GEORGE B. DANIELS, District Judge.
Plaintiffs Baldwin Technology Company, Inc. ("Baldwin") and Baldwin Americas Corporation ("Americas") move pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Defendant Printers' Service, Inc. (Notice of Mot. at 1, dated Sept. 25, 2015, filed Oct. 6, 2015, ECF No. 48.) Plaintiffs seek to prohibit Defendant "from violating the non-compete provision in the Parties' Distribution Agreement." (Notice of Mot. at 1.)
On September 17, 2015 and September 30, 2015, this Court held hearings on Plaintiffs' motions. For the purposes of this Order, this Court offers the following brief summary of the facts, drawn from the parties' submissions and the representations made at the hearings. Baldwin is a manufacturer and supplier of equipment for the print industry. (Sept. 10, 2015 Moore Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 13.) Among the products it manufactures and supplies are cleaning rolls and fabrics used in printing presses. (Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for TRO at 2, ECF No. 12.) Defendant is a manufacturer and distributor of printing industry supplies. (Amend. Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 45.) Defendant and its "affiliated" entities ("Affiliates")
Since 2000, Baldwin has sold product to Defendant's Affiliates, invoicing the Affiliates directly and receiving payments directly from the Affiliates. (Sept. 24, 2015 Liroff Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No. 36.) Baldwin and Printers' Service, Inc. entered into distribution agreements in 2000, 2004, and 2009. (Oct. 9, 2015 Liroff Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 50.) Defendant alleges, and Plaintiffs do not contest, that Baldwin drafted those agreements. (Oct. 9, 2015 Liroff Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 50.) Baldwin did not have written agreements with any of the Affiliates. (Sept. 30, 2015 Tr. 49:25-50:02.)
There are only two parties to the November 9, 2009 Distribution Agreement ("2009 Agreement"), Baldwin Technology Company, Inc. and Printers' Service Inc. (Sept. 10, 2015 Moore Aff., Ex. 1, Distribution Agreement at 1, ECF No. 13-1.) "Printers' Service Inc." is referenced as "PRISCO" throughout the 2009 Agreement. (2009 Agreement at 1.) The 2009 Agreement's introductory clauses explain that the parties entered into that Agreement because "BALDWIN and PRISCO have worked together under prior agreements under which PRISCO has been marketing, selling, and distributing certain Baldwin Products . . ., and BALDWIN has been selling certain BALDWIN Products to PRISCO for resale by PRISCO to PRISCO's customers. . . . BALDWIN and PRISCO wish to extend that relationship. . . ." (2009 Agreement at 1 (emphasis added).) The 2009 Agreement provides that "during the term of this Agreement and any Renewal Term and for a one (1) year period thereafter, [PRISCO] will not make or sell any Directly Competitive Cleaning Rolls for a one (1) year period starting from the date of expiration of the Initial Term or any subsequent Renewal Term." (2009 Agreement ¶ 14.3.) The 2009 Agreement provided that it would terminate five years from November 9, 2009. (See 2009 Agreement ¶ 14.1.) It also contained a clause providing for automatic one-year renewals unless it was terminated by written notice six months before its expiration. (2009 Agreement ¶ 14.2.)
The 2009 Agreement contains an arbitration clause providing that "[i]n the event a dispute arises under this Agreement and cannot be resolved by good faith negotiations between the parties in accordance with the [other provisions], the dispute shall be resolved by arbitration." (2009 Agreement ¶ 18.5.) The 2009 Agreement also provides that "[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, each party shall have the right to seek injunctive relief in court at any time and under any circumstances." (2009 Agreement ¶ 18.6.) The 2009 Agreement designates the Southern District of New York as the exclusive jurisdiction for an action seeking injunctive relief in court. (2009 Agreement ¶ 18.6.) As of the September 30, 2015 hearing, neither party had sought arbitration of their dispute. (See Sept. 30, 2015 Tr. 62:06-62:08.)
At some point in 2014, the relationship between Baldwin and Printers' Service, Inc. soured. The Parties disagree about when the 2009 Agreement expired and therefore when the restriction on Printers' Service Inc.'s sale of cleaning rolls ends. (Compare Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for TRO at 2 (Plaintiffs arguing the agreement expired on August 5, 2015), ECF No. 12, with Def.'s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. for TRO at 21-22 (Defendant arguing that, at the latest, the agreement expired on November 9, 2014), ECF No. 37.)
Since at least September 2015, some Affiliates have sold cleaning rolls under the "Prisco Proclean" trade name. (Sept. 24, 2015 Liroff Aff. ¶ 28, ECF No. 36.) Defendant Printers' Service Inc. alleges that it has not itself sold any competing product. (See Def.'s Mem. of Law in Further Opp'n at 9, ECF No. 49.)
The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests in a district court's sound discretion. Am. Exp. Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Thorley, 147 F.3d 229, 232 (2d Cir. 1998). A preliminary injunction "is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Moore v. Consol. Edison Co., 409 F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005)). "Where the parties have agreed to arbitrate a dispute, a district court has jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo pending arbitration." Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 894-95 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Blumenthal v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 910 F.2d 1049, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1990)).
