MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge.

At the plaintiff's request, the Court stayed this action on February 4, 2015. In two letters, the plaintiff has made a number of others motions. The letters are attached to this Order.

The plaintiff first requests the appointment of pro bono counsel. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has articulated factors that should guide the Court's discretion to appoint counsel to represent an indigent civil litigant under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1986). For the Court to order the appointment of counsel, the petitioner must, as a threshold matter, demonstrate that his claim has substance or a likelihood of success on the merits. See Hodge, 802 F.2d at 60-61. Only then can the Court consider the other factors appropriate to determination of whether counsel should be appointed: "plaintiff's ability to obtain representation independently, and his ability to handle the case without assistance in the light of the required factual investigation, the complexity of the legal issues, and the need for expertly conducted cross-examination to test veracity." Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989). The plaintiff has not yet made such a showing, and the motion to appoint pro bono counsel is denied.

The plaintiff again moves to add Ms. Hubbard as a defendant. In his letter, the plaintiff admits that Ms. Hubbard and Dr. Mammuhd work at separate institutions. Plaintiff alleges his claims against Ms. Hubbard and Dr. Mammuhd are related because "I told [Ms. Hubbard] the same thing that I told Dr. Mammuhd. ..." The scheduling order provides that no additional defendants may be added, except for good cause shown, after August 15, 2014. An allegation that the plaintiff told Dr. Mammuhd and Ms. Hubbard "the same thing" does not make those claims related or show good cause. Therefore, the plaintiff's motion to add Ms. Hubbard as a defendant is denied.

The plaintiff next requests that the Court enjoin the Central New York Psychiatric Center from forcing the plaintiff "to take medication" and that the Court order the plaintiff transferred to another prison. "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The plaintiff has made no such showing here. Therefore, the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.

Moreover, the plaintiff alleges that he is subject to a "Court ordered medication order by a Jude Hester of Marcy, N.Y." That order is not the subject of the current action, which challenges actions taken at a prior institution. And if the plaintiff brought an action challenging the order or its merits, the Court may lack jurisdiction to review it. See Spencer v. Bellevue Hosp., No. 11cv.7149, 2012 WL 1267886, at *3-6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2012) (holding that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a state-court medication order). The plaintiff can challenge a state court order in state court.

The plaintiff finally requests sanctions because the defendant "set[] ad hoc deadlines within the discovery deadline that were not authorized by the" Court. The defendant properly requested an extension of discovery—in part because the plaintiff was not responding to discovery requests—which the Court granted. There is no basis for sanctions. Therefore, the plaintiff's request for sanctions is denied.

SO ORDERED.