MICHAEL J. KAPLAN, Bankruptcy Judge.
Having considered the submissions and the oral argument conducted on November 17, 2017, the Court rules on the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss as follows.
In the Nigel Bates Adversary Proceeding
Secondly, the Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Time to Appeal the Dismissal of the Complaint as to Eleanor Bates is denied as untimely. That said, the dismissal is not yet a final order because of F.R.Civ. P. Rule 54(b) — that ruling was adjudicative as to fewer than "all parties" to the case. It will be appealable as of right only when all parties and all claims in that Adversary Proceeding have been decided by this Court. Short of that, an appeal would be available only upon the Plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order, and a grant of that motion by the District Court.
Third, to the extent that the Plaintiff's opposition to these motions seeks or impliedly seeks further leave to amend the Complaints (except as to the amount of damages), that request is denied with prejudice. Plaintiff's counsel's stated intention (on the record in open court) to seek to add further causes of action at some uncertain point in time as discovery develops, threatens to cross the line past that of "zealous advocacy" in that it
Next, the Motions to Dismiss are denied in part. The Second Amended Complaints plausibly set out (when the allegations of facts are presumed to be true) a scheme by which the Plaintiff was enticed to continue to make "loans" or "investments" past the point at which prior loans or investments had been repaid or otherwise satisfied. Possibly of greater significance is the plausibility that such a scheme induced him into making two "loans" or "investments" of a dramatically higher amount — $300,000 on January 30, 2007 and $300,000 on June 28, 2007. Whether the enticement was by fraudulent means or not remains for discovery and trial.
Next, the fact that Jeremy Bates's name does not appear on most of the documents exhibited in the current Complaint does not mean that he could not "plausibly" have been part of a fraudulent scheme, given the fact that he was integrally involved in the management of the businesses at issue here.
Additionally, "piercing the veil" does not have to be proven as a separate cause of action. Rather, a binding decision of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York makes it clear that closely-held family companies like those in this case are "alter egos," and that "veilpiercing" is self-evident, and need not be proven. Apace Communications, Ltd. v. Burke, 522 F.Supp.2d 509 (2007).
Finally, it is understandable that the Plaintiff seeks a judgment which, if satisfied, would make him whole with regard to every "loan" or "investment" he made to or in the Bates's business enterprises. However, the Plaintiff has not made clear what he alleges that he lost because the Bates family did not, in fact, obtain for him the mortgages that he expected. What would his losses have been if he had been given those mortgages? Would he still be entitled to (assuming proof of fraud) every dollar that he sent to the Bateses that was not repaid? The Plaintiff is expected to address this issue at trial, if not sooner.
The remaining Defendants shall have thirty days to Answer, after which the Court will schedule a Rule 16 Conference.