ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Corydon Carlton ("Plaintiff") filed this action on August 19, 2016, alleging that defendant Correctional Officer Robert Pearson ("Defendant") violated his civil rights by failing to protect him from an assault by another inmate. (Dkt. 1). On August 27, 2018, the Court scheduled a jury trial to commence over six months later—on March 18, 2019. (See Dkt. 47; Dkt. 48). As noted in the Pretrial Order, this was "a day-certain trial that [would] not be adjourned except for the trial of criminal cases which take precedence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161." (Dkt. 47 at 1). At the final pretrial conference held on February 25, 2019, Plaintiff (who up until that point had appeared pro se) indicated his intention to retain counsel for the upcoming trial. The Court advised Plaintiff at
On March 16, 2019—the Saturday before trial—Michael E. Talassazan, Esq., faxed a notice of appearance on behalf of Plaintiff to the chambers of United States Magistrate Judge H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr., along with a letter requesting an adjournment of the trial date. On Monday, March 18, 2019, Plaintiff appeared without the presence of counsel. That morning, Judge Schroeder's chambers contacted the undersigned's chambers to advise as to the weekend communication from Mr. Talassazan. The Court contacted Mr. Talassazan by phone and confirmed that he was not admitted to practice in the Western District of New York, nor was he even physically present in the District. Mr. Talassazan informed the Court that he was unable to appear on Plaintiff's behalf that day but represented that he would appear before the Court the next day and bring with him the necessary materials to seek pro hac vice admission.
Because the Court had set the trial date over six months earlier, prospective jurors had been called to court and were awaiting jury selection, and Defendant and his counsel were present and prepared to proceed, the Court denied Plaintiff's eleventh-hour request to adjourn the trial date. However, while jury selection proceeded on March 18, 2019, as scheduled, the Court adjourned opening statements and the presentation of proof until the following day, over Defendant's objections.
On March 19, 2019, Mr. Talassazan was permitted to formally appear on Plaintiff's behalf during trial. Following the close of evidence and closing arguments, the jury was instructed on the applicable law. The Court instructed the jury on compensatory damages, in relevant part, as follows:
The Court also instructed the jury on nominal damages, in relevant part, as follows:
Plaintiff did not object to any part of the above-referenced jury instructions. On March 22, 2019, the jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff's favor, finding that Defendant had violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and awarding Plaintiff nominal damages in the amount of $1.00. (Dkt. 70).
For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict is denied.
Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may "grant a new trial on all or some of the issues ... after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." "The Second Circuit has held that a Rule 59 motion for a new trial should be denied `unless the trial court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.'" Spinelli v. City of New York, No. 02 CIV. 8967, 2011 WL 2802937, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2011) (quoting AIG Global Sec. Lending Corp. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC., 386 F.App'x 5, 7 (2d Cir. 2010)); see Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2002) (same). "On new trial motions, the trial judge may weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses and need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner." Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2012).
"A court considering a Rule 59 motion for a new trial must bear in mind, however, that the court should only grant such a motion when the jury's verdict is egregious." DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). For this reason, a Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial based "on the ground that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence must overcome the `high degree of deference... accorded to the jury's evaluation of witness credibility' and the admonition that `jury verdicts should be disturbed with great infrequency.'" Johnson v. Perry, 763 F.App'x 81, 83 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting ING Global v. United Parcel Serv. Oasis Supply Corp., 757 F.3d 92, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2014)). While "[t]he legal test for granting a new trial is less stringent than for granting judgment as a matter of law," Luv n' Care, Ltd. v. Regent Baby Prod. Corp., 898 F.Supp.2d 650, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), "in practice courts do not grant new trials as freely as the language suggests, and movants for a new trial are still held to `a heavy burden,'" Toliver v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr., 202 F.Supp.3d 328, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quotations and citation omitted).