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate: (1) "a likelihood of success on the merits or . . . sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the plaintiffs favor;" (2) "a likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction;" (3) "that the balance of hardships tips in the plaintiffs favor;" and (4) "that the public interest would not be disserved by the issuance of an injunction." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2010)). "In non-compete cases, such as this one, the irreparable harm analysis and the likelihood of success on the merits analysis are closely related and often conflated." IBM Corp. v. Visentin, No. 11 Civ. 00399, 2011 WL 672025, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011) (quoting IBM Corp. v. Papermaster, No. 08 Civ. 09078, 2008 WL 4974508, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2008)), aff'd, 437 F. App'x 53.
"Irreparable harm is an injury that is not remote or speculative but actual and imminent, and `for which a monetary award cannot be adequate compensation.'" Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm't, Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 37 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)). "[I]rreparable harm exists only where there is a threatened imminent loss that will be very difficult to quantify at trial." Id. at 38. Consequently, "where monetary damages may provide adequate compensation, a preliminary injunction should not issue." Javaraj v. Scappini, 66 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir.1995). "[A] movant's loss of current or future market share may constitute irreparable harm." Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2007).
New York courts are reluctant to "to rewrite the plain language of [contracts] negotiated between sophisticated business entities." Cellular Tel. Co. v. 210 E. 86th St. Corp., 839 N.Y.S.2d 476, 480 (1st Dep't 2007); (see Amended Compl. ¶ 64 (describing Baldwin and "Prisco" as "sophisticated business entities"), ECF No. 45.) No Affiliate is a signatory to the 2009 Agreement, nor is any Affiliate a party to the 2009 Agreement. (See 2009 Agreement at 1.)
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' Affiliates may be enjoined under the 2009 Agreement as agents of Defendant. (See Sept. 30, 2015 Tr. 48:14-48:21.) Plaintiffs cite New York case law for the principle that "[a] court of equity will not permit a wholly owned subsidiary unconscionably or wantonly to commit violations of agreements formerly entered into by its parent." (Sept. 30, 2015 Tr. 47:3-47:8 (citing Madison Pictures, Inc. v. Pictorial Films, Inc., 151 N.Y.S.2d 95, 105 (Sup. Ct. 1956)). But Plaintiffs have not submitted evidence that Defendant and Affiliates have a parent-subsidiary relationship or even that they are commonly owned.
Plaintiffs' representations about the decline in Baldwin's sales are also unreliable. (See Sept. 30, 2015 Tr. 78:22-79:03; 79:20-80:02.) The figures that Plaintiffs represented at the September 30, 2015 hearing were projected figures and did not distinguish between losses resulting from the termination of the 2009 Agreement and losses resulting from Defendant's competition. To further support their allegations of imminent injury, Plaintiffs refer to photographs taken by a Baldwin employee purportedly showing competing cleaning rolls sold by Defendant to a customer in Tennessee; the photographs show cleaning rolls labeled with the word "Prisco." (See Sept. 17, 2015 Allen Aff. ¶¶ 2-4 (affidavit describing photographs), ECF No. 25; Ex. 8 (photographs of cleaning rolls), ECF No. 29-1.) Further, Plaintiffs point to press releases bearing the "Prisco" and "Printers' Service" trade names and advertising competing cleaning rolls. (See Sept. 10, 2015 Moore Aff., Exs. 5-6, ECF Nos. 13-5-13-6.) Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that customers have "ceased or delayed ordering product from Baldwin in order to test or use the competing products offered by Prisco." (Sept. 18, 2015 Bowers Aff. at ¶ 6, ECF No. 26.) Defendant's Affiliates, however, are authorized to use the "Prisco" and "Printers' Service" trade names, (Sept. 24, 2015 Liroff Aff. ¶ 2, ECF No. 36), and Defendant denies selling any competing product, (Def's Mem. of Law in Further Opp'n at 9, ECF No. 49).
On this record, Plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing that Defendant is now competing with Plaintiffs, or that any Affiliates' competing actions can be attributed to Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, an imminent likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, or that the balance of hardships tips in Plaintiffs' favor.
As Plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, a likelihood of irreparable harm, or that the balance of hardships tips in their favor, Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prohibit Defendant from violating the twelve-month non-compete provision of the 2009 Agreement is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Defendant argues that the 2009 Agreement terminated on either July 31, 2014 or November 9, 2014. (Def.'s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Pls.'s Mot. for TRO at 21.) On May 9, 2014, Defendant sent Baldwin a letter purporting to terminate the 2009 Agreement as of July 31, 2014 under a provision of the 2009 Agreement that permits one party to terminate the agreement in the event that the other party experiences a change of ownership. (See id at 21-22; see also 2009 Agreement ¶ 14.7.) Plaintiffs argue that Defendant could not terminate the 2009 Agreement under that provision because Defendant had previously consented to the change in ownership. (Pls.' Supp. Mem. of Law at 7, ECF No. 31.)
Defendant argues in the alternative that the 2009 Agreement expired on November 9, 2014, when the initial five-year term of the 2009 Agreement came to an end. (Def.'s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Pls.'s Mot. for TRO at 22.) Therefore, under Defendant's argument, the restriction on Defendant's sale of cleaning rolls ended on November 9, 2015 at the latest. Plaintiffs argue that the 2009 Agreement automatically renewed for a one-year term under the renewal clause as Defendant's May 9, 2014 letter did not give specific notice of non-renewal (Pls.' Supp. Mem. of Law at 8-9.)