VINCENT L. BRICCETTI, District Judge.
Plaintiff Peter Little brings this action against defendant XL Insurance Company SE, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief with respect to the agreement at issue.
Now pending is defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and on grounds of
For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
For the purpose of ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, as summarized below.
Barclays Plc ("Barclays") is a British multinational investment bank and financial services company headquartered in London. In 2012, Barclays, through its insurance broker, Marsh Limited, contracted with defendant, then operating under the name XL Insurance Company Limited, to purchase directors and officers liability insurance. As a result, defendant issued to Barclays Directors & Officers Liability and Company Reimbursement Insurance Policy Number B0509QA076812, for the period November 1, 2012, through November 1, 2013 (the "insurance policy"). The insurance policy was negotiated and underwritten in England.
Defendant was organized under the laws of England and Wales when it issued the insurance policy. It was a U.K.-registered company until January 2019, after which it changed its domicile to Ireland. Defendant's current registered address is in Dublin, Ireland.
From April 2010 to February 2013, plaintiff was employed in Barclays's New York office as Director of FX Spot Trading. On February 16, 2018, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Board of Governors") commenced an enforcement action against plaintiff for conduct that occurred at the time plaintiff was employed by Barclays. Specifically, the enforcement action alleges plaintiff participated in electronic chat rooms with foreign exchange traders at other banks to coordinate trades to influence, and manipulate, benchmark currency rates. The Board of Governors contends plaintiff breached his fiduciary duties on account of these trading improprieties.
Through the enforcement action, the Board of Governors seeks to permanently ban plaintiff from working in the banking industry, as well as a $487,500 civil penalty.
To date, plaintiff's legal fees in connection with the enforcement action surpass $1 million. He expects this number to exceed $5 million when all is said and done.
Pursuant to the insurance policy, plaintiff sought coverage from defendant to pay his legal costs to defend the enforcement action. Defendant concluded plaintiff did not meet the insurance policy's definition of "Insured" and was not eligible for directors and officers insurance coverage. Plaintiff disagreed and demanded a copy of the policy. Defendant refused, citing an agreement with Barclays not to disclose the policy without the latter's consent.
Plaintiff then requested a copy of the policy from Barclays. Barclays did not provide a copy of the policy to plaintiff but allowed plaintiff's counsel to review a copy of the policy at Barclays's counsel's offices in New York.
Thereafter, plaintiff commenced the instant action.
Shortly after plaintiff filed his complaint, defendant petitioned the English High Court of Justice for an anti-suit injunction to enjoin plaintiff from continuing to prosecute the instant matter, and to require plaintiff to resolve his claim pursuant to the insurance policy's dispute resolution provision. On February 11, 2019, the High Court issued an Interim Order in defendant's favor. Plaintiff was personally served at his residence with the interim anti-suit injunction and supporting documentation.
On May 3, 2019, following a hearing on notice, the High Court issued a Final Order enjoining plaintiff from prosecuting the instant case and requiring him to challenge defendant's denial of coverage in accordance with the terms of the dispute resolution provision of the insurance policy.
Under the doctrine of
When evaluating a motion to dismiss for
If the Court "can readily determine that it lacks jurisdiction over . . . the defendant, the proper course would be to dismiss on that ground. . . . But where . . . personal jurisdiction is difficult to determine, and
Lastly, "[t]he decision to dismiss a case on
Plaintiff contends the Court should afford significant deference to his choice of forum because he is at home in the forum. Defendant argues plaintiff's choice warrants no deference, as the insurance policy designates the forum in which disputes regarding same must be resolved.
The Court disagrees with both parties, but nevertheless concludes plaintiff's choice of forum is not entitled to significant deference.
As a general matter, there is "a strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum."
However, a plaintiff's choice of home forum is not entitled to "talismanic significance."
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, and the facts and circumstances of the dispute, the Court declines to afford significant deference to plaintiff's choice of forum simply because plaintiff is at home in the forum.
Defendant argues the express terms of the insurance policy undermine plaintiff's choice of forum. Specifically, defendant refers to Section 5.14 of the policy, styled "Governing Law and Dispute Resolution" (the "dispute resolution provision"), which states in pertinent part:
(Doc. #13-2 at ECF 55-56) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff contends the dispute resolution provision should not factor into the Court's assessment of his choice of forum because he is not a signatory to the insurance policy, and the dispute involves issues not within the scope of the provision.
The Court concludes the dispute resolution provision undermines plaintiff's choice of forum.
It is well settled that a non-signatory to an agreement containing a forum selection clause cannot seek to exploit certain provisions of the agreement and, at the same time, avoid others.
