GREGORY H. WOODS, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Shawn Nardoni fell victim to gun violence as a young teenager. In September 2015, he was shot in the leg in his neighborhood in the Bronx, after which he was hospitalized for several days. Following his release from the hospital, Plaintiff was handcuffed and detained by officers of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") and brought to a local police precinct. At the precinct, Plaintiff was interrogated by Defendant Detective David Terrell about the identity of Plaintiff's shooter. Plaintiff later sued Detective Terrell and the City of New York, bringing claims for false arrest and municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Defendants now move for summary judgment. Because it is undisputed that Detective Terrell was not involved in Plaintiff's arrest, summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's false arrest claim. And because Plaintiff points to no evidence in the record of a policy or custom by the City of New York to support his Monell claim, summary judgment is GRANTED on that claim as well.
On or about September 1, 2015, Plaintiff was shot in the leg. Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Counterstatement (ECF No. 90) ("Pl.'s 56.1") ¶ 1.
Once at the 42nd Precinct, Plaintiff was placed in a cell. Pl.'s Dep. at 83:10-11. At some point after that, Detective Terrell took Plaintiff from his cell to another room where Detective Terrell questioned Plaintiff. Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 4; Pl.'s Dep. at 83:10-13, 84:8-16. According to Plaintiff's deposition testimony, Detective Terrell kept Plaintiff in this room for three or four hours and "badgered" Plaintiff in an attempt to solicit from him the name of the individual who shot him. Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 5; Pl.'s Dep. at 85:1-8. Despite Plaintiff's response that he did not know his shooter's identity, Detective Terrell "tried to force [Plaintiff] to say it was some kid," Pl.'s Dep. at 84:20-21, and "kept on repeating the same stuff trying to force [Plaintiff] to say something that [Plaintiff] did not know," id. at 85:1-3. During the interrogation, Detective Terrell also threatened to kick Plaintiff's head through the wall and punch Plaintiff in the face. Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl.'s Dep. at 84:21-22.
Following the interrogation, Detective Terrell returned Plaintiff to his cell. Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 7. Plaintiff was not taken to court or to central booking in connection with his arrest. Pl.'s Dep. at 101:15-18, 125:7-126:8.
On January 6, 2016, Plaintiff was interrogated by Detective Corinne MacLennan at the 42nd Precinct in another attempt to discover the name of the individual who shot him.
It is undisputed that Detective Terrell did not arrest Plaintiff on either September 4 or 5, 2015. Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 9. It is also undisputed that Detective Terrell did not order, instruct, plan, or facilitate an arrest of Plaintiff on either September 4 or 5, 2015. Id. ¶ 10.
Plaintiff's mother, Patrice Nelson, initiated this action on Plaintiff's behalf on April 14, 2017. ECF No. 1. At the time of the filing of the initial complaint, Plaintiff was a minor. The complaint asserted false arrest and malicious prosecution claims under Section 1983 against Detective Terrell and the unidentified female officer who arrested Plaintiff. Id. The complaint also alleged that the City of New York bears responsibility for such violations under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Id. In the original complaint, the female officer who arrested Plaintiff was not named because Plaintiff knew only that she was female and was an officer assigned to investigate Plaintiff's September 1, 2015 shooting. Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 11.
On January 12, 2018, Plaintiff amended his complaint to name Detective MacLennan as the defendant previously identified as a Jane Doe officer. ECF No. 37. Detective MacLennan was added to the amended complaint based upon discovery identifying her as a female officer assigned to investigate Plaintiff's shooting. Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 11.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgement on a claim if they can "show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [they are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ("[S]ummary judgement is proper `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c))). A genuine dispute exists where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," while a fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id.
The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," and, if satisfied, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to present "evidence sufficient to satisfy every element of the claim." Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant — in this case, Plaintiff — "must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). ""[M]ere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts" will not suffice." Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A plaintiff "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, and "may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation," Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted).
