WILLIAM M. SKRETNY, District Judge.
After a 12-day trial, a federal jury determined that Defendants subjected Plaintiff Pamela S. Small to discrimination and a hostile work environment and unlawfully retaliated against her while she was employed as a civilian teacher at the Attica Correctional Facility ("Attica"). The jury awarded Small $4.8 million in general compensatory damages; $740,000 in back pay; $3.6 million in front pay; and $50,000 in punitive damages; for a total award of $9.19 million.
Presently before this Court are several post-trial motions. First, Defendants New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), James Conway, and Sandra Dolce move for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or for a new trial under Rule 59 (a), and for alteration or amendment of the verdict under Rule 59 (e) or for relief from judgment under Rule 60. (Docket No. 206.) Second, Defendant Carl Cuer moves for a new trial or remittitur under Rule 59 (a) and for alteration or amendment of the verdict under Rule 59 (e). (Docket No. 204.) Finally, Small moves for attorneys' fees, interest, and costs. (Docket No. 202.)
For the reasons stated below, each of the motions is granted in part and denied in part.
Despite challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in seeking to overturn the jury's verdict, Defendants have inexplicably neither obtained nor submitted the trial transcript in support of their post-trial motions.
Small worked as a teacher at Attica from 2005 to 2012. She was a civilian employee and reported directly to her academic supervisors, who in turn reported to Defendant Dolce, who was the Deputy Superintendent of Program Services and oversaw the academic, recreational, and vocational programs at Attica. Dolce reported to Defendant Conway, who was the Superintendent of Attica and responsible for oversight of the entire prison.
Defendant Cuer is a corrections officer at Attica. Between 2005 and 2010, Cuer and Small both worked in Attica's academic building, a three-story structure with two corrections officers posted on the first floor, and one officer posted on each of the second and third floors. Cuer served as the first-floor officer in the academic building, a position known as the "Hall Captain." The Hall Captain is responsible for ensuring the safety of the civilian academic employees (like Small) working in the academic building.
While Defendant Cuer was serving as Hall Captain, he and Small became friends. They discussed their shared Christian faith; Cuer worked on Small's car and assisted her with yardwork at her home. But beginning in December 2009, Cuer began making alarming comments to Small. Cuer told Small that he had been speaking with God, that God had informed him that his wife would soon die, and that God had chosen Small to be his new wife. Cuer also began sending Small frequent emails, text messages, and letters, insisting that God wanted them to be together. Small felt threatened and upset by Cuer's communications, particularly because Cuer was adamant that Small was breaching her Christian faith by refusing to be with him.
Defendant Cuer delivered some of his messages to Small at Attica, including by writing "I love you" on the desk calendar in Small's classroom and leaving her a note offering to apply lotion to her "hard to reach spots," which Small took to be a sexual advance. Cuer told a co-worker about his plans to marry Small, as well as his belief that God would kill his wife. Other officers overheard Cuer discussing plans to buy a gun, specifically one that could be easily concealed.
Small never reciprocated Defendant Cuer's romantic advances. She initially tried to discourage Cuer while remaining friendly with him, but Cuer's behavior became increasingly intense and threatening. In March 2010, Small wrote Cuer a letter directing him to cease all contact and communication with her. She also verbally complained to Defendant Conway that Cuer was harassing her and wrote to Cuer's supervisor, Sergeant Erhardt. Small also reported Cuer's advances to her direct supervisor, who reported the issue to Defendant Dolce.
Despite these reports, the contact did not stop. Instead, Defendant Cuer continued to engage with Small in ways that she found harassing and threatening. For example, in June 2010, Small found a note on her car in the Attica parking lot that included a drawing of eyes, which Small interpreted as a message that Cuer was watching her, as well as a drawing that meant "I love you."
Two months later, Defendant Cuer sent Small a number of text messages in the early morning hours that Small believed he sent while sitting outside her house. Cuer accused Small of having a man inside her home and demanded that she come out to speak with him.
Several months after that, in October 2010, Defendant Cuer told Small in an email that God told him that Small was pregnant but did not know who the father was, and that God referred to Small by the name of a woman in the Bible who was struck down after failing to obey God.
