OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMÁN, District Judge.

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPMC") pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Complaint purports to bring a class action against JPMC for its alleged violation of Section 275 of the New York Real Property Law ("RPL § 275") and Section 1921 of the New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law ("RPAPL § 1921") (collectively, "the Statutes"). For the following reasons, JPMC's motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND1

On March 17, 2004, the sole plaintiff2 named in this putative class action, Tina Bellino, obtained a $300,000 mortgage loan from JPMC to purchase a house located at 46 Highland Avenue in Tarrytown, New York. (Compl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1.) On May 11, 2012, Bellino sold the house. (Id. ¶ 12.) At some point thereafter, Bellino used the proceeds from the sale to pay off the outstanding principal, interest, and fees due on the mortgage (the "Pay-Off Amount"). (Id. ¶ 12.) JPMC received a check for the Pay-Off Amount on May 14, 2012 in Columbus, Ohio. (Statement of Material Facts in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("JPMC's 56.1 Statement"), ECF No. 67, ¶ 1.) A satisfaction of mortgage was sent to the Westchester County Clerk for recording via Federal Express on June 13, 2012. (Id. ¶ 2; Declaration of Erika Lance, ECF No. 70, ¶ 4.) The Westchester County Clerk's Office (the "Clerk") recorded the Certificate on June 21, 2012. (See Compl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1.)

STANDARD ON A SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule states in pertinent part:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine dispute or issue of material fact by pointing to evidence in the record, "including depositions, documents . . . [and] affidavits or declarations," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), "which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has fulfilled its preliminary burden, the onus shifts to the nonmoving party to raise the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Courts must "constru[e] the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[] all reasonable inferences in its favor." Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 720 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir. 2005)). In reviewing the record, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, "the inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial." Id. at 250.

DISCUSSION

The question before the Court is one of statutory interpretation: whether a satisfaction of mortgage or certificate of discharge ("satisfaction") is "presented" for recording at the time that it is mailed to, or at the time it is received by, the county clerk. When interpreting a statute, "we begin with the text . . . to determine whether its language is clear or ambiguous". Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 423 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)). "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Id. If the language remains ambiguous, the Court will resort first to canons of statutory construction, and then to legislative history. United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2000).3

I. Statutory Text of RPL § 275 & RPAPL § 1921

We look first to the text of the Statutes. Both Statutes state that a mortgagee must "arrange" to have a satisfaction "presented [to the appropriate recording officer] for recording" within 30 days. If the mortgagee fails to "present" the satisfaction for recording within 30 days, a series of escalating fees attach:

N.Y. Real Prop. § 275; N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. § 1921 (emphasis added).

JPMC argues that the Statutes contain two separate thirty-day deadline provisions. (Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Summary Judgment 5, ECF No. 76 [hereinafter Def.s' Reply].) The first provision requires mortgagees to "arrange" to have a satisfaction presented within thirty days. (Id.) The second provision requires that they actually make that presentation within thirty days. (Id.) JPMC further argues that the use of an identical deadline for both provisions indicates that the Legislature intended for "present" and "arrange to present" to have the same meaning—which is to mail (the satisfaction). Thus, according to JPMC, a satisfaction is presented for recording on the date that it is placed with a mail service for delivery to the appropriate county clerk. Under this interpretation, JPMC fulfilled its obligation to present Bellino's satisfaction for recording when it gave the document to FedEx on the thirtieth day after the mortgage was paid off. In contrast, Bellino argues that the first provision of the Statutes requires that a mortgagee "arrange" to have the satisfaction presented within thirty days, including by contracting with third-party services. The second provision imposes strict liability if the satisfaction is not received by the clerk within that timeframe. According to Bellino, JPMC violated the statute by failing to ensure that the satisfaction was "presented to" or received by the county clerk within thirty days after the mortgage was paid off.

a. Ordinary Meaning of the Term "Present"

To determine the meaning of the term "present," we look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the term. Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Town of Clarkstown, 57 N.Y.2d 206, 209, 441 N.E.2d 1076, 1078 (1982); see Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S.Ct. 1886, 1893, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (2013) ("As in any statutory construction case, we start, of course, with the statutory text, and proceed from the understanding that unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning." (citation and quotations omitted)). Citing the Miriam-Webster Dictionary, the Oxford English Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, the definitions Bellino offers include: "to give something to someone in a formal way"; "to offer, deliver, hand over"; "to bring or place (a thing) before or into the hands of a person for acceptance". (Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 8-9, ECF No. 73 [hereinafter Pl.'s Opp.].) Although, as JPMC points out, at least one dictionary defines "present" more broadly to encompass "send", see (Def.s' Reply 2 (citing Webster's New World College Dictionary)), the prevailing plain meaning of the term appears to imply receipt.