In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the Court is "required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). The Court's job is not to "weigh the evidence or resolve issues of fact." Lucente v. Int'l
To establish a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that there has been a denial of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the deprivation of such right occurred under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). "Section 1983 does not in and of itself create substantive rights; rather, a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim must demonstrate a violation of an independent federal constitutional or statutory right." Watts v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 100 F.Supp.3d 314, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979)).
A false arrest claim under Section 1983, premised on an individual's right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable seizures, "is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law." Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996)). Under New York law, a plaintiff seeking to establish a cause of action for false arrest must show that: (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement; and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged, such as by probable cause or a warrant. Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 70-71 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 (1975)).
To survive summary judgment on this claim, Plaintiff must come forward with evidence that, among other things, shows a genuine dispute regarding Detective Terrell's personal involvement in Plaintiff's arrest. The "personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983." Victory v. Pataki, 814 F.3d 47, 67 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2006)). The Second Circuit has defined "personal involvement" to mean direct participation, such as "personal participation by one who has knowledge of the facts that rendered the conduct illegal," or indirect participation, such as "ordering or helping others to do the unlawful acts." Provost v. City of Newburgh,
In addition, a plaintiff does not have a claim for false arrest under Section 1983 if, at the time of his arrest, he was already in custody. See, e.g., Walker v. Sankhi, No. 10-cv-6669 (AKH), 2011 WL 13176089, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2011) (holding that because plaintiff was already in custody at the time of his alleged false arrest, his false arrest claim could not succeed), affd, 494 F. App'x 140 (2d Cir. 2012); Goncalves v. Reynolds, 198 F.Supp.2d 278, 283 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Since plaintiff would have been in custody anyway, he cannot state a claim for false arrest.").
Here, Plaintiff points to no evidence of Detective Terrell's personal involvement in his arrest. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's false arrest claim. No dispute exists as to whether Detective Terrell was involved with Plaintiff's initial seizure and transportation to the precinct: both parties agree that he was not involved. It is also undisputed that Detective Terrell did not order, instruct, plan, or facilitate an arrest of Plaintiff on either September 4 or 5, 2015. While Detective Terrell interacted with Plaintiff at the precinct, that interaction took place after Plaintiff's arrest. Because Plaintiff was already in custody at the time of his interaction with Detective Terrell, Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for false arrest based on Detective Terrell's actions. See Garnett, 2014 WL 3950904, at *7; Walker, 2011 WL 13176089, at *2.
In opposing summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that Detective Terrell's interrogation — which lasted over three hours and during which Detective Terrell "attempted to coerce [Plaintiff] into giving false testimony" — leads to a reasonable inference that Detective Terrell "arranged the false arrest." Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 89) ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 6. First, this argument is contrary to the undisputed facts asserted in the 56.1 statements, that Detective Terrell did not "order, instruct, plan or facilitate" Plaintiff's arrest. Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 10. More fundamentally, though, an interrogation subsequent to an arrest is itself not an arrest. "A lengthy interview ..., without more, does not support a claim for false imprisonment."
Here, it is undisputed that Detective Terrell interviewed Plaintiff. However, like the investigator in Niemann, Detective Terrell was not involved in seizing Plaintiff, in bringing him to the precinct, or in confining him.
Furthermore, to hold Detective Terrell liable for false arrest on this record would open up the door for false arrest claims by arrestees against any person with whom the arrestee has contact while incarcerated. If a non-arresting officer were to remove an arrestee from his cell to have him fingerprinted, for example, that officer might then be liable for false arrest. Or if an officer merely transports an arrestee from a precinct to central booking, that officer might be liable for false arrest. Plaintiff points to no legal authority that supports such a rule. Absent supporting authority, the Court will not hold that an arrestee may sustain a false arrest claim in these circumstances.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim against the City of New York is also granted. "To hold a city liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right." Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted); see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Accordingly, "a municipality cannot be made liable [under § 1983] by application of the doctrine of respondeat superior," Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), but rather the plaintiff must "demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the alleged injury," Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An underlying constitutional violation is a required predicate for municipal liability. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986). "It does not follow, however, that the plaintiff must obtain a judgment against the individual tortfeasors in order to establish the liability of the municipality. It suffices to plead and prove against the municipality that municipal actors committed the tort against the plaintiff and that the tort resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality." Askins v. Doe No. 1, 727 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 2013). "In fact, the plaintiff need not sue the individual tortfeasors at all, but may proceed solely against the municipality." Id. (internal citations omitted).
