OPINION

DONOFRIO, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant, Connie McKitrick, appeals from a Jefferson County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division decision granting legal custody of her great-nephew to appellee, Paul Moore.

{¶2} Brittany T. gave birth to D.T. on May 15, 2012. Brittany tested positive for opiates and cocaine prior to delivery. The Jefferson County Department of Job and Family Services (JCDJFS) obtained temporary custody of the child immediately after his birth due to Brittany's drug use during her pregnancy. D.T.'s father is unknown.

{¶3} When D.T. was released from the hospital two weeks after his birth, he was placed with foster parent appellee, Paul Moore. The child has remained in appellee's care since that time.

{¶4} On January 21, 2014, just ten days before the matter was set for a permanent custody hearing, appellant filed a Petition for Allocation of Parental Rights and Responsibilities seeking custody of D.T. Appellant is D.T.'s maternal great aunt. Brittany filed a consent to custody, agreeing that the court should place her son in appellant's care.

{¶5} Subsequently, appellee filed a motion to intervene, which the trial court granted. Appellee also filed a motion for legal custody of D.T.

{¶6} A magistrate held a hearing on the parties' competing motions. The magistrate noted that all of those involved agreed Brittany was not capable of caring for D.T. The magistrate further found the evidence demonstrated that both appellant and appellee would properly care for D.T. and would make suitable custodians. The magistrate framed the issue in this case as: "[W]hat should be given more weight in the case: the blood relationship between the child and [appellant] or the bond that has been established between the child and the foster father[?]"

{¶7} The magistrate found that D.T. was placed with appellee at the age of two weeks old and has remained with appellee throughout the duration of his 21 months. He found that appellee and D.T. had bonded and that, until recently, appellee was the only family D.T. has known. The magistrate further noted that appellant did not meet D.T. until January 14, 2014, when she visited the child with Brittany. A week later, appellant filed for custody of D.T.

{¶8} The magistrate also acknowledged testimony regarding an incident of abuse that allegedly occurred at appellee's home between D.T. and an eight-year-old foster child who was also living with appellee at the time.

{¶9} The magistrate further noted that the JCDJFS caseworker testified it was the agency's position that a relative trumps a foster parent when the custody of a child is in question. Therefore, JCDFS believed it was in D.T.'s best interest for the court to grant his custody to appellant.

{¶10} Nonetheless, the magistrate found it would be in D.T.'s overwhelming best interest to remain in appellee's care. He noted that D.T. has a significant and crucial bond with appellee and the breaking of that bond would be detrimental to D.T. The magistrate further pointed out that appellee is the only family D.T. has ever known and appellee's home is the only home D.T. has ever known. Therefore, the magistrate found the bond between D.T. and appellee outweighed the blood relationship between D.T. and appellant. Thus, the magistrate recommended that the trial court deny appellant's motion and grant appellee's motion for legal custody.

{¶11} Appellant filed numerous objections to the magistrate's decision.

{¶12} The trial court overruled the objections. It entered a judgment finding it was in D.T.'s best interest to remain in appellee's care. It noted that appellee is the only family D.T. has ever known and appellee's home is the only home D.T. has ever known. Therefore, the trial court denied appellant's motion and granted appellee's motion for legal custody. The court designated appellee as D.T.'s legal custodian.

{¶13} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 21, 2014.

{¶14} Appellant raises four assignments of error.

{¶15} Appellant's first assignment of error states:

{¶16} Appellant argues the magistrate erred in excluding JCDJFS from the proceedings even though it had legal custody of D.T. at the time. She contends that by excluding JCDJFS, no one represented D.T. or his interests. Appellant asserts the trial court should have made JCDJFS a party to the proceedings. Appellant acknowledges that she failed to object to this alleged error in the trial court. She urges this was a plain error, but argues at the least, it was an abuse of discretion.

{¶17} Appellant failed to raise this error at the hearing or in her objections to the magistrate's decision. Therefore, she has waived all but plain error. Plain error is one in which but for the error, the outcome of the trial would have been different. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 97, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978).