The next month, Small sought and obtained an order of protection against Defendant Cuer. While the order of protection was in place, Attica officials allowed Cuer to come and go from the prison with no restrictions but told Small to restrict her movement, use side doors, and have supervision when moving about the facility. Cuer was later arrested for violating the order of protection.
Throughout this period, Small and her direct supervisors made several verbal reports to Defendants Conway and Dolce. Between March and August 2010, Small and others lodged verbal complaints, but neither Conway nor Dolce took any meaningful action to investigate or remedy the situation or forward Small's complaints for a formal inquiry. This lack of response was exactly what Small was afraid of, since she knew that Defendant Cuer had personal relationships with many Attica employees, including Conway. Conway and Dolce failed to act on Small's complaints until they forwarded them to DOCCS's Office of Diversity Management in August 2010, after which no further action was taken. Small was never contacted about her complaints, and Cuer was never disciplined in any way.
Small's complaints about Defendant Cuer resulted in the very retaliation that she feared. In June 2010, Defendant Dolce changed Small's classroom assignment from a classroom on the third floor of the academic building, which was off-limits to all personnel at night and on weekends, to the second floor, which was not so restricted and therefore subject to significant property damage. She also instructed Small to limit her movement around the facility and to seek escorts. In addition, Cuer and other corrections officers failed to deliver important documents to Small's staff mailbox and shunned her, and Cuer falsely accused Small in an official complaint of having an inappropriate relationship with an inmate, which DOCCS investigators later found to be without merit. All of this occurred after Small complained about Cuer.
The intolerable conditions at Attica deteriorated Small's health to the point where she could no longer work due to physical and psychological impairments. After Small exhausted her sick leave, DOCCS terminated her employment. Her last day was January 29, 2011.
Four claims went to trial. First, Small alleged that DOCCS subjected her to discrimination and a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
The jury returned a verdict in Small's favor on each claim. For the first and second claims, the jury awarded $2.4 million in compensatory damages, and this Court accepted the jury's advisory verdict in awarding $370,000 in back pay and $1.8 million in front pay, for a total award against DOCCS of $4.57 million. (Docket Nos. 197, 199, 200.) For the third claim, the jury awarded $1 million in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages against Defendant Cuer; $480,000 in compensatory damages against Defendant Dolce; and $240,000 in compensatory damages against Defendant Conway. (Docket Nos. 197, 200.) For the fourth claim, the jury awarded $680,000 in compensatory damages, $370,000 in back pay, and $1.8 million in front pay. (Docket Nos. 197, 200.)
Defendants DOCCS, Conway, and Dolce now move for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, for a new trial under Rule 59 (a), and for alteration or amendment of the verdict under Rule 59 (e) or for relief from judgment under Rule 60. (Docket No. 206.) Defendant Cuer moves for a new trial or remittitur under Rule 59 (a) and for alteration or amendment of the verdict under Rule 59 (e). (Docket No. 204.) Small moves for attorneys' fees, interest, and costs. (Docket No. 202.) These motions are resolved below.
Defendants DOCCS, Dolce, and Conway move for various forms of relief. First, DOCCS argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, or a new trial under Rule 59, on the basis that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support its liability under Title VII. DOCCS also argues that the judgment must be altered or amended under Rule 59 (e) or Rule 60 (b)(6) because compensatory damages for Title VII violations are statutorily capped at $300,000.
DOCCS moves for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial on the grounds that the trial evidence was insufficient to support its liability under Title VII.
A party that moves for judgment as a matter of law at trial may renew that motion and again seek judgment as a matter of law after the jury has returned its verdict.
That burden becomes even heavier—"particularly heavy"—when, as here, "the jury has deliberated in the case and actually returned its verdict" in favor of the nonmoving party.
In considering a Rule 50 (b) motion, "[t]he court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and `give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence' bearing in mind that a jury is free to believe or disbelieve any part of a witness' testimony."
The standard under Rule 59, which permits a court to "grant a new trial on all or some of the issues,"
DOCCS argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial because Small failed to establish that the treatment she experienced at Attica rose to the level required for liability under Title VII.
A plaintiff claiming that she was the victim of a hostile work environment must generally produce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude "(1) that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] work environment, and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer."
