OPINION AND ORDER
SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.
Defendant RBSM, LLP ("RBSM") moves to withdraw the reference to the Bankruptcy Court of an adversary proceeding for breach of contract and professional negligence brought by Michael St. Patrick Baxter ("plaintiff"), solely in his capacity as Chapter 11 Trustee of Money Centers of America, Inc. ("MCA"). For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion to withdraw the reference of the above-captioned adversary proceeding pursuant to section 157(d) of Title 28 of the United States Code is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2014, MCA filed a chapter 11 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. Plaintiff was appointed as Chapter 11 Trustee a month after the filing.1 On January 16, 2015, plaintiff filed this adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. As explained by plaintiff, "[t]he case was filed in New York because that is where Defendants are based."2 The adversary proceeding was assigned to Bankruptcy Judge Sean Lane.
The Complaint states that the adversary proceeding is non-core. That description is accurate and uncontested. Plaintiff asserts claims for breach of contract and professional negligence.3 Specifically, the Complaint alleges that defendant accounting firm Sherb & Co., LLP ("Sherb") served as MCA's auditor and breached its contractual duties to "obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatements, . . . [including those related to] misappropriation of assets" and to "inform [MCA] of any material errors or fraud" of which it became aware.4 According to the Complaint, RBSM is liable as Sherb's successor following a de facto merger with Sherb.5
RBSM filed an Answer in March 2015 and an Amended Answer in April 2015.6 Sherb has neither appeared in the proceeding nor filed an answer. Accordingly, in July 2015, the Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court entered a default against Sherb pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), made applicable by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7055.7
Judge Lane entered an initial scheduling order on June 10, 2015, a protective order on September 2, 2015, and an amended scheduling order on November 10, 2015. Under the amended scheduling order, fact discovery ends on March 31, 2016, and dispositive motions are due by July 28, 2016.8
II. LEGAL STANDARD
District courts have original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and all proceedings that "arise under" Title 11 or "arise in" or are "related to" a bankruptcy case.9 District courts are authorized by statute to refer cases and proceedings within the court's bankruptcy jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges of the district.10 The Southern District of New York has a standing order that provides for automatic reference of such cases and proceedings.11
Under section 157(d) of Title 28 of the United States Code, "[t]he district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown." As a general rule, "courts should employ withdrawal judiciously in order to prevent it from becoming just another litigation tactic for parties eager to find a way out of bankruptcy court."12 The moving party bears the burden of establishing that permissive withdrawal is warranted.
In In re Orion Pictures Corporation, the Second Circuit explained that a showing of cause depends on a number of factors.13 These include whether the proceeding is core or non-core and, if a jury demand has been made, whether the proceeding is legal or equitable, as well as considerations of judicial economy, uniformity of bankruptcy administration, reduction of forum shopping, economical use of debtors' and creditors' resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process.14 The relevance of the core/non-core inquiry is that absent the consent of the parties, only Article III judges can enter final judgments in non-core proceedings.15 When a matter is non-core, and absent the consent of the parties, a bankruptcy judge must issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that are reviewed de novo by the district court.16
Thus, the determination that a matter is not core may support withdrawal of the reference if the district court "conclude[s] that . . . unnecessary costs could be avoided by a single proceeding in the district court."17 However, "the core/non-core distinction" is often a "distinction without a difference" because the other Orion factors may counsel in favor of allowing the proceeding to remain in the bankruptcy court through the pretrial stages of the action even if it is not core.18 Indeed, the bankruptcy court's issuance of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law may promote judicial economy and aid the district court, particularly where the bankruptcy court is familiar with the underlying bankruptcy case, the adversary proceeding, and/or the substantive bankruptcy law applicable to the proceeding.19
III. DISCUSSION
RBSM has demonstrated cause to withdraw the reference. The reference should be withdrawn because "unnecessary costs could be avoided by a single proceeding in the district court."20 Judge Lane has no connection to the underlying bankruptcy case and the Complaint asserts non-core state law claims. Because the claims are non-core, and RBSM does not consent to the Bankruptcy Court entering a final judgment, the Bankruptcy Court is required to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on dispositive motions which are subject to de novo review by the district court. This extra layer of review can be avoided if the matter is withdrawn to the district court.
RBSM will be prejudiced by the cost and delay of having to multiply proceedings in this way. The sooner the action is transferred to the district court, the sooner that court can familiarize itself with the case and shepherd it to a resolution. The parties do not obtain any benefit from the case being before the Bankruptcy Court. In fact, the only reason the case was filed in the Bankruptcy Court is because of the standing order of reference.
It is therefore somewhat surprising that plaintiff even objects to RSBM's motion. Yet plaintiff makes the knee-jerk argument that RBSM's motion is not ripe because the case may never reach trial,21 and argues that the fact "[t]hat MCA's main bankruptcy case is pending in Delaware does not detract from the fact that the bankruptcy court . . . has become generally familiar with the case during the more than ten months it has been pending, and that keeping it there for pretrial purposes is thus most efficient."22 While Judge Lane may have some general knowledge,23 that does not mean that his continued stewardship of the case is prudent or likely to promote judicial economy or efficiency. MCA's bankruptcy case is pending in the District of Delaware, there are no related adversary proceedings pending before Judge Lane, and the adversary proceeding is based on two state-law claims. By contrast, the cases plaintiff cites set forth clear efficiencies in having the bankruptcy court continue to preside over the pretrial stages of the proceeding. These efficiencies are based on factors such as the bankruptcy court's familiarity with the underlying bankruptcy case, the existence of both core and non-core claims, or the bankruptcy court having had extensive pretrial involvement with the adversary proceeding.24
Judge Lane's limited involvement in the adversary proceeding does not suggest any such efficiencies. There is no sense in which a district court could benefit from any specialized knowledge of the Bankruptcy Court by virtue of its knowledge of the underlying bankruptcy case, the Bankruptcy Code, or as a result of the minimal activity in the adversary proceeding itself.25 At the same time, it is a waste of judicial resources for a court of specialized bankruptcy knowledge to administer a case that does not require application of that knowledge.26
Finally, plaintiff admits that several Orion factors — uniformity of bankruptcy administration, reduction of forum shopping, economical use of debtors' and creditors' resources, and expediting the bankruptcy process — are not relevant here, and that defendant's request for a jury trial will be relevant at the trial stage.27 Accordingly, the balance of the Orion factors weigh in favor of granting RBSM's motion to withdraw the reference pursuant to section 157(d).28
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, RBSM's motion is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion [Docket # 1]. The amended scheduling order entered in the Bankruptcy Court on November 10, 2015 remains in effect, except that the April 12, 2016 status conference will be held before this Court at 4:30 p.m.
SO ORDERED.