{¶18} The plain error doctrine is not favored in the appeal of civil cases. Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 1997-Ohio-401, 679 N.E.2d 1099, at the syllabus. Appellate courts may apply it "only in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances" where the error "seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself." Id.

{¶19} As appellee points out, although JCDJFS was not a party to this action and its counsel was not permitted to question the witnesses, Jennifer Yasho, JCDJFS's employee and D.T.'s caseworker, testified extensively. She testified that appellee has met all of his responsibilities in caring for D.T. and has done everything that JCDJFS has asked of him. (Tr. 168-170). Nonetheless, she opined it was in D.T.'s best interest for the court to grant his custody to appellant because then he would be with his biological family. (Tr. 188-189). She testified that JCDJFS always looks towards family members when placing a child. (Tr. 192-193). Therefore, even though JCDJFS was excluded from the hearing as a party, the agency's position was made clear to the court through Yasho's testimony.

{¶20} Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had the court allowed JCDJFS to be a party. The agency's position was made known to the court through Yasho's testimony. Appellant does not explain how allowing JCDJFS to be a party to the proceedings would have changed the outcome of the hearing. Thus, plain error does not exist here.

{¶21} Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is without merit.

{¶22} Appellant's second assignment of error states:

{¶23} Here appellant contends the trial court committed plain error in awarding legal custody to appellee when appellee failed to sign a statement of understanding for legal custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(3).

{¶24} R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) provides:

{¶25} Appellant failed to raise this issue in the trial court when it could have easily been corrected. Therefore, appellant has once again waived all but plain error.

{¶26} Other appellate courts have held that the failure to file an R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) affidavit is not plain error when the party seeking legal custody testifies at the hearing about their intentions to provide a home for the child and their testimony demonstrates they understand the commitment they are making as legal custodians. In re W.A., 5th Dist. No. CT2013-0002, 2013-Ohio-3444, ¶¶15-16; In re A.V.O., 9th Dist. Nos. 11CA010115, 11CA010116, 11CA010117, 11CA010118, 2012-Ohio-4092, ¶¶8-10. Appellee met these requirements.

{¶27} Appellee appeared at the hearing and testified at length. He testified regarding everything he has done to care for D.T. since D.T. came into his care, such as feeding him, bathing him, changing his diapers, taking him to doctors' appointments, and getting up with him in the middle of the night. (Tr. 371). He also testified about taking D.T. to church and to play with other children. (Tr. 368). And appellee testified about reading to him and getting him ready to go to preschool. (Tr. 351-352, 373).

{¶28} Appellee also testified as to caring for D.T. into the future too. He testified that D.T. will continue to see a neurologist for some time (Tr. 361). He also stated that he believes it is important for D.T. to know who his family is, so appellee will continue to allow appellant's family to visit with D.T. (Tr. 386). And he stated that he is a foster-to-adopt parent, so he was hopeful that he would get to adopt D.T. (Tr. 376, 387-388). He also had a plan in place where his niece would care for D.T. in the event something happened to him. (Tr. 41).

{¶29} This testimony demonstrates appellee understands the commitment required of a legal custodian. Consequently, there was no plain error in this case due to the failure to file an R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) affidavit.

{¶30} Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is without merit.

{¶31} Appellant's third assignment of error states:

{¶32} In this assignment of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred in failing to put on an order of child support. She also argues the trial court erred in failing to grant her visitation with D.T. Appellant acknowledges, however, that she currently visits with D.T. once a week for five hours.

{¶33} As to the child support issue, only those parties who can demonstrate a present interest in the subject matter of the litigation and who have been prejudiced by the court's decision have standing to file an appeal. Still v. Hayman, 153 Ohio App.3d 487, 2003-Ohio-4113, 794 N.E.2d 751, ¶26. In this case, appellant cannot demonstrate a present interest in child support because she does not have custody of D.T. Likewise, she was not prejudiced by the fact that the trial court did not include a child support order in its judgment ruling on D.T.'s legal custody. Thus, appellant does not have standing on appeal to raise an issue regarding child support.

