MARK W. PEDERSEN, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on City Defendants' motion to bifurcate (ECF No. 47) and Plaintiffs' Second Motion to Compel (ECF. 45.) The parties appeared before this Court for oral argument on February 13, 2020.
By way of background, this matter was originally referred to the Hon. Jonathan W. Feldman and then was referred to the undersigned upon Judge Feldman's retirement in November 2019. The City of Rochester filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) which was granted and denied in part by United States District Judge Michael A. Telesca. Judge Telesca granted the motion to dismiss with respect to all of Plaintiffs' claims against the Rochester Police Department and dismissed Plaintiffs' claims against the City of Rochester that were based on a theory of supervisory liability as well as Plaintiffs' state law claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Judge Feldman issued a scheduling order (ECF No. 22) after he held a scheduling conference on July 25, 2018. Plaintiffs' counsel, Elliott Shields, Esq., filed a motion for extension of discovery deadlines as well as a motion to opt out of the mediation program. (ECF No. 26.) Shortly thereafter, he filed an amended complaint (ECF No. 29).
City Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss on April 15, 2019 (ECF No. 30), the same day that an unsuccessful mediation was held before Steven V. Modica, Esq. (ECF No. 31.) Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike City Defendants' answer as well as a motion for sanctions, a modification of the scheduling order, and seeking attorney's fees. (ECF No. 32.) On May 16, 2019, Spencer Ash, Esq., filed objections to the Plaintiffs' motions via his letter to the Court (ECF No. 38), and filed a separate response on the same day. Judge Telesca issued his decision and order (ECF No. 43) on August 15, 2019, in which he denied City Defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint as moot and denied Plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint. Additionally, Judge Telesca granted Plaintiffs' motion to strike City Defendants' answer and granted them leave to re-file their answer. Judge Telesca also denied Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions. Of note, Judge Telesca in his decision and order stated,
(Id. at 39.)
On August 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed a second motion to compel discovery (ECF No. 45) and a motion to expedite the hearing of their second motion to compel (ECF No. 46). Subsequently, City Defendants filed a Motion to Bifurcate (ECF No. 47). On September 6, 2019, Judge Feldman held a status conference with the parties and issued an order (ECF No. 52), in which he denied Plaintiffs' motion to expedite and directed the parties to review his previous decisions with regard to motions to compel personnel records. Judge Feldman stated in his decision that "the Court's position generally is that if the records pertain to similar conduct as is set forth in the complaint or are relevant to the defendant's truth or veracity, they must be provided." (Id. at 2.) Judge Feldman further directed that City Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate would be heard before Judge Telesca. The parties briefed the motion to bifurcate and shortly thereafter, City Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on October 29, 2019 (ECF No. 58), to which Plaintiff emailed the Court a letter requesting that Plaintiff not be required to respond to the motion for summary judgment and that the Court impose discovery sanctions. Notwithstanding the improper method of requesting leave of the Court, Judge Telesca denied Plaintiffs' requests (ECF No. 59) and advised Plaintiffs' counsel that if he "disregards the Court's scheduling order, it is at his and his clients' peril." (Id.)
City Defendants filed a status report on November 19, 2019, with the Court (ECF No. 62) in which they contended that "it is the City Defendants' position that pending an order from the Court ordering Monell discovery, all relevant discovery has been completed and there is sufficient proof in the record to decide the summary judgment motion." (Id.) On December 12, 2019, the motion for summary judgment was submitted to the Court without oral argument.
On January 24, 2020, Judge Telesca directed by text order (ECF No. 69), that the motion to bifurcate (ECF No. 47) and the second motion to compel City Defendants to provide discovery (ECF No. 45) would both be referred to the undersigned for adjudication.
The Court may grant a motion to bifurcate discovery "`[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.'" Charvat v. Plymouth Rock Energy, LLC, No. 15-CV-4106 (JMA) (SIL), 2016 WL 207677, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016) (quoting Koch v. Pechota, No. 10 Civ. 9152, 2012 WL 2402577, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2012)). Generally, it is presumed that all claims will be resolved at a single trial:
Miller v. Am. Bonding Co, 257 U.S. 304, 308 (1921); accord Altman v. New Rochelle Pub. School Dist., 2017 WL 66326 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017) (citing Miller in denying bifurcation). In determining whether to bifurcate, a court may consider,
Dallas v. Goldberg, 143 F.Supp.2d 312, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), opinion modified on denial of reconsideration, No. 95 CIV. 9076 (LTS) (RL, 2002 WL 1013291 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2002).
City Defendants' motion argues that "[t]his case is frivolous, and before the City of Rochester is tied up in lengthy and burdensome Monell discovery, the Court should first decide whether there is sufficient evidence on summary judgment to proceed against the individual officers." (City Def.s' Mem. of Law 2, Aug. 29, 2019, ECF No. 47-8.) In contrast, Plaintiff argues that Monell liability here is not dependent on a finding that individual officers violated Plaintiffs' rights. The Second Circuit has held on this issue that:
Askins v. Doe No. 1, 727 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 2013). The complaint sufficiently alleges that one or more of the municipal actors committed a constitutional tort against Plaintiff. Further, in his Decision and Order of January 8, 2018, (ECF No. 17), Judge Telesca determined that Plaintiffs' complaint,
(Decision and Order at 11-12 & 14, ECF No. 17 (footnote omitted).)