With no citation to trial evidence, and construing the evidence in the exact opposite manner required under Rule 50 (
For the better part of 12 days, the jury heard unrebutted evidence—Defendant Cuer did not testify—that Cuer relentlessly pursued Small, mercilessly preying on her religious beliefs in an effort to coerce and convince Small that God intended her to be his new wife. Cuer told Small that his wife would soon die and suggested that Small too could die if she did not replace her. Cuer was as persistent as he was peculiar: he left Small notes and letters at work; he stalked her classroom; he turned their colleagues against her; he went to her home; he filed false accusations against her; he accused her of being with other men. All of this conduct was unwelcomed. And Cuer was relentless: his campaign continued long after Small made clear that she wished for it to stop, long after it took its physical and psychological toll,
Without question, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to determine that Small established the existence of a hostile work environment that persisted without remedy. This is true whether considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Small and crediting all reasonable inferences the jury could have drawn in her favor (for judgment as a matter of law), or not (for a new trial).
DOCCS maintains that the judgment must be amended to reduce the jury's $2.4 million compensatory damages award against DOCCS to $300,000, which is the statutory cap. Small agrees. Indeed, Title VII compensatory damages are capped at $300,000 against employers, like DOCCS, that have more than 500 employees.
Defendants Dolce and Conway argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law or relief from the final judgment because the trial evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that they were involved in the deprivation of Small's right to be free from a hostile work environment, as required for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Civil liability is imposed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only upon persons who, acting under color of state law, deprive an individual of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.
Personal involvement in the deprivation of a federal constitutional right is the sine qua non of liability under § 1983.
The Second Circuit construes personal involvement in this context to mean "direct participation, or failure to remedy the alleged wrong after learning of it, or creation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or gross negligence in managing subordinates."
Defendants Dolce and Conway first argue that their failure to act on Small's complaints did not proximately cause her any harm because when they finally did forward her complaints to the Office of Diversity Management, that office took no action. This argument, which narrowly focuses on only the failure to forward Small's complaints, entirely ignores the unrebutted evidence that despite having direct and specific knowledge about the discriminatory conditions of Small's employment, neither Dolce nor Conway intervened or took any action to stop it. They did not investigate her complaints. They did not keep Defendant Cuer away from her. They did not counsel Cuer. They did nothing whatsoever to meaningfully address the situation, other than to cause Small to change classrooms and limit her movements, a misguided reaction that only compounded the already hostile work environment. Thus, Dolce and Conway's failure to timely report Small's claims to the Office of Diversity Management is just one of many failures on their part, each of which permitted the intolerable work conditions to persist unaddressed. Sufficient evidence—indeed, mostly unrebutted evidence—thus supports the jury's verdict against Dolce and Conway.
Defendants Dolce and Conway next argue that there was insufficient evidence to establish supervisory liability against them because they did not act with intent to discriminate. In discrimination cases, however, inaction may be actionable. The failure to promptly and properly handle workplace complaints, as set forth above, constitutes personal involvement in the deprivation sufficient to support liability.
The unrebutted evidence at trial established that both Defendants Dolce and Conway had direct knowledge of the hostile work environment that Small faced yet elected to ignore it and failed to forward Small's complaints to the Office of Diversity Management for formal investigation. There was further evidence that Dolce directly contributed to the discrimination by reassigning Small to a less desirable classroom and restricting her movement around the facility while taking no action against Defendant Cuer. Thus, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find supervisory liability as to both Dolce and Conway based on at least (1) direct participation in the hostile work environment, (2) failure to remedy the hostile work environment after being informed that it existed, (3) gross negligence in the supervision of Cuer, and (4) deliberate indifference to Small's plight.
It must further be noted that these two arguments ring particularly hollow when applying the Rule 50 standard: consideration of all evidence in the light most favorable to Small and crediting all reasonable inferences in her favor.
Defendants Dolce and Conway alternatively argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified immunity. At trial, the jury rejected their qualified immunity defenses. (Docket No. 197.)
Qualified immunity protects officials from § 1983 liability if (1) their actions did not violate clearly established law, or (2) it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their actions did not violate the law.