Plaintiff's request for a new trial on damages is made only in the alternative. (See Dkt. 73-1 at ¶ 2). First and foremost, Plaintiff requests that the Court set aside the verdict and simply award additur in a
"Additur is the process by which, if a trial court considers a verdict inadequate, it may condition the denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial on defendant's consent to the entry of judgment in excess of the verdict." Elsevier Inc. v. Grossmann, No. 12 Civ. 5121 (KPF), 2018 WL 4908105, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2018). "[I]t is a tool that judges use to fix damages— something that can generally be done only by the fact-finder—without actually having to hold a second trial." Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 272 (2d Cir. 1999). However, it is settled law that additur cannot "be employed by federal courts because the procedure involve[s] an unconstitutional reexamination of a jury verdict in violation of the Seventh Amendment." Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 917 F.2d 1320, 1331 (2d Cir. 1990); see Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 482, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 S.Ct. 603 (1935) ("[T]he established practice and the rule of the common law, as it existed in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, forbade the court to increase the amount of damages awarded by a jury in actions such as that here under consideration."); Elyse v. Bridgeside Inc., 367 F.App'x 266, 267 (2d Cir. 2010) (determining that the "motion to increase the damages award was properly denied by the district court on the ground that additur is constitutionally impermissible").
Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff requests that the Court set aside the verdict and grant additur, that request is denied.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to provide citations to any relevant excerpts of the trial or pretrial records and appears to submit his motion based upon counsel's own recollection of the various arguments presented and rulings issued at trial. Generally speaking, specific reliance upon the trial transcript is necessary to demonstrate one's entitlement to relief on a Rule 59 motion based upon determinations made at trial. See Ayala v. Rosales, No. 13 C 4425, 2015 WL 4127915, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2015) (noting that "while the Court has attempted to the best of its ability to address [p]laintiff's claims on the merits," the plaintiff's "failure to provide all of the necessary record citations makes it impossible for this Court to properly address his claims of error," and thus, "any arguments lacking necessary record support are, in the first instances, denied as waived"); Ratliff v. City of Chicago, No. 10-CV-739, 2013 WL 3388745, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2013) (on a motion for a new trial, "to the extent that citation to the record would be necessary to support a
Plaintiff's sparse three-page attorney affirmation in support of his motion does little to establish that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Plaintiff's counsel emphasizes that the trial evidence demonstrated that Plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a result of the assault by the other inmate. (Dkt. 73-1 at ¶ 6). Plaintiff suggests that the jury's award of nominal damages is inconsistent with its conclusion that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated. (See id. at ¶ 11 ("Here, while the jury concluded that the plaintiff suffered a violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the United States Constitution, they somehow concluded that his damages were only one dollar.")).
There is nothing inherently inconsistent or improper with awarding nominal damages for a constitutional violation. See Randolph v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 17CV1433(DLC), 2019 WL 1567663, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2019) ("There is no inconsistency ... between a finding that a plaintiff's rights were violated and that the plaintiff should only be awarded nominal damages."). "What Plaintiff fails to recognize is that being subjected to a constitutional violation, while sufficient to sustain the claim, does not mean, a fortiori, that he is entitled to compensatory damages." Blake v. Coughlin, No. 9:92-CV-1351, 2006 WL 2270383, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2006). Indeed, the Second Circuit has recognized that "[a] finding that the plaintiff has been deprived of a constitutional right does not automatically entitle him to a substantial award of damages." Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 123 (2d Cir. 2004).