The Court disagrees with City Defendants' argument that the case is frivolous, or that Plaintiff must obtain a judgment establishing individual liability before his Monell claim would be viable. City Defendants have not made a showing that bifurcation would meet any of the factors mentioned above. The issues under Monell are not significantly different from the issues concerning the individual actions of the municipal actors. The issues will be tried before a jury. Plaintiff has already expended time on producing discovery pertinent to his Monell claim and has alleged that granting the motion to bifurcate discovery would be prejudicial to him. Finally, the documentary and testimonial evidence is likely to overlap. Accordingly, the Court denies City defendants' motion to bifurcate.
City Defendants oppose Plaintiffs' motion to compel arguing that,
(Reply, Oct. 3, 2019, ECF No. 54.) Plaintiff seeks several types of documentary evidence. At oral argument, defense counsel maintained that he had provided the General Orders which echoed the training documents Plaintiff requested (and contended that Plaintiffs' counsel had a library of general orders gathered from prior cases). However, defense counsel responded that he was not permitted to use any discovery from prior cases pursuant to a protective order the parties entered into in those prior cases. City Defendants have not moved for a Court protective order, but the parties have signed a stipulated protective order. (Stipulated Protective Order, Aug. 26, 2019, ECF No. 45-19.) The Court will address Plaintiffs' demands individually.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) limits discovery to,
The Court finds that the records of discipline and training of the officers involved in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct here are relevant and should be produced. Not only are those records relevant to Plaintiffs' Monell claims, but they relate to City Defendants' affirmative defenses, particularly the second ("Defendants acted in the reasonable and good faith belief that their actions were lawful and constitutional"), the sixth ("[t]he official actions of the City of Rochester, its employees, agents or representatives, jointly and severally, constituted a good faith exercise of discretion and judgment, for which the City of Rochester and its employees, agents or representatives are immune from common-law liability"), and seventh ("Defendants' actions were reasonable and they are entitled to qualified immunity"). (City defendants' Re-Filed Answer, Aug. 20, 2019, ECF No. 44.) The Court has already determined that the case is not frivolous, and the records sought by counsel are within City Defendants' control and City Defendants have not argued that their production would be a significant expense. As to City Defendants' concern about privacy, and avoiding the warehousing of information about officers, the Court will repeat the language from the Honorable Jonathan W. Feldman's Order of September 12, 2019 (ECF No. 52):
(Order ¶¶2-3, Sept. 12, 2019, ECF No. 52.) Accordingly, to the extent not already done, City Defendants are directed to produce no later than
Should the Court find that City Defendants have objected to the disclosure of a voluminous amount of the above-demanded documentation, such that it would be required to conduct an in camera review of an impractically large amount of documentation, the Court will consider the appointment of a Discovery Master per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, allocating the costs equitably between the parties, taking into consideration "the extent to which any party is more responsible than the other parties for the reference to a master." Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(g)(3). See, e.g., Winfield v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-5236 (LTS) (KHP), 2018 WL 2148435 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2018) (magistrate judge's decision to appoint special master for discovery). Based on the congenial nature of counsel's interactions at the oral argument of this motion, however, the Court contemplates that counsel will confer and only require the Court's intervention for serious disputes regarding disclosure.
City Defendants' objection to providing responses to Plaintiffs' document demands numbers 7, 21, 22, and 25, on the basis of privilege, are overruled. In order to claim a privilege, City Defendants would have had to produce a privilege log listing the document and the privilege claimed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A)(ii). City Defendants have not done so, nor have they provided a basis for the Court to evaluate any privileges that might apply.
City Defendants are directed to disclose by
Plaintiffs' document request 26 seeks the following:
(ECF No. 45-4.) City Defendants object to this request on the grounds that the records pertain to confidential personnel matters, citing New York Civil Rights Law section 50-a, and that any disclosure would require an in camera inspection by the Court before release. Additionally, City Defendants object that these records are irrelevant. (ECF 45-14.) The Court finds that the records are relevant to Plaintiffs' claims against City Defendants and proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). Further, the City Defendants' privacy concerns are not the type safeguarded by the statute on which they rely.
King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). As this Court observed in 1988:
Martin v. Lamb, 122 F.R.D. 143, 146 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). "It is undisputed that under federal law, New York Civil Rights Law § 50-a does not prohibit discovery of police personnel documents." Adamson v. City of Buffalo, No. 11CV663A, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31849, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2013). Moreover, the New York Court of Appeals has not held that section 50-a prohibits disclosure, only that, "if the court then determines that the records contain matter that is relevant and material in the action, such portions may be disclosed to the person who has made the request (Civil Rights Law, s 50-a, subds. 2, 3)." People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 551, 399 N.E.2d 924, 929 (1979).
