KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:
Plaintiff BWP Media USA Inc. d/b/a Pacific Coast News and National Photo Group, LLC ("Plaintiff" or "BWP Media") brings this action for copyright infringement against Defendant Gossip Cop Media, LLC ("Defendant" or "Gossip Cop").
Plaintiff BWP Media "provide[s] entertainment-related photojournalism goods and services and own[s] the rights to a multitude of photographs and videos featuring celebrities, which it licenses to online and print publications." (Am. Compl. ¶ 1). BWP Media obtains copyright registrations covering many of these photographs and videos, and additionally has pending copyright applications as to others. (Id.). BWP Media alleges that it is the legal and beneficial owner of these photographs and videos, and creates or obtains the photographs and videos "with the express purpose of licensing [them] to media organizations." (Id. at ¶¶ 11, 13).
Defendant Gossip Cop operates for profit a website, gossipcop.com, which focuses on celebrity gossip news. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 21-22). Plaintiff alleges that Gossip Cop operates its site for "the exact same commercial purpose as used by similar celebrity gossip organizations." (Id. at ¶¶ 28, 31, 33). Gossip Cop at times copies images in their entirety from other websites without independently licensing the
Plaintiff identifies four images that Defendant reproduced on its website.
The first image is a photograph of the actors Mila Kunis and Ashton Kutcher holding between them one newspaper and three cups of coffee while walking down a street. (See Am. Compl., Ex. 1 (the "Kunis/Kutcher Image")). The Amended Complaint indicates that the image is registered with the registration number VA0001848281. (Id.). As reproduced on Gossip Cop's website next to a January 28, 2013 article entitled "Mila Kunis and Ashton Kutcher `Moving to London,' Claims Tab," the Kunis/Kutcher Image appears with the headline from The Sun, reading "AK & MK in UK," and below that "Ashton Kutcher and Mila Kunis are moving to London." (See Def. Br., Ex. B (the "Kunis/Kutcher Article")). Below the picture of the photograph and headline appears a parenthetical attribution to The Sun. (Id.). The Kunis/Kutcher Article excerpts portions of The Sun's article, provides a contradictory quote from "a close Kunis insider," and assigns the story the lowest score, a "0," on its scale of "Rumor" to "Real." (Id.).
The second image is a photograph of the actor Robert Pattinson slumped over behind the wheel of a car. (See Am. Compl., Ex. 1 (the "Pattinson Image")). The Amended Complaint indicates that the image is registered with the registration number VA0001865159. (Id.). As reproduced on Gossip Cop's website next to a May 13, 2013 article entitled "Robert Pattinson, Katy Perry Partying at Chateau Marmont Before His Birthday?", the Pattinson Image appears with a parenthetical attribution to the website HollywoodLife. (See Def. Br., Ex. C (the "Pattinson Article")). It includes HollywoodLife's headline ("Robert Pattinson Parties With Katy Perry Before His Birthday — PIC"), caption ("Robert Pattinson looking tired leaves Chateau Marmont on May 9, 2013."), circular insert of Katy Perry's face, and evidently enticing offer to "Click To See More Pics Of Rob." (Id.). The Pattinson Article recounts portions of HollywoodLife's article with accompanying contradictory evidence, such as noting that "[t]he Chateau Marmont is NOT a `club,' it's a hotel with cool lounge areas inside the lobby and outdoors," as well as that the original source of the information, PopSugar, subsequently recanted the story. (Id.). Gossip Cop gives the HollywoodLife story a score of "0" on the Rumor to Real scale. (Id.).
The third image is a photograph of the model and actress Liberty Ross in stride. (See Am. Compl., Ex. 1 (the "Ross Image")). The Amended Complaint indicates that the image is registered with the registration number VA0001836367. The photograph appears on Gossip Cop's website with a watermark and parenthetical attribution to the website TMZ, side-by-side with an also-watermarked close-up of the same image focused on her left hand, where no wedding ring is evident. (See Def. Br., Ex. D (the "Ross Article")). The August 7, 2012 Ross Article, entitled "Rupert
The fourth image is a video of Gwyneth Paltrow on a Vespa scooter with a child on the backseat, pulling into a lane ahead of an approaching school bus that quickly brakes, before Ms. Paltrow is followed by her now-estranged husband Chris Martin, also toting a child on the backseat of his Vespa scooter. (See Am. Compl., Ex. 1 (the "Paltrow Image")).
