HUGH B. SCOTT, Magistrate Judge.
The parties have consented to this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The Court has reviewed the Certified Administrative Record in this case (Dkt. No. 6, pages hereafter cited in brackets), and familiarity is presumed. This case comes before the Court on cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. Nos. 10, 12.) In short, plaintiff is challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") that she was not entitled to Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Court has deemed the motions submitted on papers under Rule 78(b).
"The scope of review of a disability determination . . . involves two levels of inquiry. We must first decide whether HHS applied the correct legal principles in making the determination. We must then decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence." Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When a district court reviews a denial of benefits, the Commissioner's findings as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is defined as "`more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1999).
The substantial evidence standard applies to both findings on basic evidentiary facts, and to inferences and conclusions drawn from the facts. Stupakevich v. Chater, 907 F.Supp. 632, 637 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Smith v. Shalala, 856 F.Supp. 118, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). When reviewing a Commissioner's decision, the court must determine whether "the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached" by the Commissioner. Winkelsas v. Apfel, No. 99-CV-0098H, 2000 WL 575513, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2000). In assessing the substantiality of evidence, the Court must consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision, as well as evidence that supports it. Briggs v. Callahan, 139 F.3d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1998). The Court may not reverse the Commissioner merely because substantial evidence would have supported the opposite conclusion. Id.
For purposes of Social Security disability insurance benefits, a person is disabled when unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(A).
Such a disability will be found to exist only if an individual's "physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [he or she] is not only unable to do [his or her] previous work but cannot, considering [his or her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d) (2)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the claimed impairments will prevent a return to any previous type of employment. Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982). Once this burden has been met, "the burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to prove the existence of alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy and which the plaintiff could perform." Id.; see also Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1551 (2d Cir. 1983); Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231 (2d Cir. 1980).
To determine whether any plaintiff is suffering from a disability, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") must employ a five-step inquiry:
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920; Berry, supra, 675 F.2d at 467. If a plaintiff is found to be either disabled or not disabled at any step in this sequential inquiry then the ALJ's review ends. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) & 416.920(a); Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). However, the ALJ has an affirmative duty to develop the record. Gold v. Secretary, 463 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1972).
To determine whether an admitted impairment prevents a plaintiff from performing past work, the ALJ is required to review the plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and the physical and mental demands of the work done in the past. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) & 416.920(e). The ALJ must then determine the individual's ability to return to past relevant work given the RFC. Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1442 (10th Cir. 1994).
Here, plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision not to grant more weight to her mental health treatment providers at the Dale Association. "Plaintiff received treatment at the Dale Association for her depression and anxiety starting in 2016. In November of that year, a counselor and a nurse practitioner at that organization had signed statements indicating that the Plaintiff would have serious limitations in functioning. The ALJ gave both opinions little weight. This was error." (Dkt. No. 10-1 at 10.) Plaintiff has elaborated further on the extent to which she had significant psychiatric symptoms that the ALJ ignored:
(Id. at 12.) The Commissioner responds that plaintiff has isolated the most favorable parts of the record from the Dale Association from the broader overall file:
(Dkt. No. 12-1 at 22-23.)
The Commissioner has the better argument. Plaintiff first saw the Dale Association on January 18, 2016. At that time, plaintiff scored only mild impairments and needed only mild treatment goals that included coping skills. [369, 370.] The impairments and treatment goals remained approximately the same in May 2016. [379, 380.] Cf. Boyd v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-1316 (GLS), 2016 WL 866345, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2016) (ability to develop coping skills weighed against disability determination). A psychiatric assessment of June 27, 2016 included a mental status examination that noted some symptoms but not to the extent that plaintiff is arguing now:
[381.] By October 26, 2016, plaintiff had an increase in anxiety and depression and had begun her application for disability benefits but otherwise reported "the usual steady anxiety or steady depression." [394.] The next visit was scheduled for November 23, 2016, but on November 17, 2016, a medical source statement of mostly checkboxes was prepared. [396-400.] The checkboxes suggested more severe impairments than the previous year of clinical notes. The checkboxes dated November 29, 2016 had the same problem. [510-14.] In contrast, the clinical notes from the Dale Association were more consistent with the psychiatric examination conducted by Dr. Christine Ransom on July 11, 2014:
[312.] Cf. Breinin v. Colvin, No. 514CV01166LEKTWD, 2015 WL 7749318, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2015) (no disability based on anxiety where "medical records generally noted Plaintiff to be alert, oriented, clear and coherent with good grooming, and intact attention, concentration, and memory skills"), report and recommendation adopted, No. 514CV1166LEKTWD, 2015 WL 7738047 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2015); see also Shipp v. Colvin, No. 16-CV-919 HBS, 2018 WL 4870748, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2018) ("The remainder of the checkmarks in the questionnaire come with no explanation and are too conclusory to oppose a consistent medical record. The Second Circuit has held that such standardized form opinions are only marginally useful for purposes of creating a meaningful and reviewable factual record.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Under the circumstances, substantial evidence supports the way in which the ALJ assessed plaintiff's mental health and assigned different weights to her clinical records.
Next, plaintiff challenges the ALJ's assessment of her back pain. "The Plaintiff had the severe impairment of lumbago. She testified to a need to alternate between sitting and standing due to her back pain, however, there were no opinions on the record regarding the Plaintiff's physical capabilities." (Dkt. No. 10-1 at 14.) Plaintiff emphasizes the severity of the symptoms that she reported over time:
(Id. at 16-17; see also Dkt. No. 13 at 3.) The Commissioner emphasizes the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing her RFC and that her medical record simply contains no information contradicting an RFC of light work:
(Dkt. No. 12-1 at 25-26.)
The Commissioner again has the better argument. Plaintiff had a normal MRI of the lumbosacral spine as recently as October and November 2014. [361-62, 424.] Doctors acknowledged the back pain that plaintiff was experiencing but could not trace it to a specific physical origin. [442, 456-57, 472.] A clinical note from May 12, 2016 made only a brief reference to "moderately limited ROM" in the musculoskeletal spine. The assessment, from Urban Family Practice, increased to a limited range of motion in June 2016 but then returned to a moderate limitation in July 2016. [483, 489; see also 505 (October 2016).] Cf. Rhone v. Berryhill, No. 116CV07213CMSDA, 2018 WL 1282823, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2018) (RFC of light work supported by substantial evidence where, inter alia, plaintiff had "full ranges of motion in most extremities, the exception being limited flexion in [plaintiff]'s left ankle, as well as limited range of motion in his thoracic and lumbar spines"). Meanwhile, as the Commissioner has noted, plaintiff consistently was capable of activities of daily living and never reported an inability to carry out daily tasks. Even plaintiff herself testified that her physical exertional limits fell within the regulatory definition of light work. Compare [44] ("Q. And what do you think is the most you'd be able to lift? A. Well, my daughter is 20 pounds and that's a lot on me. Q. And are you able to carry things like groceries? A. Not—somewhat. Not—not more than 20 pounds, if that. Q. And how often do you think you'd be able or are you able to lift that 20 pounds? A. Not very often. Q. So about how many times would you say you end up lifting or carrying your daughter in a given day? A. Probably about—maybe maximum 10.") with 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) ("Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds."). Under these circumstances, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the only needed modifications to a finding of light work concerned plaintiff's mental health and not her physical exertion.
The Commissioner's final determination was supported by substantial evidence. For the above reasons and for the reasons stated in the Commissioner's briefing, the Court grants the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. No. 12) and denies plaintiff's cross-motion (Dkt. No. 10).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED.