P. KEVIN CASTEL, District Judge.
This is a putative class action brought by Alexandria Rudolph relating to a widely publicized data breach occurring on or about March 28, 2018 affecting customers of Saks Fifth Avenue, Lord & Taylor, and Saks OFF 5TH department stores. The action was commenced in the Central District of California on June 8, 2018 and transferred to this District on September 18, 2018. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, which is now fully briefed.
A group of proposed intervenors, who are plaintiffs in putative class actions against the same named defendants pending in the District of Delaware and the Middle District of Tennessee, seek to intervene in this action so that they may move to dismiss, stay or transfer this action to the District of Delaware.
By the Court's count, at least eight proposed intervenors were plaintiffs in putative class actions previously brought in this District relating to the data breach, all of which were assigned to then-Judge Forrest and voluntarily dismissed in August 2018.
Annexed to the proposed intervenors' pre-motion letter is their proposed motion to intervene (as of right or, alternatively, permissively) and to dismiss or transfer. Ms. Rudolph and the defendants oppose intervention.
The Court will deem only so much of the proposed motion as seeks to intervene as having been made. As such it will be denied.
A court must permit a person to intervene as of right if the person "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest." Rule 24(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P.;
A court may allow "anyone" to intervene who "has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact." Rule 24(b)(1)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P. The district court's discretion on a permissive intervention motion is "very broad."
As an initial matter, the motion to intervene is untimely, and "an untimely motion to intervene must be denied."
The present action was filed on June 8, 2018 and transferred to this District on September 18, 2018. (Docket # 1, 46.) There is little doubt that the proposed intervenors have been aware of the pendency of this action since its inception but have waited until the filing of a fully-briefed motion to dismiss to speak up. Given that the proposed motion seeks intervention for the purpose of staying, transferring or dismissing this action, a delay of nearly nine months renders the motion untimely.
In urging that the motion is timely, the intervenors state only that "their motion is timely in that Defendants' motion to dismiss and motions to transfer are currently pending in, respectively, the Rudolph and Intervenors' Actions." (Docket # 87 at 2;
The motion to intervene is therefore denied on timeliness grounds.
The proposed intervenors' case for intervention, as of right and permissively, is substantially overblown. No class has been certified in the instant action, nor in the Saks Action in Tennessee or the L&T Action in Delaware. It is unlikely that this Court (or any other district court) would certify two substantially overlapping class actions.
The proposed intervenors assert that they have a clear interest in this action because they may be members of a potential class. (Docket # 87-1 at 8.) But if the parties to the instant action endeavored to settle it on a class-wide basis, the proposed intervenors would have the right to opt out of the class. If they elected to stay in the class, they would have the right to object to the settlement.
At present, the lawyers in each of the three putative class actions have only individual named plaintiffs as clients. Of course, wise case management would also counsel in favor of coordination of discovery in the three actions and, perhaps, a discretionary stay if one of the courts was on the eve of deciding a merits-based motion. No trial is in sight for any of the cases.
With regard to intervention as of right, the right to opt out of a class or object to a settlement means that the proposed intervenors will have the ability to protect their interests without intervention. The assertion that Ms. Rudolph and her counsel will not adequately protect their interests because, among other things, the refusal of her counsel to work with counsel in the other two actions, shows little of relevance. (Intervenors' Mem. at 9.) "And to the extent that the . . . plaintiffs
With regard to permissive intervention, proposed intervenors offer no promise of insights on the legal or factual merits of the claims in the instant action.
The proposed intervenors also urge that pursuant to the first-filed rule, they should be permitted to intervene to pursue the dismissal, stay or transfer of this action. "As a general rule, where there are two competing lawsuits, the first suit should have priority."
The balance of conveniences weighs against application of the first-filed rule. The corporate defendants maintain their principal places of business in New York. (Second Am. Compl't ¶¶ 29, 32.) All defendants urge that this action is properly brought in New York. (Docket # 88.) Eight of the proposed intervenors initially filed their claims in New York. This case has advanced to a more advanced stage than either the Tennessee or Delaware actions. Motions to transfer those actions to this District are currently pending.
The Court concludes that intervention will both delay and prejudice the adjudication of Ms. Rudolph's claim. Intervention will not contribute to the just and equitable adjudication of the legal and factual claims. The proposed intervenors' application is therefore DENIED.
SO ORDERED.