Plaintiff filed its initial Complaint on October 25, 2013. (Dkt. #1). In lieu of filing a response, and in accordance with this Court's Individual Rules of Practice, Defendant filed a letter requesting a pre-motion conference for its anticipated motion to dismiss. (Dkt. # 11). The Court denied the request with leave to renew in order to first allow Plaintiff to file its anticipated Amended Complaint, which it did on February 3, 2013. (Dkt. # 13). As agreed to at the conference of March 4, 2014, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss on March 21, 2014, arguing that all of the images were protected by the "fair use" doctrine, and additionally that Plaintiffs could not bring a claim for infringement of the Paltrow Image because their application with the Copyright Office was still pending. (Dkt. # 24). Plaintiff filed its brief in opposition on April 28, 2014 (Dkt. # 29), and the briefing was complete upon the filing of Defendant's reply brief on May 16, 2014 (Dkt. # 37). The Court now considers the motion to dismiss.
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court should "draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff['s] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." (internal quotation marks omitted)). A plaintiff is entitled to relief if she alleges "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir.2007) ("While Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require enough facts to `nudge [plaintiff's] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955)). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are `merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it `stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint." DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable LLC, 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir.2010). "Even where a document is not incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint `relies heavily upon its terms and effect,' which renders the document `integral' to the complaint." Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir.1995) (per curiam)). "[A] plaintiff's reliance on the terms and effects of a document in drafting the complaint is a necessary prerequisite to the court's consideration of the document on a dismissal motion; mere notice or possession is not enough." Id. (emphasis in original). Because Plaintiff relies upon Defendant's allegedly infringing webpages, and includes screen captures of them, in the Amended Complaint (see Am. Compl., Ex. 1), the Court incorporates these documents — displayed in greater detail in Exhibits B through E of Defendant's opening brief — by reference.
Although registration is not required to obtain copyright protection, see 17 U.S.C. § 408(a), it is a prerequisite to bringing an infringement action in federal court, see id. § 411(a). But see Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 171, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) ("We... decline to address whether § 411(a)'s registration requirement is a mandatory precondition to suit that ... district courts may or should enforce sua sponte by dismissing copyright infringement claims involving unregistered works."). As Plaintiff points out, the Second Circuit has not decided whether a pending application for copyright satisfies the registration requirement of § 411(a). See Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 125 (2d
However, the most exhaustive recent analysis within this District concluded that "Courts in this Circuit have ... required that a plaintiff either hold a valid copyright registration outright or have applied and been refused a registration prior to filing a civil claim, both before and after Reed Elsevier. A pending application does not suffice." Muench Photography, Inc. v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. Co., No. 09 Civ. 2669(LAP), 2012 WL 1021535, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012). It has since been noted that "[c]ourts in this district generally hold that a copyright registration is required, and that a pending application will not do." BWP Media USA Inc. v. Hollywood Fan Sites, LLC, No. 14 Civ. 121(JPO), 69 F.Supp.3d 342, 353 n. 6, 2014 WL 6077247, at *5 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014); accord Int'l Diamond Importers, Inc. v. Oriental Gemco (N.Y.), Inc., No. 14 Civ. 3506(SAS), 64 F.Supp.3d 494, 517, 2014 WL 6682622, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2014) ("I agree that an application is not sufficient to bring an infringement action[.]"); Accurate Grading Quality Assur., Inc. v. Thorpe, No. 12 Civ. 1343(ALC), 2013 WL 1234836, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013) (same). Plaintiff provides only a single example to the contrary. (See Pl. Opp. 17 (citing Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int'l Corp., 210 F.Supp.2d 147, 157 (E.D.N.Y.2002))). The Court agrees with the overwhelming majority of courts in this District and Circuit that a pending application does not constitute "registration" sufficient to allow suit for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a).