First, Defendants Dolce and Conway once again take the narrowest view of the evidence and construe it entirely in their favor, blatantly ignoring the majority of the trial evidence and the proper standard for judgment as a matter of law.
Second, the factual premise of their argument—that Defendant Cuer's offending conduct occurred outside of the workplace—is simply not true. As indicated above, Small presented abundant evidence that Cuer harassed her at Attica.
Third, Defendants Dolce and Conway's contention that their failure to forward Small's complaint was simply a "mistake in judgment" flies directly in the face of the jury's findings and ignores the weight of the trial evidence, which established that their conduct went beyond simply failing to timely report Small's complaint and included deliberately failing to remedy the discrimination and hostile work environment despite having direct knowledge of its existence.
Accordingly, for these reasons, Defendants Dolce and Conway's claim that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity is unfounded, and therefore, denied. The jury's verdict against them will stand.
Defendant Cuer moves for a new trial or remittitur of the verdict under Rule 59 (a), and for alteration or amendment of the judgment under Rule 59 (e).
Defendant Cuer argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence and its compensatory damages award is unclear, ambiguous, and duplicative.
"A motion for a new trial ordinarily should not be granted unless the trial court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice."
Defendant Cuer first asserts that a new trial is required because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. He does not, however, offer any argument or evidence in support of this bald assertion. He therefore fails to carry his burden.
Defendant Cuer next argues that a new trial is necessary because the jury's compensatory damages award is unclear, confusing, ambiguous, and duplicative. He correctly notes that the jury awarded $2.4 million in compensatory damages against DOCCS, and then awarded an equal amount in compensatory damages against the individual defendants apportioned among them—Cuer ($1.68 million); Dolce ($480,000); Conway ($240,000). Cuer takes issue with this award as confusing because, in his view, "the question remains what amount of compensatory damages the Jury intended to award, either $2,400,000.00 or that amount multiplied by two." (Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 205, p. 5.)
Contrary to Defendant Cuer's argument, nothing in the jury's verdict suggests that it intended a single, collective award of $2.4 million against all defendants. Cuer maintains that the jury may have intended a total award of $2.4 million, which it then apportioned as $1.68 million against Cuer, $480,000 against Dolce, and $240,000 against Conway. (Affidavit of James Wujcik, Docket No. 204-1, ¶¶ 10-17.) But this cannot be, because the verdict sheet on its face reflects that the jury entered individual damage awards against each separate defendant, as this Court instructed it to do. Moreover, under Cuer's formulation, the jury would have made no award against DOCCS, which it clearly found liable.
Rather, the completed verdict form quite plainly reflects what the jury intended: a compensatory damages award of $4.8 million (not including front and back pay). It awarded $2.4 million in compensatory damages against DOCCS, and another $2.4 million in compensatory damages collectively against Defendants Cuer, Dolce, and Conway, for a collective compensatory damages award of $4.8 million. In apportioning the total $4.8 million award, the jury may well have found that DOCCS was 50% responsible; that Cuer was 35% responsible; that Dolce was 10% responsible; and that Conway was 5% responsible. Setting aside the amount of the award, Cuer offers no reason why the jury could not reasonably proceed in this manner.
In any event, Defendant Cuer waived each of the arguments he now raises because he failed to object at trial.
Accordingly, Defendant Cuer's request for a new trial on these grounds is denied.
Defendant Cuer seeks remittitur of the jury's damages award against him on the grounds that it is excessive when weighed against the trial evidence. The jury returned a verdict in Small's favor on both causes of action that she brought against Cuer. For Cuer's deprivation of Small's federally protected right to be free from a hostile work environment, the jury awarded Small $1 million in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. For Cuer's aiding and abetting the unlawful discrimination and hostile work environment that DOCCS engaged in, the jury awarded Small $680,000 in compensatory damages, $370,000 in back pay, and $1.8 million in front pay. The jury's total award against Cuer was thus $3.9 million.
"A jury has broad discretion in measuring damages,"
Remittitur, "a limited exception to the sanctity of jury fact-finding",
Focusing on the jury's entire $7.02 million verdict returned against all defendants, Defendant Cuer argues that the award "is excessive when compared to controlling precedent and when weighed against the evidence." (Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 205, p. 7.) Cuer, however, neither cites controlling precedent nor identifies the trial evidence upon which he relies.
