VINCENT L. BRICCETTI, District Judge.
Plaintiff Mamadou Barry, proceeding
Now pending is defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. #14).
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
In deciding the pending motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and its exhibits, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, as summarized below.
Plaintiff is a convicted inmate housed at Green Haven. At some time prior to the events giving rise to the instant complaint, plaintiff applied for, and Green Haven staff approved, a special diet consistent with plaintiff's Rastafarian faith. During a five-day facility-wide lockdown at Green Haven, plaintiff alleges defendants failed to provide him fifteen consecutive meals comporting with his religious beliefs. The following allegations concern defendants' conduct during the lockdown.
On July 30, 2018, around noon, an unnamed officer presented plaintiff with a cold lunch tray. Plaintiff informed the officer that he receives special meals on account of his Rastafarian faith. The officer replied: "[I]'m just passing the cold tray's, as far as your religious diet meal you have to talk to the area sergeant or the higher ups." (Doc. #2 ("Compl.") at 5).
Capt. Bey then came to speak with plaintiff. Plaintiff informed Capt. Bey that he did not receive a religious meal for lunch, and showed Capt. Bey his religious "diet card." (Compl. at 5). Capt. Bey replied: "[T]his is an institutional lock-down, which mean's you will eat what we give you or dont eat at all, it is your choice." (
On July 31, 2018, when plaintiff again did not receive religious meals, he informed Supt. LaManna and presented his religious diet card. Supt. LaManna told plaintiff he would look into the matter.
That evening, plaintiff spoke with Sgt. Elmore. Plaintiff explained he had not received a religious diet for two days and showed Sgt. Elmore his religious diet card. Sgt. Elmore said she would look into the matter.
On August 1, 2018, plaintiff wrote a letter to Supt. LaManna, acknowledging their interaction the day prior, alleging violations of his constitutional rights for having been denied religious meals, and asking Supt. LaManna to deal with the matter "as soon as possible." (Compl. at 20). Plaintiff's letter further stated other inmates of other religions were "receiving their religious meals" during the lockdown. (
On August 2, 2018, plaintiff again spoke to Capt. Bey about the absence of religious meals since the beginning of the lockdown. Capt. Bey told plaintiff: "[Y]ou eat what we give you." (Compl. at 7).
On August 3, 2018, plaintiff submitted a grievance concerning his missed religious meals, which was consolidated with other grievances concerning the same complaints. The grievance committee split in its decision on the merits of the consolidated grievances. (Compl. at 17). Although two members of the committee concluded the grievances were meritless, two others concluded inmates "should have been provided [proper] meals" because, during the lockdown, inmate labor was used in the food service area to prepare meals for in-cell feeding. (
Plaintiff appealed the grievance to the superintendent, who denied the grievance and noted:
(Compl. at 18).
In sum, plaintiff alleges that for five days, during an institutional lockdown, defendants failed to provide him religious meals comporting to the dictates of his faith, and that he was treated differently than others similarly situated because of his religious beliefs.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the operative complaint under the "two-pronged approach" articulated by the Supreme Court in
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations in the complaint must meet a standard of "plausibility."
The Court must liberally construe a pro se litigant's submissions and interpret them "to raise the strongest arguments that they
Defendants argue plaintiff has not alleged a plausible First Amendment free exercise claim. They assert plaintiff's alleged deprivation of religious meals for five days during an institutional lockdown was nothing more than
The Court disagrees.
The First Amendment's free exercise guarantee applies to state actors through the Fourteenth Amendment.
To state a free exercise claim, plaintiff "must show at the threshold that the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs."
An inmate's "right to practice his religion is, however, not absolute."
In some cases, alleged misconduct is so
In
Here, unlike in
Likewise, the Court cannot conclude the failure to provide plaintiff religious meals during the lockdown was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Whether the lockdown was legitimate, and alternative meals reasonable, involve questions of fact and law which, though suitable for summary judgment, are not appropriate here. Further, although defendants note the conduct at issue occurred during a facility-wide lockdown—a detail plaintiff himself pleads—this fact alone does not preclude plaintiff's claim.
For these reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's First Amendment free exercise claim must be denied.
Liberally construed, the complaint presents a plausible Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. Specifically, plaintiff alleges inmates with other religious beliefs received religious meals during the lockdown, but he, a Rastafarian, did not.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is "essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike."
Defendants do not seek dismissal of, nor do they mention, a Fourteenth Amendment claim, presumably because such claim is not plainly alleged on the face of the complaint. Nevertheless, the claim shall proceed, as the allegations in the complaint project a plausible equal protection claim.
Defendants argue plaintiff has failed to allege defendants were personally involved in any constitutional violation.
The Court agrees with respect to defendant Dep. Supt. Phil only.
"[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under Section 1983."
However, "[a] supervisor defendant's `mere receipt of a letter or grievance, without personally investigating or acting [thereon] is insufficient to establish personal involvement."
Here, plaintiff's allegations fail to state plausibly a Section 1983 claim against Dep. Supt. Phil. Plaintiff alleges only that Dep. Supt. Phil is "responsible for the establishment and maintenance" of Green Haven policies and failed to respond to plaintiff's August 2, 2018, letter. (Compl. at 9). As noted above, mere receipt of plaintiff's August 2, 2018, letter, does not signify Dep. Supt. Phil had anything to do with alleged constitutional deprivations.
The same is not true of plaintiff's allegations respecting Supt. LaManna, Capt. Bey, and Sgt. Elmore. Plaintiff alleges speaking personally to each of them about his missed religious meals and requesting their help in obtaining such meals. As noted above, personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that such "defendant, after being informed of the violation. . ., failed to remedy the wrong."
Accordingly, plaintiff has plausibly pleaded the personal involvement of Supt. LaManna, Capt. Bey, and Sgt. Elmore, in the alleged constitutional violations.
In his opposition, plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint if the Court grants defendants' motion.
The Court declines to grant plaintiff leave to amend.
Rule 15(a)(2) instructs that courts "should freely give leave" to amend a complaint "when justice so requires." Liberal application of Rule 15(a) is warranted with respect to a
However, leave to amend may "properly be denied for. . . `futility of amendment.'"
The complaint, even liberally construed, contains no allegations suggesting plaintiff has a valid constitutional claim against Dep. Supt. Phil that plaintiff "inadequately or inartfully pleaded" and "should therefore be given a chance to reframe."
Accordingly, the Court concludes plaintiff would not be able to state a valid claim against Supt. Dept. Phil if given an opportunity to amend his pleading.
The motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
By December 31, 2019, Supt. LaManna, Capt. Bey, and Sgt. Elmore shall file an answer to the complaint.
The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion (Doc. #14), and terminate from the case defendant Dep. Supt. Melecio Phil.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore
SO ORDERED.
Plaintiff will be provided copies of all unpublished opinions cited in this decision.