Accordingly, since Plaintiff's application for registration of the Paltrow Image was pending as of the filing of the Complaint, the Amended Complaint, and this Opinion, the motion to dismiss must be granted with respect to the Paltrow Image. The Court need not at this time address the question of whether Plaintiff should be allowed to amend its complaint to include the Paltrow Image once the Copyright Office grants or rejects the application for registration.
Gossip Cop moves to dismiss the remainder of the Amended Complaint on the basis that the defense of fair use prevents any claim of infringement. Based upon the allegations in the Amended Complaint and the materials incorporated by reference therein, the Court is unable to conclude that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court declines to find that fair use constitutes a complete defense at this stage.
The Copyright Act is intended "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, "by granting authors a limited monopoly over (and thus the opportunity to profit from) the dissemination of their original works of authorship," Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir.2014). But there are also limits upon creators' control over their own works, in particular "the doctrine of `fair use,' which allows the public to draw upon copyrighted materials without the permission of the copyright holder in certain circumstances." Id. "[T]he fair use determination is an open-ended and context-sensitive inquiry," Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013), but Congress has provided four nonexclusive
17 U.S.C. § 107.
Although "[t]he determination of fair use is a mixed question of fact and law," Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2014), the Second Circuit has endorsed the resolution of other copyright questions at the pleadings stage by analyzing the complaint and incorporating by reference the documents referred to therein, see Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63-65 (2d Cir.2010) (analyzing a dismissal based upon lack of substantial similarity between copyrighted and allegedly infringing work). And the Second Circuit has approvingly cited the Seventh Circuit's discussion of the fair use inquiry at the motion to dismiss stage. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707 (discussing Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir.2012)). The Brownmark court determined that in certain circumstances, "the only two pieces of evidence needed to decide the question of fair use ... are the original version" and the allegedly infringing work, and found that this analysis could be conducted pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), without converting the motion into one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d). Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 690. While the Second Circuit has noted in the context of the Lanham Act that "[b]ecause fair use is an affirmative defense, it often requires consideration of facts outside of the complaint and thus is inappropriate to resolve on a motion to dismiss," it recognized that "[a]ffirmative defenses may be adjudicated at this stage in the litigation, however, where the facts necessary to establish the defense are evident on the face of the complaint." Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir.2013). The Court thus finds that it is possible to resolve the fair use inquiry on a motion to dismiss under certain circumstances, but observes that there is a dearth of cases granting such a motion. See, e.g., M. Shanken Commc'ns, Inc. v. Cigar500.com, No. 07 Civ. 7371(JGK), 2008 WL 2696168, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2008) (noting that a similarly situated defendant could not identify "any cases in this Circuit that have granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds of fair use"). Nonetheless, given the possibility, however slim, of resolution at this stage, the Court will undertake a review of the three remaining images in light of the fair use factors.
The first factor in the fair use inquiry, which has been described as "[t]he heart of the fair use inquiry," Cariou, 714 F.3d at 705 (alterations in original) (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir.2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted), asks in part whether the new work "merely `supersede[s] the objects' of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is `transformative,'"
Swatch, 756 F.3d at 84. Yet the Second Circuit has specifically rejected the contention that commentary is necessary to the fair use defense, holding that "[t]he law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the original or its author in order to be considered transformative." Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706. "Instead, ... to qualify as a fair use, a new work generally must alter the original with `new expression, meaning, or message.'" Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164).
The commercial nature of the secondary use is also relevant; "[t]he greater the private economic rewards reaped by the secondary user (to the exclusion of broader public benefits), the more likely the first factor will favor the copyright holder and the less likely the use will be considered fair." Swatch, 756 F.3d at 83 (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985) ("The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use."). On the other hand, "purposes such as criticism, comment, [and] news reporting" are set forth in the Copyright Act as prototypical examples of fair use, 17 U.S.C. § 107, and the Second Circuit has "recognized that `[a]lmost all newspapers, books and magazines are published by commercial enterprises that seek a profit.'" Swatch, 756 F.3d at 83 (alteration in original) (quoting Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir.1983)). Accordingly, though a work may be commercial in nature, where it is found to be transformative courts "do not place much significance on that fact due to the transformative nature of the work." Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708.
