MICHAEL A. TELESCA, District Judge.
By Decision and Order dated March 25, 2014, I granted plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement agreement (the "Agreement" or "Settlement Agreement") in this action, and Ordered the defendant United States to make payments to the plaintiffs in accordance with the terms of the Agreement which was made an Order of this Court on April 29, 1985. Under the original terms of the Agreement, the plaintiffs were to receive monthly payments, along with larger periodic payments as set forth in the schedule of payments listed in the Agreement. To facilitate making the agreed payments, the defendant purchased an annuity from the Executive Life Insurance Company of New York ("ELNY") and all payments were to be made from the annuity.
In 2013, however, ELNY was liquidated, and the plaintiffs began receiving only approximately one-half of the amounts they were entitled to under the Settlement Agreement. Plaintiffs thereafter moved this Court to enforce the terms of the Agreement, claiming that under those terms, the United States guaranteed that the full amount of future payments would be made to the plaintiffs, and that as a result of ELNY's inability to pay the full amount of the settlement proceeds, the defendant was required to remit the additional amounts required to make plaintiffs whole under the agreement. By Decision and Order dated March 25, 2014, I granted the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement.
The Government now moves for reconsideration of my March 25, 2014 Decision and Order on grounds that this Court overlooked facts, which, had they been considered, would have established that this Court failed to retain jurisdiction over the enforcement of the settlement of this action. The Government further argues that this Court overlooked binding legal precedent establishing that this Court lacks jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement because the Government did not wave its immunity to be free from such an action in district court. Defendant additionally argues that it is prohibited by law from making future payments as directed by the Court, and therefore, because the Government is legally incapable of making such payments, the Court must relieve the Government of that obligation. Finally, the Government objects that the Court failed to allow the Government to address the merits of plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement, and should have permitted the Government to file additional opposition papers to the plaintiffs' motion.
For the reasons set forth below, I deny the defendant's motion for reconsideration.
In 1985, during the trial of plaintiffs' injury claims against the Government, the parties agreed to settle the case, and in doing so, entered into a "structured" settlement whereby the United States would be obligated to pay plaintiff William Hendrickson an initial lump sum payment of $151,782.66, and additional future payments including $2,500.00 per month for 40 years (which amount would be increased by 4% annually); $625,000.00 in 10 lump sum payments over the course of 24 years; and $80,000.00 in eight equal lump sum payments to assist with anticipated educational expenses of the plaintiffs' children. Pursuant to its obligation to make future payments to the plaintiffs, the Government purchased an annuity from the Executive Life Insurance Company of New York in the amount of $522,217.34. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the United States retained "sole" ownership of the annuity.
Until 2013, the payments owed to plaintiffs were made as required under the terms of the parties' settlement agreement. In 2013, however, ELNY was liquidated, and the plaintiffs were informed that they would be receiving approximately one-half of their payments. The plaintiffs attempted to recoup the remaining amounts owed under the settlement from the defendants, but the defendants refused to contribute any additional payments, and as a result, the plaintiffs moved this Court to enforce the April 29, 1985 settlement agreement.
By Decision and Order dated March 25, 2014, I granted plaintiffs' motion to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement entered into by the parties. In that ruling, I held that because the Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties required the approval of the Court, and was made an Order of the Court, this Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the Order issued on April 29, 1985. I further held that this Court retained ancillary jurisdiction in this matter to enforce its own Orders, and therefore the Government was precluded from claiming that sovereign immunity prohibited this Court from exercising jurisdiction over the defendant, or that any motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement could only be brought before the United States Court of Federal Claims. Finally, I held that under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Government is obligated to make the payments promised to the plaintiffs, and that any shortfall in payments resulting from the liquidation of ELNY must be satisfied by the defendant.
A motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may be properly brought if it appears that the court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters which might reasonably be expected to alter the court's decision. "The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court."
In my March 25, 2014 Decision and Order, I held that this court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement because the terms of the settlement were reduced to a written agreement that required approval of the Court, and was made an Order of the Court. I held that under the Court's inherent authority to enforce its Orders, this Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the Court Order which incorporated the terms of the settlement.
The Government now seeks reconsideration of that holding on grounds that the April 29, 1985 Order of the Court approving the settlement was filed after this case was closed by the Clerk of the Court. The Government contends that because the Order was filed after the case was closed, the Court no longer had jurisdiction to issue such an Order.