The only specific argument that Cuer makes in favor of remittitur is that the jury's overall damages award of $7.02 million is excessive and "shocks the conscience" because it is more than triple the $2.3 million valuation of Small's claims by her economic expert. This argument limps for two reasons.
First, the other defendants in this action do not seek remittitur of the damages against them, and Defendant Cuer cannot do so on their behalf. Cuer's arguments must therefore be examined in relation to the $3.85 million in compensatory damages awarded against him alone (not counting the $50,000 punitive damages award), not the overall jury award of $7.02 million.
Second, Defendant Cuer's argument focuses solely on limited evidence concerning the economic value of Small's claims while entirely ignoring the extensive evidence of psychological and physical harm that he caused, as presented at trial through treating psychologist Dr. Fiona Gallacher and expert psychologist Dr. Norman Lesswing. Their largely unrebutted testimony, which the jury could reasonably have accepted, supports a significant award for emotional damages in this case.
Because Defendant Cuer concedes that Small presented evidence at trial from which the jury could reasonably find that her economic damages alone were $2.3 million, the question becomes whether the balance of the jury's award—$1.55 million—which may fairly be attributed to emotional and physical damage, is "so high as to shock the judicial conscience and constitute a denial of justice."
One of the most concrete methods used to resolve such questions is to "consider[] . . . the amounts awarded in other, comparable cases."
Emotional distress awards within the Second Circuit can "generally be grouped into three categories of claims: `garden-variety,' `significant' and `egregious.'"
In "garden variety" emotional distress cases, "the evidence of mental suffering is generally limited to the testimony of the plaintiff, who describes his or her injury in vague or conclusory terms, without relating either the severity or consequences of the injury."
"Significant" emotional distress claims "are based on more substantial harm or more offensive conduct, are sometimes supported by medical testimony and evidence, evidence of treatment by a healthcare professional and/or medication, and testimony from other, corroborating witnesses."
Finally, "egregious" emotional distress claims "generally involve either `outrageous or shocking' discriminatory conduct or a significant impact on the physical health of the plaintiff."
From the unrebutted testimony at trial, the jury could reasonably have determined that Cuer's conduct was outrageous and shocking, such that it had a significant impact on Small's psychological and physical health. Small presented evidence that Cuer's campaign of harassment left her with debilitating psychological conditions—including post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, sleep phobia, agoraphobia, and anxiety—as well as physical ailments, including loss of hair, grinding teeth, incessant coughing leading to a prolapsed bladder, twitching, loss of appetite, weight gain, lethargy, nausea, and diarrhea. The jury may therefore have reasonably found this to be an egregious case warranting substantial damages.
Unlike Defendant Cuer, Small presents cases that she deems supportive of the jury's award, but upon close examination, none of them are comparable to the circumstances here. In
In this Court's view, what amounts to a $1.55 million psychological/physical damages award against Defendant Cuer does in fact shock the conscience and constitute a denial of justice. Remittitur is therefore required. But without question, Small suffered persistent, pervasive, troubling discrimination that no one would remedy, despite her cries. It is an egregious case, but one that lasted months, not years. It is akin to
Accordingly, the remittitur offered is a total compensatory damages award against Defendant Cuer of $2.88 million, which represents $2.3 million in unchallenged pecuniary damages
In addition to challenging the compensatory damages award, Defendant Cuer also seeks remittitur of the jury's $50,000 punitive damages award on the grounds that it is excessive and against the weight of the evidence. This Court disagrees.
"Awards of punitive damages are by nature speculative, arbitrary approximations."
Punitive damages must be "reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their purpose to punish what has occurred and to deter its repetition."
A court's authority to limit an award derives in part from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The three guideposts articulated by the Supreme Court in
The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct is "[p]erhaps the most important indicum of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award."
The Supreme Court has outlined five factors relevant to determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct.
