OPINION AND ORDER

KIMBA M. WOOD, District Judge.

Plaintiff Zuffa LLC ("Plaintiff" or "Zuffa") has moved pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a preliminary injunction against Defendants Eric Schneiderman, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of New York; Vincent G. Bradley, in his official capacity as Commissioner and Chairman of the New York State Liquor Authority; and Kevin Kim, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York State Liquor Authority (collectively, "Defendants"). Zuffa seeks to prevent Defendants from enforcing New York's Combative Sport Law, N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8905-a, and a related provision of New York's Liquor Law, N.Y. Alco. Bev. Law § 106(6-c)(a), until a trial on the merits can be held to resolve Plaintiff's constitutional challenge to those laws. For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.

I. BACKGROUND

Much of the relevant factual background regarding mixed martial arts (MMA) and New York's Combative Sport Law is discussed at length in this Court's three decisions in the related case, Jones v. Schneiderman, 11-CV-8215. See Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F.Supp.2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Wood, J.) ("Jones I"); Jones v. Schneiderman, 974 F.Supp.2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Wood, J.) ("Jones II"); Jones v. Schneiderman, 101 F.Supp.3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Wood, J.) ("Jones III"). What follows is a brief overview.

A. The Origins and Evolution of MMA

Plaintiff Zuffa, which does business as the Ultimate Fighting Championship, is the leading promoter worldwide of professional MMA contests and exhibitions. (Compl. ¶ 15).1 MMA is a sport combining the elements of multiple different martial arts disciplines and forms of combat, including karate, jiu-jitsu, boxing, kickboxing, grappling, judo, Muay Thai, and Greco-Roman wrestling. (Compl. ¶ 2, [Doc. No. 1]); (Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Mot. for Prelim. Inj."), 1-3 [Doc. No. 17]). MMA first drew widespread attention in the United States in 1993, when promoters organized a televised pay-per-view tournament under the name "Ultimate Fighting Championship" ("UFC"). (Mot. for Prelim. Inj., 3). The tournament pitted competitors from different martial arts disciplines against one another, without weight classes and essentially without rules. Id. This event and subsequent UFC tournaments in the 1990s were aggressively marketed to emphasize the violence of the competition and the enormous physical risks to the competitors. Id. These competitions were variously advertised as "blood sport," "fights to the death," and "no holds barred." (Compl. ¶ 42).

B. New York's Combative Sport Law and Liquor Law Combat Prohibition

In response to the perceived dangers of MMA following its emergence in the U.S. in the early 1990s, a number of state legislatures began enacting prohibitions on MMA competitions. Id. ¶ 43. In 1997, the New York Legislature enacted the Combative Sport Law ("CSL"), N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8905-a. Id. ¶ 47. The law was directed primarily at the new "ultimate" or "extreme" fighting events that combined skills from multiple different disciplines in a "no holds barred format"; legislators expressed concern that these events posed significant health and safety risks to competitors. (Defs.' Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. ("Defs.' Opp'n"), 2-3 [Doc. No. 33]); (Mot. for Prelim. Inj., 3).

The CSL states that "[n]o combative sport shall be conducted, held, or given within the state of New York," N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8905-a(2), and provides civil and criminal penalties for any person "who knowingly advances or profits from a combative sport activity," except by acting as a spectator, id. § 8905-a(3)(a)-(b).2 A "combative sport" is defined as "any professional match or exhibition . . . wherein the contestants deliver, or are not forbidden by the applicable rules . . . from delivering kicks, punches, or blows of any kind to the body of an opponent." Id. § 8905-a(1). However, "boxing, sparring, wrestling, [and] martial arts" are explicitly excepted from this definition. Id. Martial arts is defined as "includ[ing] any professional match or exhibition sanctioned by" one of twelve exempt organizations enumerated in the statute (the "Exempt Organizations"), including the U.S. Judo Association, the U.S. Tae Kwon Do Union, and the World Karate Association (now renamed the World Kickboxing Association). Id.3

Four years after the enactment of the CSL, the New York Legislature passed a companion law regulating combative sport events at venues that hold liquor licenses. N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 106(6-c) (the "Liquor Law"); (Compl. ¶ 166). The Liquor Law prohibits these venues from hosting either professional or amateur events where contestants engage in combative sport as that term is defined in the CSL. Like the CSL, the Liquor Law makes exceptions for "boxing, sparring, wrestling, or martial arts" or anything else "excepted from the definition of . . . combative sport" in the CSL. N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 106(6-c)(a)-(b); (Mot. for Prelim. Inj., 5).