Having presided over the trial and settlement of this action, this Court is fully aware of the sequence of events that led to the settlement of this action. Following several days of trial testimony, the parties informed the Court of their intention to settle the matter, and at my insistence, the parties spread the terms of the settlement on the record. The parties also indicated that they would reduce the oral agreement to a written settlement agreement. The parties then spread the terms of the settlement on the record, and I made inquiry of plaintiffs and all counsel as to whether or not they understood and accepted the terms of the Agreement. All parties and counsel indicated that they agreed to the terms, and it was understood that the terms would be formalized in a written settlement agreement. Based on the representations made in open court and on the record, I directed the Clerk of the Court to administratively close the case on the basis of the settlement reached by the parties. The mere fact that the written Settlement Agreement was submitted to the Court for approval approximately one-month after the Clerk of the Court closed the case does not render the Agreement a nullity. It was fully anticipated by the parties and the court when the parties spread the terms of the settlement agreement on the record that a written settlement agreement would be entered into by the parties. The Government was well aware that the case had been closed at the time it submitted the Agreement to the Court and sought the Court's approval of the settlement terms. Accordingly, any claim that the Court lacked authority to approve the settlement or issue the Order approving the settlement because the case was closed should have been made at the time the Agreement was submitted to the Court-not 29 years after the event. In short, the Government cannot now claim that the Court lacked authority to issue the final Order approving the settlement when it was aware of the facts giving rise to that argument in 1985. To the contrary, the Government, knowing that the case had already been closed, did not object to the Court issuing such an Order confirming the settlement, and indeed, sought the final Order from the Court approving the explicit terms of the Settlement Agreement.
The defendant contends that the current action by the plaintiffs to enforce the Settlement Agreement is essentially a breach of contract action against the Government, and because the action involves sums greater than $10,000.00, any such action to enforce the Agreement must be brought in the United States Court of Claims. Defendant argues that even if the Court attempted to retain ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, such an attempt to retain jurisdiction would be void because the defendant did not, and could not waive its sovereign immunity to be free from contract claims brought in district courts involving sums greater than $10,000.00. Defendant claims that the Court failed to identify an explicit waiver of immunity which would allow it to retain jurisdiction over any settlement agreement involving the Government where the amount in controversy is greater than $10,000.00.
If the Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties in this case was merely a private agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, the Government's argument would be correct. In such a case, an attempt to enforce that Agreement would be a contract action, and an independent basis for jurisdiction would be required for the court to entertain such an action.
In this case, however, the plaintiffs are seeking to enforce an
The instant case differs from
Defendant claims, however, that even where a settlement agreement has been approved by the Court, any attempt to enforce such an agreement constitutes a separate action that requires a waiver of sovereign immunity to proceed. In support of this argument, the defendant cites
According to the defendant here,
In this case, however, the plaintiffs have not initiated an action for breach of contract. They are not seeking damages against the Government for any breach. Rather, they have filed a motion requesting the Court to enforce an Order that it issued approximately 29 years ago. As stated above, because this Court had authority under the Tort Claims Act to issue that Order, it has authority under the Tort Claims Act to enforce that Order. Moreover, the mere fact that contract issues might be raised in resolving a motion to enforce a settlement does not mean that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over such an action. Rather, where "the parties are really seeking to enforce or vacate an agreement reflected in a court Order that arose from a case instituted pursuant to the F[ederal] T[ort] C[laims A[ct]" jurisdiction properly lies with the district court that entered the Order settling the matter.
The Government contends that this Court's Order directing the defendant to supplement the payments owed plaintiffs under the Settlement Agreement is invalid
As I stated in my March 25, 2014 Decision and Order, however, I find that the Government agreed not only to purchase the annuity that would fund plaintiffs' future payments, but also guaranteed that those payments would be made. In so holding, I relied on that portion of the parties' Agreement which provided that "[t]he purchase of [the] annuity contracts . . .
In support of its claim that it can not be held liable for the failure of ELNY to make full payment to the plaintiffs, the Government cites to the case of
Indeed, my holding that the Government is obligated to supplement the diminished payments now being received by the plaintiffs is in accord with the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in
That the Government chose to purchase an annuity to facilitate the making of those payments does not relieve it of its obligations to make those payments. As the Court in
Defendant contends on this motion that reconsideration of my March 25, 2014 Decision and Order is warranted because the Court did not give it an opportunity to address the merits of plaintiffs' motion to enforce. Specifically, defendant claims that when it filed its brief opposing the plaintiffs' motion, it addressed only the jurisdictional issues presented by the motion, and sought permission from the Court to supplement its briefing should the court decide that it had jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs' motion. The Government complains that the Court failed to recognize or grant its request when it ruled on both the jurisdictional issues and the merits of plaintiffs' motion.
Defendant's motion for reconsideration on this basis is denied. The Government responded to plaintiffs' motion as it saw fit, and was not prevented from addressing the merits of plaintiffs' motion in its opposition papers. While the defendant may have preferred to address the merits of plaintiffs' motion only after the Court made a ruling on the jurisdictional issues, no party is entitled to piecemeal argument of a motion, and the Government chose not to address the merits of plaintiffs' motion at its own peril.
For the reasons set forth above, I deny the defendant's motion for reconsideration.
ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.