Here, plaintiff attempts just that. On the one hand, the relief plaintiff seeks— indemnification and payment of his legal expenses in connection with the enforcement action— are benefits hinging on whether plaintiff and his conduct are covered under the insurance policy. In other words, plaintiff argues the express terms and definitions of the policy entitle him to coverage. Yet, on the other hand, plaintiff argues he is exempt from the policy's dispute resolution provision. Under these circumstances, the dispute resolution provision merits consideration.
The broad provision unambiguously selects England as the forum in which "any dispute or difference which may arise under or in connection with this policy" will be resolved. (Doc. #13-2 at ECF 55-56). The instant dispute concerns the validity, and the parties' interpretations of, the policy, and whether the policy obligates defendant to provide coverage to plaintiff. As such, the instant dispute falls within the contours of the dispute resolution provision.
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's choice of forum does not warrant significant deference under the facts and circumstances of this dispute.
Defendant next contends an adequate alternative forum is available.
The Court agrees.
Under the second prong of the
Here, the dispute resolution provision prescribes an adequate alternative forum for the disposition of the dispute: alternative dispute resolution in England. Defendant, a party to the insurance policy, agreed to the provision, and thus can be compelled to comply with it.
Plaintiff argues the alternative forum is inadequate because he cannot pursue in the alternative forum his claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This argument is misplaced, because "the availability of an adequate alternative forum does not depend on the existence of the identical cause of action in the other forum, nor identical remedies."
Moreover, the insurance policy expressly states that its construction, validity, and operation "shall be determined in accordance with English law," not New York substantive law. (Doc. #13-2 at ECF 55). For these reasons, plaintiff's argument is not persuasive.
As an additional matter, plaintiff suggests defendant cannot now seek to enforce the dispute resolution provision because defendant refused to provide plaintiff a copy of the insurance policy before plaintiff commenced the case. However, plaintiff's counsel reviewed the insurance policy in full at Barclays's counsel's offices prior to filing the complaint. Nevertheless, some lack of knowledge does not alter the provisions of the policy, some of which plaintiff seeks to enforce to his benefit.
For these reasons, defendant has demonstrated the availability of an adequate alternative forum for the instant dispute.
Finally, the Court must "balance a series of factors involving the private interests of the parties in maintaining the litigation in the competing fora and any public interests at stake."
For the reasons set forth below, and despite any deference afforded plaintiff's choice of forum, the balance of private and public interests strongly favors England as the proper forum for this dispute.
The Court has considered the following private interest factors to determine whether dismissal on
Here, the private interest factors support dismissal. First, the situs of the insurance policy's negotiations, formation, and, in large part, its performance, is England. Brokers, underwriters, and executives who oversaw negotiations, drafting, and performance, are in England. The location of witnesses and evidence favors the alternative forum, even though plaintiff, and perhaps some evidence respecting his employment, are located in the New York.
To that end, the costs for cooperating witnesses to attend trial in the instant forum outweigh the costs of alternative dispute resolution in England, even though defendant may very well be better-situated to bear the expenses of the legal dispute. This conclusion finds strong support in the oft-cited "twin goals" of alternative dispute resolution: efficiency and the avoidance of litigation costs.
Moreover, should plaintiff succeed on his claims, he may seek confirmation of an arbitral award against defendant in the United States.
Finally, "practical matters that might shorten" the dispute and "make it less expensive" in the alternative forum weigh strongly in favor of dismissal for the reasons set forth above.
As for the public interest factors, the Court must consider "court congestion, interest of forums in deciding local disputes, and interest in issues of foreign law being decided by foreign tribunals."
These considerations also favor dismissal on
By contrast, and aside from nominal evidence or witnesses, the action's lone connection to the instant forum appears to be plaintiff. He was employed in the New York office of an British investment bank. Whether plaintiff is entitled to coverage under the policy is a personal, fact-specific inquiry. Indeed, plaintiff's claims against defendant have little, if any, significance to the public in the instant forum.
Finally, cost considerations weigh strongly in favor of the alternative forum. Should plaintiff's claims proceed in a manner prescribed by the dispute resolution provision, costs of mediation or arbitration will be borne by defendant. Moreover, although dispute resolution inevitably will entail some cost for each party, the community of the instant forum, at large, would be best served by private resolution in England of the instant dispute, as opposed to continued proceedings in New York.
For these reasons, the alternative forum has a far greater interest in this matter than does the instant forum.
The motion to dismiss on grounds of
The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion (Doc. #13) and close this case.
SO ORDERED.