JPMC argues that, because the Legislature established deadlines through filing dates in other provisions of the same statutes, its failure to do so here is indicative of an intent not to require receipt. According to this logic, if the Legislature intended to guarantee that the clerk received the satisfaction within thirty days after the balance on the mortgage was paid, it would have written the statutes to, for instance, require mortgagees to "file" the satisfaction, rather than requiring that it be "presented for recording". This argument is unavailing. The provisions cited by JPMC — N.Y. R.P.A.P.L. § 1921(5)(a), § 1946 and N.Y. R.P.L.§ 280(6)—either concern filings of objections, affidavits and notices regarding special proceedings, or analogize recording with filing in reference to the actual act of the county clerk. (See Defs. Mem. 8-9.) To "present" something "for recording" appears to be a term of art commonly used to describe the submission of legal instruments affecting real property to the recording clerk, see e.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 291-d (referencing instruments of conveyance "presented for recording"); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 321 (referencing certificates "presented to the recording officer"); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 335 (referencing certificates of abandonment to be "presented" to the county clerk for recording), whereas, the term "file" is often employed with regard to documents associated with litigation, such as objections and affidavits.5 Because these verbs appear to correspond with their subjects, these provisions do not make clear that the Legislature perceived, or meant to signal any difference between the terms "present" and "file".6 Thus, the imposition of filing dates does not resolve the question of whether the Legislature intended for presentation to be complete upon mailing or receipt in RPL § 275 and RPAPL § 1921.

II. "Present" in Other Provisions of New York Law

A look at other provisions of New York Real Property Law that include the term "present" shed some light on the Legislature's intent in employing this word. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 321 provides that a "recording officer shall mark on the record of a mortgage the word `discharged' when there is presented to him a certificate or certificates . . . specifying that the mortgage has been paid or otherwise satisfied and discharged." (emphasis added.) Clearly, the recording officer cannot mark the mortgage "discharged" until he actually receives the certificate of discharge. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 291-I7 requires that accompanying documents, to be filed "therewith" or alongside a legal instrument, be "presented to the recording officer" "at the same time" that the instrument is recorded electronically. In this instance, "presented to" is more akin to "filed" or "submitted" than "mailed." The most natural reading of these provisions is that a document is "presented" to the recording officer upon receipt. See People v. Lam, 31 Misc.3d 101, 103, 925 N.Y.S.2d 805, 807 (App. Term 2011) ("General rules of statutory construction dictate that a statute be construed according to its natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction" (citing McKinney's Cons. Law of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes § 94)).

Outside of property law, other New York statutes use the term "present" to indicate actual receipt. For instance, N.Y. Tax Law § 2568 provides that, for the purpose of assessing the taxes to be paid on a mortgage, where the principal indebtedness is not apparent from the mortgage itself, the taxes shall be determined based on the value of the property, "unless at the time of presenting such mortgage for record," the owner files a sworn statement with the recording officer regarding the indebtedness.9 Defendant acknowledges that filing implies receipt. (See Def.s' Mem. 8-9.) For a sworn statement to be filed at the same time as a mortgage is "presented" for record, the mortgage would have to be before the clerk. Furthermore, if we were to replace the term "present" with "mail", this provision would require that the owner file a sworn statement at the time that she places the mortgage in the mail. Such an interpretation would defy the ordinary, apparent meaning of this provision. Here again, the most obvious reading of this provision indicates that a presentation for recording occurs when the document is received by, not merely mailed to, the clerk.

III. "Present" in New York Case Law

New York case law elucidating the meaning of the term "present", in relevant contexts, is sparse. However, property-related case law does imply that a document is "presented" for recording upon receipt. See M & T Real Estate Trust v. Doyle, 20 N.Y.3d 563, 567, 987 N.E.2d 257 (2013) (citing Brackett v. Barney, 28 N.Y. 333, 340-341 (1863) (analogizing "presentment" with "delivery", and noting that where, as with a deed, delivery and acceptance is necessary to give effect to an instrument, common law dictates that delivery (or presentment), implies acceptance, without which, it is "nugatory"); see also MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 8 N.Y.3d 90, 95-96, 861 N.E.2d 81, 82-83 (2006) (synthesizing a lower court holding indicating that a "Clerk must record and index. . . . [specific kinds of] mortgage[s] when presented . . ." (emphasis added)); Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n v. Levine-Rodriguez, 153 Misc.2d 8, 16, 579 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (noting, in the context of competing mortgages, that, "shortly after presentation of the document the title company (or filer) [should] run an additional search as of the date of recordation to establish proper indexing" (emphasis added)).

Both parties cite case law outside of the property context in support of their interpretation of the word "present." (See e.g., Def.s' Reply 2-3; Pl.s' Opp. 9-10.) However, the Court does not find these interpretations persuasive. For instance, JPMC points to Matter of Ford, 111 A.D.2d 951, 490 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1985), which held that a claim was timely presented upon mailing, after comparing the service requirements for a notice of claim in a similar statute.10 Bellino counters with Indig v. Nat'l City Bank, 80 N.Y. 100, 106 (1880). In Indig, the Court remarked that "presentment" by mail was sufficient to present a note to a bank because the note arrived on the date it was due, and that the bank had a duty to pay the note "on presentation" assuming funds were available. Indig, 80 N.Y. at 104, 106. Taken together, these cases merely demonstrate that the term "present" occurs in numerous contexts outside of property law, connoting mailing on some occasions, and receipt on others.