Defendant's use of the copyrighted work is undoubtedly commercial in nature. Plaintiff adequately pleads as much (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24, 28-30), and Defendant does not contest that fact; rather, it simply urges that "the fact that Gossip Cop is a for-profit entity should be afforded little-to-no weight or significance by this Court" (Def. Br. 20). Yet "[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562, 105 S.Ct. 2218. The question of Gossip Cop's motive is a factual one, making it inappropriate for dismissal at this stage. However, there is certainly enough in the complaint to suggest that at least some of the uses — and perhaps Gossip Cop's business model as a whole — is meant to allow Gossip Cop to till the same ground as other publications without paying the customary
BWP Media asserts that Gossip Cop is simply another tabloid engaged in precisely the same kind of celebrity gossip reporting as the outlets to which BWP Media licenses its images. This allegation, normally automatically credited, is somewhat belied by the nature of the Gossip Cop articles that are incorporated into the Amended Complaint by reference. Although Gossip Cop is, broadly speaking, in the same celebrity journalism business as other outlets, the Kunis/Kutcher Image and the Pattinson Image are utilized in a different context on Gossip Cop's website than in the publications from which the images are copied. Gossip Cop makes clear, including by copying the headlines that ran with the images, that the images were used to illustrate or bolster the stories run by The Sun and HollywoodLife, and proceeds to attack the factual bases of these stories.
On the other hand, the Ross Image contains no surrounding commentary or criticism of the underlying source of the image, and the Ross Article makes no mention whatsoever of another publication. It is not enough for an image to be used in the course of news reporting; the use must be transformative. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561, 105 S.Ct. 2218 ("The fact that an article arguably is `news' and therefore a productive use is simply one factor in a fair use analysis."). Similarly, the mere appending of the Rumor to Real scale to a story that uses the image for the exact same purpose as its original location does not transform it from celebrity journalism to commentary on celebrity journalism. Plaintiff's citation to Mathieson v. Associated Press, No. 90 Civ. 6945(LMM), 1992 WL 164447 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1992) (Pl. Opp. 7), is inapposite. Whereas in that case the Associated Press copied a photo from a business promotion brochure to illustrate a news story, id. at *3, in this case Gossip Cop reproduced the photo in precisely the same context in which it was originally deployed. Taking the allegations in the Amended Complaint as true, the Court must conclude that the first fair use factor weighs in Defendant's favor with regard to the Kunis/Kutcher and Pattinson Images, and in Plaintiff's favor with regard to the Ross Image.
The second fair use factor is "the nature of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107. The Supreme Court has interpreted this factor to incorporate two primary inquiries: whether the work is factual or fictional, and whether the work is unpublished. The Second Circuit has elaborated, calling for a consideration of "(1) whether the work is expressive or creative,... with a greater leeway being allowed to a claim of fair use where the work is factual or informational, and (2) whether the work is published or unpublished, with the scope for fair use involving unpublished works being considerably narrower." Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709-10 (alterations in original) (quoting Blanch, 467 F.3d at 256) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Regarding the former, "[t]he law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563, 105 S.Ct. 2218; accord Authors Guild, 755 F.3d at 96 ("The second factor considers whether the copyrighted work is `of the creative or instructive type that the copyright laws value and seek to foster.'" (quoting Leval, supra, at 1123)). Regarding the latter, "[t]he fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of its `nature.'" Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564, 105 S.Ct. 2218. Due to the importance of the author's right of first publication, "the unpublished nature of a work is a key, though not necessarily determinative, factor tending to negate a defense of fair use." Id. at 554, 105 S.Ct. 2218 (internal alterations, citation, and quotation marks omitted).