It is well settled that in order to "recover compensatory damages under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that his injuries were proximately caused by the constitutional violation." Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); see Kerman, 374 F.3d at 123 ("The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law,' which applies to actions brought under § 1983, `is that of compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant's breach of duty.'" (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978))). "A plaintiff is `not ... entitled to compensatory damages simply because the jury found'
Here, the jury heard substantial testimony relating to the duration of the assault and how long it took Defendant to open Plaintiff's prison cell door to stop the fight. The jury was free to reject Plaintiff's theory that Defendant perpetrated a cage match between Plaintiff and the other inmate by purposefully locking Plaintiff's cell door after the inmate began his assault. The jury was also free to accept Plaintiff's position that Defendant was indifferent by not reacting to diffuse the situation within a reasonably swift manner. See Rodriguez v. Ghoslaw, No. 98 CIV. 4658 (GEL), 2001 WL 755398, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2001) ("A jury that found that [the defendant] did deliberately authorize or goad inmates to continue a violent and dangerous brawl could still find that the Constitution was violated, and return a verdict of at least nominal damages for [the plaintiff]." (footnote omitted) (citing Gibeau, 18 F.3d at 110)). A reasonable jury could have concluded that while Defendant violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Defendant's failure to act did not proximately cause Plaintiff's injuries. See Rentas v. Ruffin, 816 F.3d 214, 223 (2d Cir. 2016) ("`[W]hen a defendant has deprived the plaintiff of liberty[,] ... but the... adverse action would have been taken even' in the absence of the wrongful conduct, `the plaintiff ... is entitled only to nominal damages.'" (quoting Kerman, 374 F.3d at 123)); Haywood v. Koehler, 885 F.Supp. 624, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[T]he jury could well have concluded that the injuries sustained by [the plaintiff] were the result of the use of justified force by [the defendant] in attempting to quell a near riot condition and that while [the defendant] also used excessive force, that use of force was not the cause of any compensable injury."), aff'd, 78 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996); see generally Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311, 314 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[W]here both justified and unjustified force were used, the jury could conclude that the injuries resulted from the justified use of force.").
Plaintiff points to no evidence that would have required the jury to find that the injuries he sustained during the assault arose from Defendant's violation of his rights. See Ali v. Kipp, No. 11-CV-5297 (NGG) (VMS), 2016 WL 7235719, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2016) ("[A] verdict should be overturned and set aside only if there is no view of the case that can harmonize the jury's findings."), aff'd, 891 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2018). The jury was in the best position to piece together the facts in determining how, if at all, Defendant violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights and whether any actual injury resulted from that violation. See Haywood v. Koehler, 78 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he jurors were not required to accept the entirety of either side's account, but were free to accept bits of testimony from several witnesses and to make reasonable inferences from whatever testimony they credited."). Because "a court should rarely disturb a jury's evaluation of a witness's credibility," DLC Mgmt. Corp., 163 F.3d at 134, and since the degree to which Defendant's wrongful conduct proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries hinged upon the jury's assessment of the witnesses' demeanor, the Court declines to substitute its own credibility determinations for those reached by the jury, see Raedle, 670 F.3d
Therefore, Plaintiff's motion to set aside the damages portion of the verdict as against the weight of the evidence is denied.
Where an action is brought pursuant to § 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs," subject to certain exceptions not relevant here. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). "[P]laintiffs may be considered `prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (quotation omitted). "Plaintiffs who win nominal damages are, indeed, prevailing parties for purposes of fee awards." Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992)).
"However, while prevailing parties are eligible for fees under § 1988, they are not invariably entitled to them." Husain v. Springer, 579 F.App'x 3, 4 (2d Cir. 2014); see Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566 ("In some circumstances, even a plaintiff who formally `prevails' under § 1988 should receive no attorney's fees at all."). The Supreme Court has explained that "[i]n a civil rights suit for damages, ... the awarding of nominal damages ... highlights the plaintiff's failure to prove actual, compensable injury." Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566. As a result, "[w]hen a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." Id. (citation omitted); see also Pino, 101 F.3d at 238 ("[W]hile there is no per se rule that a plaintiff recovering nominal damages can never get a fee award, Farrar indicates that the award of fees in such a case will be rare."). In other words, "`[w]here recovery of private damages is the purpose of ... civil rights litigation,' a plaintiff who obtains no more than nominal damages will typically not merit an award of attorneys' fees." LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 758 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566); see Husain, 579 F.App'x at 4 ("[I]t is not the technical fact of prevailing party status, but the `degree of success obtained' that determines a party's entitlement to a fee award and, relatedly, the reasonableness of the amount of that award." (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566)).