Plaintiff alleges that during the time the CSL has been in force, New York state officials have interpreted and enforced the law inconsistently and erratically. See (Mot. for Prelim. Inj., 1-2, 6-11). In particular, the New York State Athletic Commission (NYSAC) has issued numerous cease-and-desist orders taking different positions as to whether certain conduct is prohibited under the CSL. However, no one has ever been prosecuted under the CSL. 4 (Defs.' Opp'n, 5).

C. The Jones v. Schneiderman Litigation

In 2011, Zuffa, as well as several MMA athletes, trainers, and fans, filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of the CSL and corresponding provisions of the Liquor Law. See Jones I, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 422. The plaintiffs in that action asserted a variety of claims including: (1) challenges based on the First Amendment; (2) challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause and the Commerce Clause; (3) challenges asserting that the laws lacked a rational basis in violation of the Due Process Clause; and (4) challenges asserting that the laws were unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied, in violation of the Due Process Clause. Id. In Jones I and Jones II, this Court dismissed the majority of the plaintiffs' claims, holding that the CSL had a rational basis and did not discriminate against interstate commerce, and that neither the CSL nor the Liquor Law prohibited protected speech or expressive conduct. See Jones I, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 424-31; Jones II, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 332-339, 347-53. This Court also dismissed the plaintiffs' facial vagueness challenge and certain as-applied vagueness challenges, Jones II, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 339-47, but declined to dismiss other as-applied vagueness challenges, id. at 341. In particular, the Court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with their challenge based on the application of the CSL to professional MMA events sanctioned by an Exempt Organization, in part because of the "[d]efendants' varying interpretations of the statutory language." Id.

Following the Jones II decision, the parties conducted discovery and cross-filed motions for summary judgment. Jones III, 101 F. Supp. 3d at 288. In 2015 in Jones III, this Court resolved these motions in favor of the defendants, on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their as-applied vagueness claim. Id. at 289. Jones III held that the plaintiffs had failed to make the necessary showing that they faced an imminent threat of prosecution under the CSL because (1) they had not made concrete plans to organize and promote any MMA events in New York; and (2) at the time the lawsuit was filed, New York officials had not taken a clear stance that the CSL prohibited certain types of MMA events, including a professional MMA event sanctioned by an Exempt Organization. See id. at 294-99. The Court also advised the plaintiffs to consider bringing a state declaratory judgment action in order to "decisively settle disputes regarding the [CSL's] scope," given that the statute had never been construed by a New York state court. Id. at 299. The plaintiffs then appealed the Court's decisions in Jones I, Jones II, and Jones III. See (Notice of Appeal, Jones v. Schneiderman, 101 F.Supp.3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 11-CV-8215) [Doc. No. 148]). That appeal is currently pending before the Second Circuit.

D. Procedural History

Following the Court's decision in Jones III, Zuffa entered into an agreement to host a live professional MMA event sanctioned by the World Kickboxing Association ("WKA") at Madison Square Garden ("MSG") on April 23, 2016. See (Mot. for Prelim. Inj., 11); (Crenshaw Decl., Ex. C [Doc. No. 20-3]); (Wanagiel Decl., Ex. 1 [Doc. No. 21-1]). Plaintiff then filed its Complaint in the instant action asserting that the CSL and Liquor Law are unconstitutionally vague as applied to a professional MMA event sanctioned by an Exempt Organization, [Doc. No. 1], and on the following day filed a motion to preliminarily enjoin the State from enforcing the challenged provisions against it during the pendency of this litigation, [Doc. No. 17].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The District Court may grant a preliminary injunction when the moving party shows: (1) irreparable harm; (2) a likelihood of success on the merits;5 and (3) that a preliminary injunction is in the public interest. New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Oneida Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).6

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that its plan to host a WKA-sanctioned MMA event at Madison Square Garden creates a sufficiently imminent, concrete, and particularized injury to confer standing, and that it will suffer irreparable harm if the State is not enjoined from enforcing the CSL against it, thereby allowing the scheduled event to take place. See (Mot. for Prelim. Inj., 2, 11). Although the Court agrees that Plaintiff has standing to bring its claim challenging the CSL, the Court declines to consider the merits of Plaintiff's claim, invoking Pullman abstention.

A. Standing

"Whether a claimant has standing is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit." In re Gucci, 126 F.3d 380, 388-89 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The "`irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements'":

Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh, 714 F.3d 682, 688 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). If a plaintiff lacks standing, "there is no case or controversy over which a federal court may exercise jurisdiction." In re Direxion Shares ETF Trust, 279 F.R.D. 221, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Forrest, J.).

In Jones III, this Court concluded that Zuffa and the other plaintiffs lacked standing because they had failed to allege an injury that was sufficiently imminent. Jones III, 101 F. Supp. 3d at 293. In particular, the Court determined that Zuffa had failed to show that it faced an imminent threat of prosecution at the time of filing suit because: (1) it had failed to make concrete plans to hold a sanctioned professional MMA event, and (2) Zuffa had had no contact with the NY Office of the Attorney General (OAG) that would give it reason to believe that its hypothetical event would give rise to a prosecution.7 Id. at 294-95.