The evidence before the Court might support a claim that the officer who arrested Plaintiff — although not named as a defendant here — did so without probable cause. Even if Plaintiff had shown a dispute of fact with respect to the underlying constitutional violation, however, he has not pointed to evidence of a policy or custom sufficient to withstand summary judgment. A plaintiff may satisfy the "policy or custom" prong in one of four ways: by proving the existence of (1) a formal policy, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018; (2) actions taken or decisions made by final municipal policymakers that caused the violation of plaintiff's rights, see Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292; (3), a practice so persistent and widespread that it constitutes a "custom or usage" and implies the constructive knowledge of policymakers, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018; or (4) a failure to properly
Plaintiff asserts that the City is liable because (1) the City failed to adequately supervise or discipline its officers when they made arrests without probable cause in order to satisfy unofficial arrest quotas, SAC ¶ 63-64; Pl.'s Opp'n at 8; and (2) the City knew, or should have known, of Detective Terrell's "propensity to engage in misconduct of the types alleged herein including false arrest, use of physical threats and threat of improper criminal prosecution to suborn false testimony, and filing of false official statements." SAC ¶ 78; Pl.'s Opp'n at 8-9. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
To succeed on a theory of liability based on either the City's failure to supervise or failure to discipline, a plaintiff must make three showings to establish the requisite "deliberate indifference":
Green v. City of N.Y., 465 F.3d 65, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Walker v. City of N.Y., 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "[D]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff must demonstrate that the City had notice — be it "actual or constructive" — that such inadequacy or failure to supervise was causing civil rights violations. Id. "Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights." Id. at 62, 131 S.Ct. 1350. The Second Circuit has recognized that the "stringent causation and culpability requirements" applicable to a claim premised on a city's failure to train its employees "have been applied to a broad range of supervisory liability claims," including claims based on a failure to discipline. Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 127 (2d Cir. 2004)).
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff fails to point to any evidence that the City of New York had notice — either actual or
Plaintiff cites to a class action settlement against the City of New York, Stinson v. City of New York, 256 F.Supp.3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), "as direct proof of NYPD's ... tacitly encouraging false arrests." SAC ¶ 71; see Pl.'s Opp'n at 8. Therefore, it appears that, in addition to his deliberate indifference theory, Plaintiff relies on a widespread practice theory of liability. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018. To establish the existence of a widespread custom of constitutional violations, Plaintiff cites to Stinson and two other cases brought against the City. See SAC ¶¶ 62-63. None of those cases, either individually or considered together, sufficiently shows a persistent and widespread practice.
In Stinson, the court approved a settlement of $75 million in favor of a class of plaintiffs who brought false arrest claims after they were served with criminal summonses that were later dismissed for lack of probable cause. Stinson, 256 F.Supp.3d at 287, 297. A review of the Stinson settlement reveals that "the parties have reached a settlement agreement ... without admitting any fault or liability." See ECF No. 319-1 at 3, No. 10-cv-4228 (RWS).
