VERNON S. BRODERICK, District Judge.
Petitioner New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters ("Petitioner" or "District Council") commenced this action against Respondent A.J.S. Project Management a/k/a A.J.S. Project Management, Inc. ("Respondent") to confirm an arbitration award pursuant to § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, et seq.
At all relevant times, Petitioner, a labor organization, and Respondent, an employer, were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA").
The District Council submitted the dispute to Arbitrator Adelman (the "2015 Arbitration"). On September 8, 2015, following notice to all parties, the Arbitrator held a hearing. (Pet. ¶ 8; Op. & Award 1.)
In 2016, the Funds commenced a separate arbitration against Respondent related to an audit and alleged delinquent fringe benefit contributions due to the Funds that the audit revealed (the "2016 Arbitration").
On November 14, 2016, Petitioner commenced this action by filing its Petition. (Doc. 1.) On January 11, 2017, Respondent filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the Petition and in support of its cross-petition to vacate the 2015 Arbitration Award, along with the declaration of Milo Silberstein, with exhibits, in support. (Docs. 10, 11.) On March 3, 2017, Petitioner filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Respondent's cross-petition to vacate the 2015 Arbitration Award and in further support of its Petition, along with the declaration of Lydia Sigelakis in support. (Docs. 14, 15.)
"Section 301 of the [LMRA] provides federal courts with jurisdiction over petitions brought to confirm labor arbitration awards." Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater N.Y. v. Parker Meridien Hotel, 145 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1998). A court's review of a final arbitration award under the LMRA is "very limited." Nat'l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 820 F.3d 527, 536 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001)). A party moving to vacate an arbitration award "bears the burden of proof, and the showing required to defeat confirmation is high." N.Y. Hotel & Motel Trades Council v. Hotel St. George, 988 F.Supp. 770, 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citation omitted).
"Confirmation of a labor arbitration award under LMRA § 301 is a summary proceeding that merely makes what is already a final arbitration award a judgment of the Court." Trs. of the N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Coastal Envtl. Grp., Inc., No. 1:16-CV-6004-GHW, 2016 WL 7335672, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Because the federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of arbitration awards, an arbitrator's award resolving a labor dispute is legitimate and enforceable as long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and is not merely an exercise of the arbitrator's own brand of industrial justice." Local 97, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 196 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, "barring exceptional circumstances—such as fraud or an arbitration decision that violates public policy— a reviewing court must confirm an arbitration award so long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority." Trs. of N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. A to E Inc., No. 16-cv-4455 (CM), 2018 WL 1737133, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Respondent asserts that the 2015 Arbitration Award should be vacated because it violates public policy. Specifically, Respondent argues that the 2016 Arbitration litigated the same claims as the 2015 Arbitration and that both arbitrations were commenced by the same party— Petitioner. (Respt.'s Mem. 2.) I disagree and find that Respondent has failed to demonstrate the exceptional circumstances necessary to warrant me making a determination that the award violated public policy such that I should not enforce that 2015 Arbitration Award.
After review of the documents submitted by the parties, including the 2016 Notice of Intention to Arbitrate and the Opinion and Award of Arbitrator Maher, it is evident that the 2016 Arbitration was commenced by the Funds—including the New York City District Council of Carpenters Pension Fund and the New York City District Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund, among others—rather than Petitioner New York City & Vicinity District Council of Carpenters. (See Silberstein Decl. Ex. B (the Fund's demand to commence the 2016 Arbitration, enclosing "a copy of a Notice of Intention to Arbitrate filed by the New York City District Council of Carpenters Benefit Funds"), Ex. C (Arbitrator Maher's opinion and award listing the various funds that demanded arbitration).) To the extent Respondent contends that the Funds is the same entity as the District Council, "[t]hat is simply wrong; the [] Fund[s] is a distinct entity." Trs. of the Hollow Metal Pension Fund v. Morris Fine Furniture Work Shops Inc., No. 13 Civ. 1660(PAC), 2013 WL 5912162, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2013); see also Sciss v. Metal Polishers Union Local 8A, 562 F.Supp. 293, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("The legislated separation between the unions and the funds . . . lead to the conclusion that the funds are not agents of the union.").
Furthermore, based on the facts and record before me, I cannot conclude that the claims at issue in the 2015 Arbitration and the 2016 Arbitration were identical. The 2015 Arbitration involved a violation pertaining to Respondent's failure to hire a shop steward while performing certain covered work, which was not at issue in the 2016 Arbitration. Moreover, there is no indication that the delinquent contributions at issue in the 2016 Arbitration—which covered a broader timeframe and more individuals than the 2015 Arbitration—were the same as or overlapped with the unpaid contributions at issue in the 2015 Arbitration.
Lastly—to the extent that Respondent is attempting to assert res judicata or a similar claim—Respondent points to nothing in the record demonstrating that it raised the issues it now raises concerning the 2015 Arbitration Award at the 2016 Arbitration, a failure that is also fatal to its claim. See Transit Mix Concrete Corp. v. Local Union No. 282, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 809 F.2d 963, 969-70 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that res judicata effect of previous arbitration award was a question, at least in the first instance, for the arbitrator); N.Y. Hotel & Motel Trades Council, 988 F. Supp. at 770, 777-79 (foreclosing respondent's res judicata claim in LMRA confirmation action because respondent did not raise the issue before the arbitrator).
Because (1) Respondent provides no support for its assertion that the claims in both arbitrations were identical, (2) the same party did not initiate both the 2015 Arbitration and the 2016 Arbitration, and (3) Respondent failed to raise the issue of preclusion at the 2016 Arbitration, I find that the 2015 Arbitration Award does not violate public policy.
I have reviewed the record before me and find that Arbitrator Adelson's 2015 Arbitration Award was not arbitrary, did not exceed his powers, was not contrary to public policy, and provides the parties with far more than "a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached." D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 110 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, I find that the 2015 Arbitration Award should be confirmed.
For the foregoing reasons, the District Council's Petition to confirm the 2015 Arbitration Award, (Doc. 1), is GRANTED.
While Petitioner seeks recovery for interest and for attorneys' fees and costs, it has not provided any materials documenting the attorneys' fees and cost in support of its position. If Petitioner still intends to seek recovery for pre- or post-judgment interest and attorneys' fees and costs, it is directed to submit, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Opinion & Order, documents establishing a factual basis for any such award. Such documents should include contemporaneous billing records documenting, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, the nature of the work, and the total amount of fees and costs sought, including documentation of those costs.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment in favor of Petitioner and against Respondent in the amount of $22,280.20.
SO ORDERED.