IV. Legislative History

The legislative history of RPL § 275 and RPAPL § 1921 provides further assistance in ascertaining what the Legislature intended by the term "present." See Albany Law Sch. v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 19 N.Y.3d 106, 120, 968 N.E.2d 967, 974 (2012) ("[Principles of statutory interpretation require inquiry] into the spirit and purpose of the legislation, which requires examination of the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history"). State agencies that advised the Governor of New York before he signed the statutes into law appeared to use the terms "provide" and "file" interchangeably with "present".11 See Memorandum from Robert P. Leslie, Acting General Counsel, Department of State, to Platkin (June 29, 2005), reprinted in Bill Jacket at 8 ("This bill . . . require[s] a mortgagee to pay specified penalties . . . if the mortgagee fails to provide the mortgagor with a certificate of discharge within specified periods of time after the mortgage has been paid." (emphasis added)); Letter from Christopher C. O'Brien, Deputy Commissioner and Counsel, Department of Taxation and Finance, to Platkin (June 24, 2005), reprinted in Bill Jacket at 9 ("This bill would . . . establish a time frame under which a mortgagee would be required to file a certificate of discharge for recording after the principal and interest due on the mortgage have been paid in full." (emphasis added)). Sponsors of the bill also appeared to use the term "deliver" interchangeably with "present".12 See N.Y. Gen. Assemb. Debate on Assemb. Bill A4540-C, Calendar No. 445 (June 15, 2005) (noting during debate that, "if the satisfaction is delivered to the county clerk more than" thirty days after a mortgage is paid, a penalty would result).

V. Analysis

As a general rule, Courts should apply an interpretation that harmonizes the provisions of a statute with each other, and with the general intent of the statute, Westchester Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Melissa B. v. Robert W.R., 25 A.D.3d 62, 68-69, 803 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676-77 (2005), which is to ensure the timely recording of satisfactions. As part of this endeavor, the Court attempts to give effect to every word of the statute, so as to avoid interpretations that would render any language superfluous. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Salovaara, 326 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir.2003). "In the construction of a statute, meaning and effect should be given to all its language, if possible, and words are not to be rejected as superfluous when it is practicable to give to each a distinct and separate meaning." N.Y. Stat. Law § 231. If the Court were to adopt JPMC's interpretation, it would render both the first provision, and the phrase "arrange to", superfluous. If the first provision required that mortgagees mail the mortgage satisfaction within thirty days, and the second provision required the exact same thing, lest the mortgagee be subject to penalties, the first provision would be a redundancy, encompassed within the second provision. This interpretation would also render the phrase "arrange to" an unnecessary and peculiar addition, omitted from one sentence to the next. "Among the most fundamental canons of statutory interpretation is the rule that [w]hen different terms are used in various parts of a statute or rule, it is reasonable to assume that a distinction between them is intended." N. Mariana Islands v. Millard, 287 F.R.D. 204, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, an "inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted and excluded". Chem. Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Jorling, 85 N.Y.2d 382, 394, 649 N.E.2d 1145, 1151 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This would appear to be especially true for consecutive sentences. In order to harmonize these sentences with each other, and the Statutes' legislative intent, this Court adopts Bellino's interpretation, and reads RPL § 275 and RPAPL § 1921 to require that the mortgagee "arrange," or make preparations to provide, the county clerk with the satisfaction within thirty days, and if it fails to provide the mortgage satisfaction to the clerk, ensuring receipt within that time period, to be subject to penalties.

As this Court has said previously, penalties for failure to timely provide satisfactions encourage mortgagees to record mortgage satisfactions expeditiously, which helps ensure that property records accurately reflect encumbrances (or lack thereof), and facilitate efficient real estate markets. See Glatter v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 669 N.Y.S.2d 651, 654 (App. Div. 1998) (noting that "[d]ischarges of mortgages are routinely delivered many months after the final payment has been made to the mortgage lender," and that the legislative sponsors of the Statutes enacted this scheme to prevent this problem from "bring[ing] the whole system for transferring residential property in [New York] grinding to a halt" (internal quotation marks omitted)).13 If the Court were to find that presentment occurred upon mailing, to the extent delivery dates can vary significantly between mail carriers, the certificate could presumably take days, weeks, or longer to arrive, in direct contravention of the statutory intent to incentivize the timely recording of satisfactions. See O'Reilly v. State, 164 Misc.2d 477, 480, 625 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Ct. Cl. 1995) (noting it could take "many days" for mail to be delivered even within one state).

Based upon the plain meaning of the term "present", the meaning of the term as it appears in the Statutes, similar provisions and case law, and the legislative intent and history of the RPL § 275 and RPAPL § 1921, the Court finds that a satisfaction is "presented" for recording upon receipt by the county clerk. Accordingly, this Court construes RPL § 275 and RPAPL § 1921 to have required that JPMC provide Bellino's satisfaction to the county clerk for recording on or before the thirtieth day after Bellino paid the balance due on her mortgage.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, JPMC's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Court respectfully directs the Clerk to terminate the motion at ECF No. 66. The parties are directed to contact Judge McCarthy within 48 hours of this decision.