{¶34} Moreover, this was an action dealing with two separate motions for legal custody, one by a great aunt and the other by a foster parent. Neither of these parties have any obligation to pay child support.

{¶35} As to the visitation issue, R.C. 3109.12(A) provides that if a child is born to an unmarried woman, the woman's parents and any relative of the woman may file a complaint requesting the court to grant them reasonable visitation with the child.

{¶36} Appellant, however, did not file a motion for visitation with D.T. in this case. She only filed a petition for allocation of parental rights and responsibilities. Thus, visitation was not at issue.

{¶37} Even so, after the court entered its judgment in this case, the parties agreed that appellant would have visitation with D.T. on Saturdays from 1:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. The court put on an order to this effect.

{¶38} Accordingly, appellant's third assignment of error is without merit.

{¶39} Appellant's fourth assignment of error states:

{¶40} Appellant argues in her final assignment of error that the trial court focused solely on the bond between appellee and D.T. She claims the court minimized the fact that while D.T. was in appellee's care, he may have been sexually assaulted by another foster child living at appellee's home. Appellant also points out that JCDJFS favored placing D.T. with her because she is a blood relative. She acknowledges that blood relations are not controlling but notes that relative placement is generally favored over non-relative placement. Appellant contends the trial court failed to consider all of the applicable statutory best interest factors.

{¶41} On appeal, we will not reverse an award of legal custody absent an abuse of discretion. In re Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d 445, 455, 751 N.E.2d 552 (7th Dist.2001). Abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). If the court's decision on the child's best interest regarding legal custody is not supported by competent, credible evidence, then it is unreasonable and we may reverse it. Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d at 455. The burden of proof is not clear and convincing evidence, as it is in a permanent custody proceeding, but is merely preponderance of the evidence. Id; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and (E); Juv.R. 29(E).

{¶42} When a juvenile court makes a determination of legal custody under 2151.353, it must do so in accordance with R.C. 3109.04. In re Poling, 64 Ohio St.3d 211, 1992-Ohio-144, 594 N.E.2d 589, paragraph two of the syllabus. This means the court should consider all factors relevant to the best interest of the child, including any relevant factors found in R.C. 3109.04(F). In re D.T., 5th Dist. No. 2013CA00252, 2014-Ohio-2495, ¶21.

{¶43} The relevant R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) factors are:

{¶44} "While `blood relationship' and `family unity' (i.e., a preference for a family member) are factors to consider when determining a child's best interest, neither one is controlling." In re D.S., 2d Dist. No. 2013 CA 51, 2014-Ohio-2444, ¶9, citing In re S.K.G., 12th Dist. CA2008-11-105, 2009-Ohio-4673, ¶12.

{¶45} In this case, the parties and the mother agreed that the mother is not capable of caring for D.T. at this time. The mother testified that she signed a consent for appellant to have custody of D.T. (Tr. 72). She stated that even though she cannot care for D.T., she wants him to know his family. (Tr. 74-75).

{¶46} D.T.'s pediatrician testified D.T. was born addicted to drugs. (Tr. 61). She also stated appellee has brought D.T. to all of his appointments, including travelling to Akron, Ohio and Wheeling, West Virginia so D.T. could see specialists. (Tr. 65). She further testified appellee did well administering and weaning D.T. from the phenobarbital, asked appropriate questions, and was an attentive caregiver. (Tr. 65).

{¶47} Both appellant and appellee presented evidence that they would provide a good home for D.T.

{¶48} Appellant's friend testified that appellant is a good Christian mother to her six children and her home is stable and fun. (Tr. 91). She also testified that when she observed D.T. at a visit to appellant's home, he appeared comfortable as if he was one of appellant's children. (Tr. 95). Appellant's pastor testified that appellant has a good family that comes to church every week and is actively involved in the church. (Tr. 112). Appellant's husband testified that he supports appellant's motion for custody. (Tr. 267). He stated that appellant is a good mother and knows how to raise children. (Tr. 267). He testified that when D.T. visits at their home D.T. is happy and loving and acts like he is one of their children. (Tr. 267).