Defendant Cuer's only argument in support of his request for remittitur of punitive damages is that "the evidence at trial shows intermittent contact and communication between [himself] and [Small] after March 2010." (Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 205, p. 6.) Cuer argues that punitive damages are unwarranted because he transferred out of the Academic Building and away from Small to minimize his contact with Small after their friendship ended. In so arguing, Cuer once again ignores the unrebutted evidence of his harassing behavior, including leaving notes on Small's car, accusing Small of being with other men, filing false charges against her at work, and acting in a manner to cause the need for Small to obtain a protective order against him, all during the period when he claims to have minimized his contact with her.
As set out above, the trial evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Defendant Cuer's conduct sufficiently reprehensible to warrant punitive damages. In addressing the reprehensibility factors (which Cuer fails to do), Cuer caused both psychological and physical harm; he totally disregarded Small's mental health; he preyed on Small's vulnerabilities (though not financial); he persisted in repeated acts of harassment both before and after Small asked him to stop; and he intentionally targeted Small and warped her religious beliefs to coerce or deceive her into believing that God wanted her to succumb to his otherwise unwanted advances. Cuer's conduct was thus sufficiently reprehensible to support the jury's award of punitive damages.
The next factor is proportionality. "Courts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered."
Here, unlike in most cases, the jury's punitive damages award against Defendant Cuer is a fraction of the compensatory damage award, not a multiple of it. The jury awarded $50,000 in punitive damages against a remitted compensatory damages award against Cuer of $2.88 million. The punitive damages award is therefore reasonable and proportionate, and Cuer makes no specific arguments otherwise.
The third, and arguably least important, guidepost assesses the "disparity between the punitive damages award and the `civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.'"
Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the degree of reprehensibility, the compensatory award, Defendant Cuer's failure to assert meaningful arguments, and the ultimate purpose of punitive damages—to punish and deter future misconduct—this Court finds that the jury's $50,000 punitive damages award is both reasonable and well supported by the trial evidence. It is therefore affirmed.
Small seeks attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,054,600, costs in the amount of $100,448.72, and pre- and post-judgment interest at the New York rate of 9%. Defendants oppose only Small's request for attorneys' fees.
To ensure that federal rights are adequately enforced, a prevailing party in a civil rights action may recover, subject to the court's discretion, "a reasonable attorney's fee."
Determining attorneys' fees involves a two-step process. First, the court must determine whether the party seeking fees is a prevailing party.
In this circuit, if a court finds a fee award to be appropriate, it must set a "reasonable hourly rate," which is "the rate a paying client would be willing to pay."
Once the reasonable hourly rate is identified, the court uses it to calculate the presumptively reasonable fee by multiplying the rate by the number of hours reasonably expended.
There is no dispute that Small is a prevailing party. A party is a prevailing party if the party "succeeds on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit."
Small seeks $1,054,600 in attorneys' fees. She supports her request with a 162page billing statement covering the time period August 10, 2011, through September 28, 2018. (Billing Statement, Docket No. 201-2.) The billing statement contains entries from multiple legal professionals and reflects instances of "block billing." Defendants maintain that Small's fee request is unreasonable both because the requested hourly rates exceed those permitted in this district and because the billing statement shows overstaffing, inflated billing, and vague entries. Defendants request that Small's request be trimmed by one-third to account for these overages.
The first issue is the reasonableness of the hourly rates claimed, which have periodically increased over the 7-year course of this litigation. For example, lead counsel Jennifer Shoemaker, a litigation partner with 18 years' experience in labor and employment litigation, billed $493,755.50 for 1,670.6 hours at hourly rates that varied from $225 to $320. (Shoemaker Affirmation; Docket No. 201, ¶¶ 47, 48; Billing Statement, p. 5.) Second-chair Alina Nadir, a litigation associate with 8 years' experience in labor and employment litigation, billed $329,341 for 1,317.6 hours at hourly rates that varied from $235 to $260. (
The billing statement also contains entries by eight other lawyers and five other paralegals. Using the same method described above, the other eight lawyers billed at the following average rates: Ramsey ($305/hour); Fitch ($295/hour); Cordello ($265/hour); Gregorio ($240/hour); Farrar ($258/hour); Keneally ($365/hour); Nunes ($345/hour); and Hull ($330/hour). (Billing Statement, pp. 5-6.) The five other paralegals billed at rates as follows: Cross ($160/hour); Coleman ($125/hour); Smith-Schuler ($180); Soeffing ($172/hour); Bansbach ($175/hour). (
Assessing these average rates-per-hour, this Court finds that Shoemaker's rate of $295/hour and Nadir's rate of $250/hour are reasonable and within the range of rates approved in this district in civil rights actions for attorneys of comparable experience and expertise.