Those failings have been remedied in this case. First, Plaintiff's agreements with WKA and MSG to host a sanctioned professional MMA event in New York City on April 23, 2016 constitute the sort of "concrete plans" necessary to show the imminence of an injury in fact. See id. at 291 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564) ("[A] prosecution can be imminent only if the plaintiff has `concrete plans' to perform, in the near future, the conduct that officials would consider illegal."). Second, the statements made by the OAG during the course of the Jones litigation to the effect that "all sanctioned professional MMA [was] illegal" under the CSL, id. at 294, are sufficiently specific to show that prosecution is imminent against this particular Plaintiff because they were made before Zuffa commenced this action. See id. at 291-92 (collecting cases).

The OAG's statements regarding the illegality of a sanctioned professional MMA event also suffice to show causation and redressability for the purposes of standing. That local District Attorneys are not parties to the instant action does not defeat Plaintiff's standing, because Plaintiff must show only that it is "likely, as opposed to merely speculative" that a favorable decision would redress the injury. See Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc., 714 F.3d at 688. The relief requested here would, if granted, prevent enforcement of the CSL against Plaintiff by the OAG, the only state agency with enforcement authority that has made a clear threat of prosecution based on Plaintiff's planned conduct. See (Mot. for Prelim. Inj., 20).8 Accordingly, Plaintiff Zuffa has standing to bring its claim with respect to the CSL.

However, Plaintiff Zuffa lacks standing to challenge the combative sport provision of the New York Liquor Law. Zuffa is not a retail licensee under the Liquor Law, and it never applied for a retail liquor license; it therefore is not directly subject to the Liquor Law prohibitions on hosting combative sport events. See (Defs.' Opp'n, 6). Because Plaintiff has made no allegation that the Liquor Law has been, or will imminently be, applied to its conduct, it has failed to show that it would suffer any injury in fact relating to the Liquor Law.9

B. Pullman Abstention

Because Plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits depends upon the interpretation of an unclear New York state statute that no New York state court has ever construed, this Court abstains under Pullman. See R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

"When anticipatory relief is sought in federal court against a state statute, respect for the place of the states in our federal system calls for close consideration of whether a ruling on the constitutionality of the state law is, in fact, necessary." Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 808 F.3d 118, 137 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75 (1997). Pullman abstention is "[i]ntended to further the harmonious relation between state and federal courts" by allowing a federal court to abstain from deciding difficult and "unsettled questions of state law that are antecedent to federal constitutional questions." Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 74 (2d. Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 384 (2d Cir. 2000). Once the federal court has abstained, "the parties may seek a controlling interpretation of the challenged law from the state courts, whose decision could cause the federal constitutional question to disappear altogether." Expressions, 808 F.3d at 137. Pullman abstention thus allows a federal court to avoid both: (1) unnecessary or premature decisions on questions of federal constitutional law, and (2) potentially erroneous rulings with respect to state law. Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, 261 F.3d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 2001)); Tunick, 209 F.3d at 74 (quoting Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498-99).

The Second Circuit has held that abstention under Pullman is appropriate when three necessary conditions are met: "(1) an unclear state statute is at issue; (2) resolution of the federal constitutional issue depends on the interpretation of the state law; and (3) the law is susceptible to an interpretation by a state court that would avoid or modify the constitutional issue." Wang v. Pataki, 164 F.Supp.2d 406, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Sweet, J.) (quoting Greater N.Y. Metro. Food Council v. McGuire, 6 F.3d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of First, Second, Third, and Fourth Departments, Appellative Div. of Supreme Court of New York, 847 F.Supp.2d 590, 599 n.56 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Kaplan, J.); Winters v. Meyer, 442 F.Supp.2d 82, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (McMahon, J.). "Abstention is not appropriate . . . where the meaning of a state statute is clear on its face." Tunick, 209 F.3d at 74 (citing Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984)). Although a court may invoke Pullman abstention when the three conditions listed above are met, it is not required to do so. Abstention is not appropriate where "important federal rights .. . outweigh the interests underlying the Pullman doctrine." Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F.Supp.2d 235, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Seibel, J.) (quoting Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 100 (2d Cir. 2004)).