{¶49} Appellant testified that when D.T. came to visit her home, she was surprised that he was calm and comfortable with her family. (Tr. 219). She stated they all played with him with different toys and balls. (Tr. 219-220). Appellant also testified that she works from home. (Tr. 194-197). And she stated that of her six children, four still live at home. (Tr. 197). They are ages 26, 19, 17, and 11. (Tr. 197).

{¶50} Appellant stated that she did not initially seek custody of D.T. because she was concerned about violence from the alleged father. (Tr. 204). But in May 2013, she contacted JCDJFS about obtaining custody of D.T. (Tr. 206-207). Appellant and her family then submitted to fingerprinting and background checks. (Tr. 208). Appellant stated that initially Brittany did not want her to have custody of D.T. but in early December 2013, Brittany texted her and asked if she was still willing to take D.T. (Tr. 209; Pt. Ex. A). Appellant then filled out the necessary paperwork and she and Brittany made arrangements to visit D.T. (Tr. 212-213). She visited with D.T. on January 14, 2014. (Tr. 216). JCDJFS conducted a home study a few days later. (Tr. 216).

{¶51} Appellee's niece testified that she has observed a "loving father-son relationship" between appellee and D.T. (Tr. 318). Appellee's sister-in-law testified that D.T. and appellee have an "emotional bond" and that to take D.T. away from appellee would be to take him away from the only father he has ever known. (Tr. 326). Appellee's sisters testified that appellee has raised D.T. up to this point and believed it would be in D.T.'s best interest to remain with appellee. (Tr. 329-330, 332).

{¶52} Appellee testified that he has been the only parent D.T. has ever known. (Tr. 371). He stated he has done everything to care for him. (Tr. 371). Appellee testified that he loves D.T. and he believes it is in D.T.'s best interest to remain with him. (Tr. 373).

{¶53} Jennifer Yasho, the JCDJFS caseworker, also testified. She made numerous visits to appellee's house. Yasho testified that appellee took good care of D.T. and she did not have any concerns about him. (Tr. 141). She stated that he has met all of his responsibilities as a foster parent. (Tr. 168-170).

{¶54} Yasho testified appellant first approached her in May 2013, about getting custody of D.T. (Tr. 143). She stated it took until December 2013, to get the results of the fingerprints and background checks because they had to be "mailed out." (Tr. 144). When she conducted the home study of appellant's house, she found it to be very appropriate with a sufficient amount of space. (Tr. 146).

{¶55} Yasho further testified that she observed the first visit between appellant and D.T. and that after D.T. warmed up, he was smiling and playing. (Tr. 150). She stated that, ten days later, when D.T. went with appellant for a weekend visit, he was "clingy" to appellee. (Tr. 152). But Yasho stated that recently when appellee brought D.T. to visit appellant, D.T. smiled at appellant and put his hands up to go with her. (Tr. 152).

{¶56} Yasho went on to testify about her opinion and the agency's position. She opined that it was in D.T.'s best interest to be with his family. (Tr. 188). She stated that the blood relationship between D.T. and appellant trumped the fact that D.T. had resided with appellee for most of his life. (Tr. 188-189, 193). Yasho stated that she believed D.T.'s best interest was to live with a relative instead of a foster parent who had raised him for two years. (Tr. 189). She stated that JCDJFS looks to place children with family. (Tr. 193).

{¶57} Pam Petrilla testified on appellee's behalf. She is a counselor with experience working with children and families. (Tr. 305). She is also the executive director of the Jefferson County Prevention and Recovery Board. (Tr. 304). Additionally, she is appellee's friend and appellee is a member of the Jefferson County Prevention and Recovery Board. (Tr. 307). The trial court qualified Petrilla as an expert in this case. (Tr. 306). Appellant had no objections.

{¶58} Petrilla stated that she has seen appellee and D.T. every few weeks since D.T. was two weeks old. (Tr. 307). She stated that D.T. shows his love for appellee and appellee is devoted to D.T. (Tr. 307). Petrilla opined she had concern for a child being removed from his home at the developmental age of two years. (Tr. 308). She believed it would break the trust D.T. had built and it could affect him for the rest of his life. (Tr. 308). She opined that the trust D.T. had built in appellee and his home outweighed a blood relationship. (Tr. 309-310). Thus, Petrilla stated in her professional opinion, it was in D.T.'s best interest to remain with appellee. (Tr. 310).

