CHARLES J. SIRAGUSA, District Judge.
Wanda J. Carmel ("Plaintiff") proceeding pro se brings this action against her former employer, the United States Veterans Administration ("VA"), alleging that she suffered employment discrimination on the basis of a disability, in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § § 12111 et seq. Now before the Court is Defendant's motion (Docket No. [#5]) to dismiss the action, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") 12(b)(6), for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in a timely manner. The application is granted and this action is dismissed.
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint [#1] and the documents attached thereto, as well as from the portions of the underlying administrative record.
On May 9, 2014, shortly before her employment was terminated, Plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the VA's Office of Resolution Management ("ORM"). Subsequently, on June 3, 2014 and June 20, 2014, respectively, ORM sent requests for additional information to Plaintiff, to which she did not respond.
Instead, Plaintiff waited five months, until December 17, 2014, before filing an appeal with the EEOC.
On November 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed the subject action, which happens to be the third employment discrimination action that she has filed in this Court.
On June 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed a response [#7] to the motion. Plaintiff's response is a one-page handwritten letter and some exhibits, consisting of both materials pertaining directly to Plaintiff, and materials printed from the internet concerning the ADA and workplace discrimination generally. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court is required to construe her submissions liberally to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See, Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, Plaintiff's response [#7] says nothing whatsoever concerning her failure to comply with the deadlines in 29 CFR § 1614.402(a) and 29 CFR § 1614.407(a).
Prior to receiving Plaintiff's response, the Court issued a Motion Scheduling Order [#6], which included a date for oral argument. However, upon reviewing Plaintiff's response, the Court determines that oral argument is unnecessary.
The pro se Plaintiff commenced this action using a pre-printed form employment discrimination complaint, which listed three type of employment discrimination claims (Title VII, ADEA and ADA), and directed the user to select one or more of those three options. Plaintiff selected only the ADA option, presumably because her claim involves only alleged discrimination on the basis of disability, and not on the basis of race, color, gender, religion, national origin or age. However, ADA claims against the federal government are barred by sovereign immunity. See, Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1998) ("As a federal employee, Rivera has no remedy for employment discrimination under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)."). Instead, the sole remedy for a federal employee alleging employment discrimination on the basis of a disability is to sue under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act. See, Rivera v. Heyman, 157 F.3d at 103-104 (Concluding that § 501, and not § 504, is the only mechanism for bringing a disability-based employment discrimination claim against a federal executive-branch agency). Accordingly, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff's Complaint [#1] as asserting a claim under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Defendant maintains that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The general legal principles concerning motions under FRCP 12(b)(6) are well settled:
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also, ATSI Communications, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) ("To survive dismissal, the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient `to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'") (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly) (footnote omitted).
Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies in a timely manner before commencing this action. Before a federal employee may sue in federal court under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies within a specified time frame:
Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 2000); see also, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(a) (Authorizing, inter alia, a lawsuit in U.S. District Court under the Rehabilitation Act "[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of the final action on an individual or class complaint if no appeal has been filed."). However, "[t]his timeliness requirement is not jurisdictional, and the filing deadline is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Bruce v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 314 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2002).
In this action, it is undisputed that Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § § 1614.402(a) and 1614.407(a) in a timely manner. Specifically, after the Department of Veterans Affairs issued a Final Agency Decision on July 10, 2014, denying Plaintiff's EEO complaint, she neither appealed to the EEOC within thirty days, nor filed an action in U.S. District Court within ninety days. Instead, Plaintiff waited five months and then filed an appeal with the EEOC, which that agency dismissed as untimely, specifically finding that Plaintiff "ha[d] not offered justification for an extension of the applicable time limit for filing her appeal."
Although Plaintiff's response to Defendant's motion fails to address Defendant's argument, the Court liberally construes the entire record as raising an issue of equitable tolling. In that regard, while it is undisputed that the Final Agency Decision was actually delivered to Plaintiff's home in a timely manner, she maintains that she did not see the correspondence until later, because it was delivered to an entrance of her home which she did not use. She further contends that after she discovered the correspondence, she telephoned "civil rights," but was unable to either contact the case manager or leave a message, though someone reportedly told her that she might "fall under equitable tolling."
"To qualify for equitable tolling, the plaintiff must establish that extraordinary circumstances prevented her from filing her claim on time, and that she acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period she seeks to toll." Parada v. Banco Indus. De Venezuela, C.A., 753 F.3d 62, 71 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even construing the record liberally in Plaintiff's favor, the Court cannot find that her proffered excuses satisfy either prong of the equitable tolling test. See, e.g., Semper v. New York Methodist Hosp., 786 F.Supp.2d 566, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ("Equitable tolling applies to clerical or mailing complications primarily in those situations where the EEOC, not plaintiff, was derelict in its duties.") (citation omitted); see also, Mandarino v. Mandarino, 408 F. App'x 428, 430, 2011 WL 285242 at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) ("[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling cannot rely on conclusory and vague claims [of illness], and must proffer a particularized description of how his condition adversely affected his capacity to function generally or in relationship to the pursuit of his rights.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claim is barred due to her failure to timely exhaust her administrative remedies prior to commencing this action.
Defendant's motion [#5] to dismiss is granted, and this action is dismissed without prejudice. See, Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 560 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[A] dismissal for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies should be `without prejudice.'"). The Court hereby certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person is denied. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). Further requests to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis should be directed on motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate this action.