The three essential conditions for Pullman abstention are met in this case. First, the CSL is an unclear state law, susceptible to multiple, different interpretations. In particular, it is not clear what falls within the scope of the martial arts exception to the definition of a combative sport. The CSL reads in pertinent part: "`martial arts' shall include any professional match or exhibition sanctioned by" one of twelve listed Exempt Organizations. N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 8905-a(1). Since the CSL has been in force, the NYSAC has assumed primary responsibility for interpreting the statute and has embraced widely varying interpretations, including:

Furthermore, the OAG, the entity charged with enforcing the CSL's criminal provisions, has previously stated that the CSL would permit an MMA event sanctioned by an Exempt Organization, only to reverse course and declare that the CSL prohibited any professional MMA event, even if sanctioned by an Exempt Organization. (Compl. ¶¶ 104-113).

This history of shifting interpretations of the CSL, coupled with erratic enforcement that has often contradicted the official interpretation of the law, amply demonstrates that the CSL is unclear on its face. The CSL has never been interpreted by any New York state court, see (Defs.' Opp'n, 8), leaving this Court with no guidance as to the proper scope of the statute.

The second and third conditions of Pullman are also met. Plaintiff's federal constitutional vagueness challenge depends on the interpretation of this state law, and the CSL is susceptible to interpretations that would resolve the statutory uncertainty and eliminate the federal constitutional issue. "A statute is unconstitutionally vague only if it cannot be construed in a way that eliminates the vagueness." Expressions, 808 F.3d at 144 (citing Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 403-04 (2010)). "[C]larity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute." United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). "Thus, in considering a vagueness challenge to a state statute, a federal court must consider not only how the law is presently drafted, but also how it has been construed by the state courts." Expressions, 808 F.3d at 144 (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff has identified two possible readings of the CSL that could eliminate the alleged statutory vagueness, namely (1) that an Exempt Organization could sanction any kind of event, and (2) that an Exempt Organization could sanction any event of the kind found in that Exempt Organization's name. (Mot. for Prelim. Inj., 17). Either of these constructions would likely provide the judicial gloss necessary to resolve any uncertainty in the text of the statute and provide "ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes." Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015).10

Abstention under Pullman is particularly appropriate where, as here, the state law being interpreted governs issues that are traditionally a matter of state concern, such as health and safety. See Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v. Suffolk County, 583 F.Supp. 1364, 1371, 1376 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86-87 (1970)) (abstaining under Pullman when unclear state law involved matters of particular state concern); N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. New York City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting "the traditional primacy of state regulation in matters of health and safety"); Jones I, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 428-29 (finding that the CSL regulated the health and safety of combatants).

For these reasons, the Court concludes that it would be inappropriate to reach the merits of Plaintiff's vagueness challenge to the CSL before any New York state court has had an opportunity to construe the challenged provision. See Hickerson v. City of New York, 932 F.Supp. 550, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Cedarbaum, J.) ("A federal court should not be the first to construe these provisions. Abstention is warranted to give the New York courts an opportunity to construe the resolution, for the courts could interpret these phrases in such a way as to change or eliminate the vagueness claims."); Expressions, 808 F.3d at 139 ("[W]e cannot hold a duly enacted state law unconstitutional based entirely on speculation that the New York courts might give it a[] . . . problematic reading that its text does not require."); cf. Kachalsky, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 253 ("Where, as here, state courts have settled upon an interpretation of the statute at issue, Pullman abstention is not warranted.").11

The Court further concludes that abstention is warranted because the federal interests at stake do not, in this instance, outweigh those interests that underlie the Pullman doctrine. First, there will be no chilling effect on First Amendment rights caused by the decision to abstain, because this Court has previously determined that the CSL does not prevent Plaintiff from engaging in any conduct protected by the First Amendment. See Jones II, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 333-39 (holding that the CSL does not prohibit protected speech or expressive conduct); see also Expressions, 808 F.3d at 141 (abstaining under Pullman where "there is a minimal risk that any First Amendment rights . . . will be compromised by our decision to abstain"). Second, as stated in Jones III, Plaintiff may still seek a declaratory judgment in state court to settle decisively the scope of the CSL. See N. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, No. 04-CV-9949, 2005 WL 926969, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2005) (Karas, J.) (quoting Accident Fund v. Baerwaldt, 579 F.Supp. 724, 728 (W.D. Mich. 1984)) ("An important consideration, apparently overlooked by plaintiffs, is their freedom to seek injunctive relief in the state courts; a course of action clearly contemplated by the Pullman . . . doctrine[].").12

In sum, because this Court wishes to avoid the "friction-generating error that can result when a federal court endeavors to construe a novel state act not yet reviewed by the state's highest court," Expressions, 808 F.3d at 137, and because this Court believes that a state court determination of the meaning of the CSL will resolve or modify the federal constitutional issue, this Court abstains.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court abstains in this case, but retains jurisdiction pending a determination by a state court as to the meaning of the challenged state laws. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501-02. Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is DENIED without prejudice to its renewal. This Opinion and Order resolves Docket entries 17 and 37.

SO ORDERED.