For the eight other attorneys, Small provides little information about their experience and expertise, other than identifying whether they are a partner or associate. (
In assessing Small's paralegal rate of $165/hour, this Court finds that it is excessive. In this district, a paralegal rate of $75/hour predominates,
To strike a balance between Hance's 28 years' experience and the unknown experience of the other paralegals who billed considerable time, this Court will apply a $100/hour rate to all paralegal time, a rate that this Court finds a reasonable paying client would willingly pay.
Applying these reasonable hourly rates—$295/hour for partners; $250/hour for associates; $100/hour for paralegals—Small's fee request becomes $966,242.50 for 4,388.8 hours as follows:
The second issue is the reasonableness of the time expended. The party seeking attorney's fees must support the number of hours expended with "contemporaneous time records . . . [that] specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done."
But "the district court is not obligated to undertake a line-by-line review of [an] extensive fee application."
Defendants first contend that the time Small's counsel expended is unreasonable because they overstaffed the case, using 10 attorneys and six paralegals. This raises the question whether Small's attorneys exercised sound billing judgment. As explained in
388 F. Supp. 2d at 163 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Seeking fees for individuals who had little or no involvement in a case is indicative of poor billing judgment.
Here, Small seeks attorneys' fees for work performed by several individuals who are only peripherally related to this case. For example, of the 3,012.2 total attorney hours billed, only 24 of those hours (or less than 1%) were billed by attorneys other than Shoemaker and Nadir. Similarly, of the 1,376.6 total paralegal hours billed, only 16.7 of those hours (or less than 2%) were billed by paralegals other than Hance, Cross, and Coleman. Given this lack of billing judgment, this Court will not award fees for work done by Ramsey, Fitch, Keneally, Nunes, Hull, Cordello, Gregorio, Farrar, Smith-Schuler, Soeffing, and Bansbach, each of whom is only tangentially related to this litigation. See id. at 426 (disallowing fees for individuals only tangentially involved in the case, ranging from an individual who billed .7 hours to one who billed 28.3 hours).
Defendants next argue that the total number of hours claimed—now 4,347.6—is excessive given the circumstances of this particular case. Defendants maintain that "the legal analysis was the same [for all claims] and [the] factual record was particularly simple." (Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 215, p. 2.) Without citing any examples, they fault Small's attorneys for expending an "excessive, redundant number of hours for attorneys who have practiced as long as they have." (
Although the legal claims were not unusually complicated, this case was not as straightforward as Defendants suggest. The parties heavily litigated for more than seven years. After Defendants answered Small's amended complaint on August 27, 2013, it took approximately 2½ years to complete discovery (complete with motions), after which the parties litigated their summary judgment motions. Small's counsel interviewed more than 24 witnesses and reviewed thousands of pages of documents. (Shoemaker Affirmation, Docket No. 218, ¶ 6.) Significantly, counsel had to fully prepare for trial three different times, due to the first two trials needing to be unexpectedly adjourned.
Defendants' contention that many of the time entries "raise serious concerns" is also unfounded. Defendants cite several instances in which "Plaintiff's counsel" billed more than 24 hours in a single day, a circumstance that, if true, would certainly raise suspicion. (Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 215, p. 3.) But what Defendants fail to recognize is that multiple legal professionals worked on the case in a single day, thus leading to what otherwise would appear to be billing anomalies. For example, on June 13, 2017, Shoemaker worked on the case for 13.2 hours; Nadir for 12.3 hours; and Hance for 5 hours. (Billing Statement, Docket No. 201-2, pp. 107-108.) Similar circumstances occurred on June 14 and September 14, 2017. (
The rich and unusual facts of this case required painstaking preparation and detailed presentation to the jury. Witness testimony was crucial, particularly that of Small, who surely required delicate preparation given her fragile state. Counsels' preparation was therefore a critical factor in obtaining the result achieved, one that was overwhelmingly in Small's favor. In this Court's view, the time billed is commensurate with counsels' task. This Court therefore finds that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the time expended was not unreasonable.