Consequently, City Defendants are directed to disclose by
Document demands 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, and 24, seek the following:
(ECF No. 45-4.)
City Defendants object to production of these document in part because "complaints regarding third parties are not relevant to the particular act or omission of the case at bar." (ECF No. 45-14.) City Defendants cite Crenshaw v. Herbert, 409 Fed. App'x 428 (2d Cir. 2011) in support of this contention. The Second Circuit's holding in Crenshaw was simply that, "the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Crenshaw's motion to compel production of Bartkowiak's personnel file. The district court properly relied on defense counsel's affirmation that Bartkowiak's file contained no relevant disciplinary records." Crenshaw v. Herbert, 409 F. App'x at 430. City Defendants have made a similar claim here: "In the present case, none of the named Defendants have any substantiated claims of excessive force in their personnel history." (ECF No. 47-8 at 3 (emphasis added).)
In a similar case, the Eastern District held: "except for reasonable redactions of names and addresses to protect privacy or informer sources, plaintiffs in federal civil rights actions are presumptively entitled to recollections as well as documents on prior complaints and police history." King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); accord Benitez v. Lopez, 372 F.Supp.3d 84, 87-88 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) ("the officers' conduct need not be subject to a Monell claim for the disciplinary files to be discoverable"). In Adamson v. City of Buffalo, No. 11CV663A, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31849, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2013), Judge Scott determine that it was "unlikely that documents relating to unsubstantiated claims of excessive force would lead to admissible evidence." However, in this case, Plaintiff supplied a study which showed that in Chicago, "between 1 and 5 percent of all police officers are involved in most of the city's misconduct cases." (Casaccia 1067-1133, Rozema, K., and M. Schanzenbach, Forthcoming, Good cop, bad cop: Using civilian allegations to predict police misconduct, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy (August 2018) ("Rozema") attached as Ex. KK, ECF No. 45-38.) Regarding the issue of substantiated versus unsubstantiated complaint, the study concluded, "just over half of all civil allegations in Chicago were dismissed for failing to have a sworn affidavit from the accuser. Schanzenbach and Rozema find that allegations without affidavits are as strong a predictor of misconduct as those with affidavits, suggesting the affidavit requirement should be dropped." (Id.) That study involved a review of 50,000 civilian allegations of police misconduct and found that civilian misconduct allegations were an accurate predictor of whether a police officer would repeatedly commit serious misconduct in the future. It concluded: "The worst 1 percent of officers, as measured by civilian allegations, generate almost five times the number of payouts and four times the total damage payouts in civil rights litigation." (Rozema at 1073, attached as Ex. LL, ECF No. 45-39.)
The Court finds that the material sought is within the scope of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), and directs its disclosure by
Plaintiff seeks an Order compelling the City Defendants to designate a Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) witness. That Rule states:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). Plaintiff contends that the City Defendants "have not acknowledged the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice or responded to Plaintiffs' numerous communications requesting that the City designate a 30(b)(6) witness and schedule the deposition." (ECF No. 45-2 at 25.)
The Court has searched the documents filed in opposition to Plaintiffs' pending motions (ECF No. 47-8 and 54) and found no discussion of Rule 30(b)(6). Consequently, the Court directs the City to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) by
In his Decision and Order denying in part City Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, the Honorable Michael A. Telesca wrote:
(Decision and Order, Aug. 14, 2019, ECF No. 43.) Plaintiff asks the Court to strike City Defendants' affirmative defenses as sanctions for their failure to comply with Rule 26(a) and their "refusal to produce clearly relevant materials demanded by Plaintiff." (ECF No. 45-2 at 26.) As outlined above, City Defendants refused to provide any discovery they deemed relevant only to a Monell claim until the Court intervened. Plaintiffs' counsel lays out the history of exchanges between the parties starting in March 2019, and continuing until almost the present time. Without seeking a protective order from the Court, counsel for the City Defendants informed Plaintiffs' counsel, "I've said multiple times I will not turn over the discovery you've requested without first providing same to the Court for review." (ECF No. 45-33.) As stated above, City Defendants never provided a privilege log despite claiming that much of the material sought was privileged.
The relief sought by Plaintiff, striking City Defendants' affirmative defenses, is drastic. Although defense counsel has not been forthcoming and has not strictly complied with discovery requirements, he has not evaded, but has maintained that the material was not relevant, or was privileged. Plaintiff properly filed a motion to compel and the Court has ordered disclosure. The Court believes the proper sanction is to direct payment of the costs of bringing the motion to compel and engaging in two appearances in relation to it. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to file a motion for costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, associated with his motion to compel and preparation of the motion for fees.
This portion of Plaintiffs' motion is now moot. In an apparent spirit of cooperation, the parties jointly agreed to extend fact discovery to March 31, 2020, and expert discovery to May 15, 2020. (ECF No. 68.) In view of the Court's directive that further discovery be produced by March 23, 2020, the Court will entertain a further extension of discovery deadlines upon application of either party.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
