without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law. This scope of review is narrow[;] thus[,] [the court is] not free to substitute [its] own judgment for that of [the administrator] as if [the court] were considering the issue of eligibility anew.'" Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 83-84 (2d Cir.2009) (alterations in original) (quoting Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir.1995)).

Here, the parties agree that the Pension Plan grants discretion to the plan administrator. (Joint Stip. (Dkt. No. 24) ¶ 13) Accordingly, this Court "will not disturb the administrator's ultimate conclusion unless it is `arbitrary and capricious.'" Hobson, 574 F.3d at 82.

III. THE PLAN ADMINISTRATOR'S DECISION IS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS

Defendant contends that the plan administrator's "determination that Preville did not make a timely application for Immediate Disability Pension benefits was not arbitrary and capricious. The clear language of the Pension Plan, as supplemented by the Plan Administrator's rule, compelled the determination." (Def. Br. (Dkt. No. 27) at 12).

As discussed above, the Pension Plan provides at subsection 4.6(e) that an "irrevocable election must be made in the six month period following the onset of the Participant's Total and Permanent Disability, unless the period for such an election is extended in accordance with such rules as the Plan Administrator may establish in writing." (Def. R. 56.1 Stmt. (Dkt. No. 30) ¶ 6 (citing AR at 6) (emphasis added)) Subsection 2.1(uu) of the Pension Plan, which defines the term "Totally and Permanently Disabled," explains that the onset of a participant's Total and Permanent Disability occurs when he suffers an injury or illness while actively employed that ultimately results in either (1) his being entitled to receive long-term disability benefits under the LTD Plan or (2) being determined to be disabled under the Social Security Act. (Id. ¶ 8 (citing AR at 7)) It is undisputed that the administrator of the LTD Plan determined that Preville was entitled to receive benefits under the LTD Plan beginning January 13, 2009. (Joint Stip. (Dkt. No. 24) ¶ 3) Preville, however, did not elect to receive an Immediate Disability Pension within six months of January 13, 2009. Indeed, he waited until October 2011 — more than two years after the onset of his disability — to file his claim. Preville's claim is therefore untimely under the express terms of the Plan.

Subsection 4.6(e) provides that the plan administrator may extend the election period by written rule. (Def. R. 56.1 Stmt. (Dkt. No. 30) ¶ 6 (citing AR at 6)) Here, the plan administrator adopted a rule that permits eligible employees to elect to receive an Immediate Disability Pension within thirty days of written notice. (Id. ¶ 7 (citing Ryan Aff. (Dkt. No. 26), Ex. B: Plan Administration Manual)) Pursuant to this rule, the plan administrator mailed notice to Preville by letter dated June 17, 2009. The letter states, in relevant part,

(Ryan Aff. (Dkt. No. 26), Ex. A: AR at 10 ("June 17, 2009 Fidelity Ltr.") (emphasis added)) Although Preville acknowledges that he received this letter on June 22, 2009 (Joint Stip. (Dkt. No. 24) ¶ 6), he did not contact Fidelity or make an election within the thirty day period.

In sum, it is apparent from the record that the plan administrator's decision to deny Preville's claim for an Immediate Disability Pension is neither arbitrary nor capricious. To the contrary, that decision was compelled by both the language of the Pension Plan and the 30-day rule adopted by the plan administrator.

Preville argues, however, that the Pension Plan's language is ambiguous as to when a plan participant is required to make an election. (Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pltf. Br.") (Dkt. No. 32) at 2) In support, Preville cites a provision of the Pension Plan's 2009 Pension Guidelines which states:

In order to be eligible for a disability retirement benefit, you must:

(Ryan Aff. (Dkt. No. 26), Ex. A: AR at 17 (emphasis in original)) According to Preville,

(Pltf. Br. (Dkt. No. 32) at 3 (emphasis in original)) Accordingly, the gist of Preville's argument is that the Pension Plan permits him to make an election after either the LTD Plan or the SSA determines that he is disabled.

Assuming arguendo that Preville's interpretation of the relevant Pension Plan provisions is correct, his claim still fails. Here, the SSA determined that Plaintiff was disabled on July 23, 2010. (Joint Stip. (Dkt. No. 24) at 2) The unambiguous language of subsection 4.6(e) provides that an "irrevocable election must be made in the six month period following the onset of the Participant's Total and Permanent Disability,..." (Def. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 6 (citing AR at 6) (emphasis added)) Preville did not file a claim until October 6, 2011, however. (Joint Stip. (Dkt. No. 24) ¶ 9, Ex. B) Because more than a year passed between the time that Preville learned of the SSA's determination and the filing of his claim for an Immediate Disability Pension, the plan administrator's decision was not incorrect, let alone arbitrary and capricious.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the motions (Dkt. Nos. 23, 31) and to close this case.