{¶59} The parties also presented testimony about an incident that occurred at appellee's house. Appellee testified that in December 2013, he was changing D.T.'s diaper in the T.V. room when he realized he did not have any baby wipes. (Tr. 362). He went to another room to retrieve the wipes, leaving D.T. in the T.V. room with an eight-year foster child who was also staying at appellee's house at the time. (Tr. 362). Appellee testified that when he returned with the wipes 40 second later, he found the eight-year-old with his pants down and when the eight-year-old saw appellee he ran into the bathroom. (Tr. 362). Appellee immediately called JCDJFS to report the incident. (Tr. 362). The other foster child was removed from appellee's home the next day. (Tr. 363).

{¶60} Yasho testified that when the eight-year-old was interviewed, he stated that he put his penis in D.T.'s butt. (Tr. 156). Based on this statement, JCDJFS found this was a matter of lack of supervision, which constituted a finding of neglect on appellee's part. (Tr. 162). Yasho stated that she contacted Detective Erik Dervis to interview appellee a week after the incident but the interview did not take place until January 31, 2014. (Tr. 159).

{¶61} Det. Dervis testified that he interviewed appellee regarding the incident. He stated appellee was "fantastic, willing to give information, wasn't holding anything back." (Tr. 122). Det. Dervis testified nothing criminal occurred and he would not classify appellee's conduct as neglectful. (Tr. 123).

{¶62} Given all of the above evidence, the court appropriately concluded that both parties would provide suitable, stable homes for D.T. The evidence was clear that appellee has provided good care for D.T. and that the two are very bonded to each other. The evidence was also clear that appellant has done everything required of her to obtain custody and that she and her family would provide a loving home for D.T. Thus, as the magistrate observed, this case turned on which factor is to be given more weight — the bond between appellee and D.T. or the blood relationship between appellant and D.T.

{¶63} In developing a case plan, the children's services agency and the court shall be guided by the following general priorities:

R.C. 2151.412(H)(1)(2)(3).

{¶64} Regarding these priorities, this court has stated:

In re Halstead, 7th Dist. No. 04 CO 37, 2005-Ohio-403, ¶39.

{¶65} Other districts have cited to Halstead in affirming judgments granting legal custody to foster parents over blood relatives. See, In re S.K.G., 12th Dist. No. CA2008-11-105, 2009-Ohio-4673, ¶15 ("fact that appellant is biologically related to the child while appellees are not was only one factor the juvenile court had to consider in making the custody decision. However, it was not the determining factor. There was ample evidence to show that appellees took the child in and have provided a nice, stable environment for the child. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's decision to grant appellees custody of the child."); In Matter of A.V., 10th Dist. No.05AP-789, 2006-Ohio-3149, ¶19 (trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that considerations related to stability and continuity of care were overriding factors, especially, where the child had been raised since birth by the same foster family that sought legal custody, and notwithstanding the fact that both parties seeking legal custody were suitable custodians); In re Patterson, 1st Dist. No. C-090311, 2010-Ohio-766, ¶16 ("No preference exists for family members, other than parents, in custody awards. R.C. 2151.412(G) does state that if parents are not suitable custodians for their children, extended family members are next in priority. But courts have held that this statute applies only to case plans, not custody determinations, and even then, its provisions are not mandatory.")

{¶66} This case presents a close call. The evidence makes clear that both parties would love and care for D.T. and provide him with a stable home. And while we may have reached a different decision, given that our standard of review is abuse of discretion and because there is ample evidence to support the trial court's judgment, we must conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting legal custody of D.T. to appellee.

{¶67} Accordingly, appellant's fourth assignment of error is without merit.

{¶68} For the reasons stated above, the trial court's judgment is hereby affirmed.

DeGenaro, J. and Robb, J., concurs.