Furthermore, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e ("PLRA"), limits a prevailing prisoner-plaintiff's recovery of attorney's fees to 150% of the money judgment awarded. See Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603, 607 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[W]e have observed that § 1997e(d)(2) `effectively caps a defendant's liability for attorneys' fees in a prisoner's § 1983 action at 150% of a money judgment.'" (quoting Torres v. Walker, 356 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 2004))); Carbonell v. Acrish, 154 F.Supp.2d 552, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("When a prisoner-plaintiff garners a monetary judgment, section 1997e(d)(2) imposes a ceiling on the defendants' liability for attorneys' fees equal to 150% of the amount of that judgment." (quoting Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2000))). This limitation has been applied with equal force in the context of nominal monetary
Here, Plaintiff sought compensatory damages in the amount of $5,000,000.00 and punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.00. (Dkt. 1 at 6, 8). It is beyond dispute that the purpose of this civil action was the recovery of a substantial damages award. Nonetheless, while Plaintiff established at trial that Defendant violated his constitutional rights, he obtained an award of just $1.00 in nominal damages. (Dkt. 70 at 2). The Second Circuit has affirmed the denial of an attorneys' fee award "where the plaintiff recovered only nominal damages and received no other meaningful relief." McCardle v. Haddad, 131 F.3d 43, 54 (2d Cir. 1997); see Caruso v. Forslund, 47 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of attorneys' fee award where compensatory damages were sought but only nominal damages were obtained); see also Pino, 101 F.3d at 238-39 (reversing attorneys' fee award where the plaintiff sought $21 million in damages but only received $1.00). As in Farrar, "[t]his litigation accomplished little beyond giving [Plaintiff] `the moral satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded that [his] rights had been violated.'" Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566. Considering that the primary pursuit of this litigation was a private damages award, "[t]he only way [Plaintiff] could have been less successful is if [ ]he had lost altogether, and then, of course, [ ]he would not qualify as a prevailing party." Pino, 101 F.3d at 238. It is also worth mentioning that Defendant is now retired, and as such, poses no risk of repeating the alleged constitutional violation with other inmates. In other words, a personal damages award to Plaintiff was necessarily the sole focus of the litigation, and under the circumstances, a nominal award of $1.00 simply does not denote the type of success required for an attorneys' fee award.
Given Plaintiff's limited success in this action, an attorney's fee award is inappropriate. Therefore, Plaintiff's counsel's request for attorney's fees is denied.
"Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, `costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.'" Dattner v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 458 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1)). "Under normal circumstances, a plaintiff who prevails on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is entitled to recover costs...." Stanczyk v. City of New York, 752 F.3d 273, 280 (2d Cir. 2014). "The decision to award costs to a prevailing party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) rests within the sound discretion of the district court." LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995).
Defendant contends that Plaintiff's request for costs is procedurally defective because it fails to comply with this District's applicable local rule. (Dkt. 75 at 16). Pursuant to L.R. Civ. P. 54(a), a party that is otherwise entitled to recover costs shall, "[w]ithin thirty (30) days after entry of final judgment, ... submit to the Clerk of Court a verified Bill of Costs on the form provided by the Court." Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to file a verified
"[P]ost-judgment motions pursuant to [Rule 59] will ordinarily toll any applicable time period that turns on the date of the entry of judgment." Deep v. Coin, 453 F.App'x 49, 56 (2d Cir. 2011). Although the Deep decision concluded that the post-judgment motion did not extend the thirty-day time period to file a bill of costs under the Northern District of New York's applicable local rule, it did so because that rule specifically provided otherwise. Id.; see id. at 55-56 (noting that the local rule clarified that "[p]ost-trial motions shall not serve to extend the time within which a party may file a verified bill of costs as provided in this Rule, except on an order extending time"). A review of this District's Local Rule 54 reveals that it contains no such limitation. See L.R. Civ. P. 54. In fact, Deep recognized that the Northern District's local rule "differ[ed] from that applicable in other districts within this Circuit." See Deep, 453 F.App'x at 56.
Here, Plaintiff filed his motion to set aside the verdict 16 days after the entry of Judgment. (See Dkt. 72; Dkt. 73). That motion tolls the time limitation set forth in L.R. Civ. P. 54(a), which requires that a verified Bill of Costs be submitted to the Clerk of Court 30 days "after entry of final judgment." Therefore, Plaintiff's time to file a verified Bill of Costs with the Clerk of Court has not yet expired.
However, because Plaintiff has failed to provide a sufficient itemization of his costs, Plaintiff's application for costs has not been filed in proper form pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and request for an award of attorney's fees (Dkt. 73) is denied, and Plaintiff's request for costs is denied without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