Finally, Defendants argue that the billing statement contains impermissibly vague entries and block-billing, such as "meet with client," "continue to review documents," "continue document review," "work on complaint," and "continue research." (Memorandum of Law, Docket No. 215, pp. 6-7.) This Court agrees to a limited extent.
A billing entry "cannot be so vague as to bar the court from being able to decipher its meaning in the context in which it appears."
Here, the billing statement is largely adequate and sufficiently detailed, but Defendants are correct that it contains some vague entries and extensive block-billing, which makes the overall reasonableness of the listed tasks difficult to discern. This Court will therefore apply a 10% across-the-board reduction.
Accordingly, Small's final approved attorneys' fee award is $862,395.30 as follows:
The party seeking to recover costs bears the burden of adequately documenting and itemizing the costs requested.
Here, Small seeks reimbursement of her costs in the amount of $100,448.72, including expert fees and legal research, and she has submitted a detailed invoice in support. (Invoice of Costs, Docket No. 201-3, pp. 30-49.) Defendants do not oppose this request. Small's application for costs is therefore approved.
Small seeks pre-judgment interest on her Title VII compensatory damages and Title VII and New York Human Rights Law back pay awards compounded annually at the applicable New York State rate. Small further seeks post-judgment interest on her entire award, including attorneys' fees and costs. Defendants do not meaningfully oppose these requests.
Small first seeks pre-judgment interest on her Title VII compensatory damages award. "Under Title VII, in its discretion, a court may award pre-judgment interest on awards of compensatory damages for pain and suffering and emotional distress."
Small also seeks pre-judgment interest on her back-pay awards. "Title VII authorizes a district court to grant pre-judgment interest on a back pay award."
For federal claims under Title VII, courts award pre-judgment interest on back pay at the federal rate,
Here, the Title VII back pay award is $370,000. The relevant time period is January 30, 2011 (day after termination) to October 11, 2018 (date of judgment).
The same method of calculation applies for Small's state law back pay award, but pre-judgment interest is calculated at 9% under New York CPLR § 5004.
Finally, Small seeks post-judgment interest on her entire award, including attorneys' fees and costs. By statute, "[i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court." 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (a). Accordingly, this Court will grant post-judgment interest on the award reflected in the amended judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (a) running from October 11, 2018, the date of the original judgment.
The jury determine that Defendants unlawfully subjected Pamela Small to discrimination and a hostile work environment and then retaliated against her when she complained about it. For the reasons stated above, the jury's determinations are supported by the evidence adduced at trial, and Defendants have failed to show that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. Defendant Cuer, however, has demonstrated that the jury's $3.85 million compensatory damages award against him requires remittitur to $2.88 million, for the reasons stated herein. Finally, Small is entitled to recover $862,395.30 in reasonable attorneys' fees, $364,622.14 in pre-judgment interest, and $100,448.72 in costs. Post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (a) will run on the entire award from October 11, 2018, the date of the original judgment.
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Defendants' post-trial motions (Docket Nos. 204, 206) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, consistent with this Decision and Order.
FURTHER, that a new trial on damages against Defendant Carl Cuer will be scheduled by separate order if Plaintiff does not accept this Court's remittitur of compensatory damages against Defendant Cuer from $3.85 million to $2.88 million. Plaintiff must file an affidavit within 10 days of the entry date of this Decision and Order advising whether she will accept the remittitur.
FURTHER, Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Interest, and Costs (Docket No. 202) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, consistent with this Decision and Order. Defendants must pay Plaintiff $862,395.30 in attorneys' fees, $364,622.14 in pre-judgment interest, and $100,448.72 in costs, consistent with this Decision and Order.
FURTHER, that the Clerk of Court is directed to file an amended judgment against Defendants New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, Sandra Dolce, and James Conway as follows:
FURTHER, that the amended judgment may be amended further to include Defendant Cuer once Plaintiff notifies this Court of her remittitur decision.
SO ORDERED.