Regarding the first element, Plaintiff asserts that its images are "original, creative works" that "typically provide little if any informational value." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14). Though the Court is bound to accept the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint is true, "[t]he Court is not, however, bound to accept ... `legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.'" Elsevier, Inc. v. Grossman, No. 12 Civ. 5121(KPF), 77 F.Supp.3d 331, 342, 2015 WL 72604, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2015) (quoting Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2008)). Many courts have expressed trepidation at characterizing photographs as either factual or creative. See Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 760 (6th Cir.2012) (noting, in the course of upholding the reasonableness of a jury's finding, that "photographs have varying degrees of creativity"); Nunez, 235 F.3d at 23 ("Given the difficulty of characterizing the `nature' of the photographs, we find that the impact of their creativity on the fair use finding is neutral."). As in Balsley, the creativity of the images at issue is mixed; while a paparazzi photographer does "not direct [the subject] or create the background for the images," he does "ha[ve] control over the exposure of the film (i.e., shutter speed and flash settings), use[] his artistic skill to edit the pictures for size, color, and clarity, and [choose] which images to publish based on the allurement of the subject." 691 F.3d at 760. Though the Court suspects that the Pattinson and Ross Images are intended to inform the viewer by scandalous implication rather than cause aesthetic appreciation of the lighting choices, given the procedural posture of the case Plaintiff has at least plausibly suggested that the images at issue constitute creative works.
The second element of this factor — whether the copyrighted work was previously published — favors Defendant, since Plaintiff acknowledges that the images were taken from outlets where they had previously been published. Yet while Defendant has not impeded Plaintiff's right to control first publication, overemphasis of publication status in the fair use analysis
The third factor in the fair use inquiry is "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole." 17 U.S.C. § 107. In examining this factor courts consider "the proportion of the original work used, and not how much of the secondary work comprises the original." Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710; accord Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565, 105 S.Ct. 2218. Ultimately, "[t]he question is whether `the quantity and value of the materials used, are reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying.'" Blanch, 467 F.3d at 257 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586, 114 S.Ct. 1164) (internal quotation marks omitted). As courts have repeatedly emphasized, the inquiry "calls for thought not only about the quantity of the materials used, but about their quality and importance, too." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587, 114 S.Ct. 1164; accord, e.g., Hollander v. Steinberg, 419 Fed.Appx. 44, 47 (2d Cir.2011) (summary order) (finding reasonable a complete reproduction for the purposes of litigation).
Gossip Cop "copied and displayed [Plaintiff's images] in their entirety." (Am. Compl. ¶ 25). The Court declines to resolve at this stage whether the Kunis/Kutcher and Pattinson Images were necessary to their respective articles; however, their use therein — copied with their original headlines — suggests that they were used "to convey the `fact' of the photograph to viewers," Blanch, 467 F.3d at 257, a purpose for which copying the entirety may have been reasonable. Certainly cropping the Pattinson Image would have required alteration or omission of some of the surrounding elements that HollywoodLife placed around the image, perhaps diminishing the force of the critique leveled by Gossip Cop in the Pattinson Article. Plaintiff's argument is significantly stronger with regard to the Ross Image, which was used to exactly the same extent and to convey precisely the same information as in its original publication. Given the deference owed to Plaintiff's allegations, the Court finds that, due to the complete reproduction of the copyrighted images, the third fair use factor weighs in Plaintiff's favor.
The fourth and final enumerated factor in the fair use inquiry is "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107. The Supreme Court has described this factor as "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566, 105 S.Ct. 2218. The Second Circuit has emphasized that "[t]he focus here is on whether defendants are offering a market substitute for the original.... [O]ur concern is not whether the secondary use suppresses or even destroys the market for the original work or its potential derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps the market of the original work." NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 481-82 (2d Cir.2004). Accordingly, there is a difference between a parody or critique that harms the market for the original work by devaluing it in the eyes of audiences, and a copy that usurps the market by offering a substitute good. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92, 114 S.Ct. 1164.
Plaintiff alleges that Gossip Cop operates in precisely the same market as the organizations to which Plaintiff licenses its
Because Plaintiff's application for registration of the Paltrow Image has neither been accepted nor rejected, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED with regard to claims based upon that image.
With regard to the remaining images, Defendant's case for the fair use defense is significantly stronger for the Kunis/Kutcher and Pattinson Images than for the Ross Image. Yet even if the use of the former images is transformative — a difficult determination to make at this stage — the other factors vary from neutral to favoring Plaintiff. Under such conditions, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as to the remaining images.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Docket Entry 24, and the parties are directed to appear before the Court for a status conference on
SO ORDERED.
For convenience, Defendant's memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is referred to as "Def. Br." (Dkt. #25); Plaintiff's opposition brief as "Pl. Opp." (Dkt. #31); and Defendant's reply brief as "Def. Reply" (Dkt. #37).
