ORDER

RICHARD J. ARCARA, District Judge.

The Defendant, Lancaster Central School District, has filed a notice of interlocutory appeal from this Court's August 1, 2018 Decision and Order (Docket No. 50) that, as relevant here, denied the District's motion for summary judgment. At a conference on August 27, 2018, the Court scheduled trial for May 2019.

Because "the filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance," Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982), and because a federal court has "an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party," Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006), the Court sua sponte considers whether the District's notice of appeal divested the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

"A district court's denial of summary judgment is ordinarily not an appealable `final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291," and none of the limited exceptions to the final-decision rule—such as the collateral-order doctrine—appears to be implicated by the Court's August 1, 2018 Decision and Order. Tolbert v. Queens College, 164 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1999). See also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2018 (2014) ("An order denying a motion for summary judgment is generally not a final decision within the meaning of § 1291 and is thus generally not immediately appealable.") The District's notice of appeal therefore appears to be premature.

Although the filing of a notice of appeal typically divests a district court of subjectmatter jurisdiction, see Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58, a premature notice of appeal does not do so. See United States v. Rodgers, 101 F.3d 247, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1996). The Court therefore concludes that, notwithstanding the District's notice of interlocutory appeal, the Court retains subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. Absent order of the Second Circuit, trial will commence, as scheduled, on May 7, 2019.

SO ORDERED.