Finally, Plaintiff cites to Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), as evidence of the NYPD's alleged policy or practice of performing baseless arrests and issuing unfounded criminal summonses in order to meet monthly quotas. See SAC ¶ 62. In Floyd, the court evaluated evidence of unconstitutional stops and frisks that occurred between January 2004 and June 2012. 959 F.Supp.2d at 555. The court held that the City of New York was liable for violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of plaintiffs — blacks and Hispanics who were stopped by police — because the City was deliberately indifferent to the police department's "unconstitutional stops, frisks, and searches" which were based on racial profiling. Id. at 658-59. The court also found sufficient evidence of a widespread practice of those unconstitutional stops and frisks. Id. at 659-60. While the findings of that court may be evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional stops and frisks, Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence showing any connection between that practice and a widespread practice of unconstitutional arrests. Even if the practice of the unlawful stops were applicable here, Floyd only assessed the practice as it existed between 2004 and 2012. Plaintiff has produced no evidence that such a practice was still in place in September 2015 when he was arrested. See Rodriguez v. County of Westchester, No. 15-cv-9626 (PAE), 2017 WL 118027, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2017) (dismissing Monell claim where evidence relied upon to prove widespread practice "was too remote in time because the report was written more than six years before the events in question occurred"); Melvin v. County of Westchester, No. 14-cv-2995 (KMK), 2016 WL 1254394, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2016) ("Allegations that a defendant acted pursuant to a policy or custom[,] without any facts suggesting the policy's existence, are plainly insufficient." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to show that a genuine issue of fact exists with respect to, a "direct causal link," City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, between the unlawful stop-and-frisk practice and his arrest over three years later. His Monell claim based on a persistent and widespread practice is, therefore, dismissed. See Mitchell, 841 F.3d at 80 ("A plaintiff must also demonstrate a sufficient causal relationship between the violation and the municipal policy or practice." (citing
Plaintiff also relies on Detective Terrell's alleged history of misconduct as evidence of a pattern or practice. SAC ¶¶ 77-87; Pl.'s Opp'n at 8-10. Specifically, Plaintiff describes a February 9, 2005 incident in which Detective Terrell falsely arrested Peter Thomas and used excessive force against him, SAC ¶ 80; a June 2006 incident in which Detective Terrell "falsely arrested and physically brutalized Taisha Carter," id. ¶ 81; a February 2009 incident in which Detective Terrell "brutally assaulted" a fifteen-year-old girl, id. ¶ 82; a March 2011 incident in which Detective Terrell "brutalized Charmaine Dixon and her infant son, then falsely arrested Ms. Dixon and charged her with bogus crimes," id. ¶ 83; a January 2012 incident in which Detective Terrell and other officers falsely arrested and "brutalized" a teenager, id. ¶ 84; and a June 2015 incident in which Detective Terrell "made a false official statement and abused process by failing to show a search warrant," id. ¶ 85. The false arrest allegations are stated in conclusory fashion, and the only evidence outside of the pleadings that Plaintiff cites to is a short excerpt of Detective Terrell's deposition testimony. In that testimony, Detective Terrell describes a 2009 incident in which he hit a fifteen-year-old girl twice and received no disciplinary action as a result. Nwokoro Decl., Ex. B at 62:3-63:22. No lawsuits, complaints, or claims resulted from that incident. Id. at 62:16-63:3. This evidence is insufficient to support a claim that the City is liable for Plaintiff's false arrest here. See Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that three incidents "fell far short of showing a policy, custom, or usage of officers"); Giaccio v. City of New York, 308 F. App'x 470, 472 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that four constitutional violations "falls far short of establishing a practice that is `so persistent or widespread' as to justify the imposition of municipal liability"); White v. City of New York, 206 F.Supp.3d 920, 938 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding six incidents over five years insufficient to plausibly allege the existence of a municipal policy); see also Tieman v. City of Newburgh, No. 13-cv-4178 (KMK), 2015 WL 1379652, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) ("[T]he fact that there were allegations of thirteen instances of excessive force during arrests over four years (none of which involved findings or admissions of culpability) during which hundreds, if not thousands, of arrests were made does not plausibly demonstrate that the use of excessive force during arrest was so frequent and pervasive as to constitute a custom").
Even if these incidents were sufficient to establish a widespread pattern of misconduct by Detective Terrell, Plaintiff shows no causal link between that pattern and his arrest. As the Court has explained, Detective Terrell did not participate in Plaintiff's arrest, and the only constitutional violation for which Plaintiff has filed this suit is false arrest. And there is no evidence in this record to even hint that whatever past misconduct Detective Terrell is guilty of was the cause of Plaintiff's alleged false arrest in September 2015. See Triano, 895 F.Supp.2d at 531. Summary judgment is accordingly granted on Plaintiff's municipal liability claim.
For the reasons stated above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in its entirety.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions, to enter judgment
