MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

GREG WHITE, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Tim Guntner ("Guntner") challenges the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, Michael J. Astrue ("Commissioner"), denying Guntner's claim for a Period of Disability ("POD") and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, et seq. This matter is before the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and the consent of the parties entered under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2).

For the reasons set forth below, the final decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

I. Procedural History

On June 2, 2006,1 Guntner filed an application for POD and DIB alleging a disability onset date of April 15, 2006, and claiming that he was disabled due to anxiety, depression, migraines, dyslexia, and a lumbar strain. (Doc. No. 107.) His application was denied both initially and upon reconsideration. Guntner timely requested an administrative hearing.

On December 5, 2008, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing during which Guntner, represented by counsel, testified. Thomas F. Nimberger, an impartial vocational expert ("VE"), also testified. On January 30, 2009, the ALJ found Guntner was unable to perform past relevant work, but that he had acquired work skills that were transferable to other occupations. The ALJ found there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy Guntner could perform and, therefore, he was not disabled. The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied further review.

II. Evidence

Personal and Vocational Evidence

Age 52 at the time of his administrative hearing, Guntner is an individual closely approaching advanced age under social security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563. (Tr. 26.) Guntner has at least a high school education and past relevant work as a registered nurse and an office nurse. Id.

Medical Evidence

In September, 2004, Guntner sustained a lumbar strain while assisting a patient from a wheelchair. (Tr. 202.) He was treated conservatively and returned to work on light duty until when he was released to work with no restrictions. (Tr. 206-207; 214.)

In July, 2005, Guntner began treating with David Cogan, M.D., an internist, for depression, anxiety, and a lumbar strain.2 (Tr. 220; 301-312.) On July 21, 2006, Dr. Cogan, in a letter to the Bureau of Disability Determination, noted as follows:

(Tr. 220.)

On July 26, 2005, Richard Halas, M.A., performed a consultative psychological evaluation for the Bureau of Disability Determination. (Tr. 322-325.) A generalized anxiety disorder with occasional panic attacks, a depressive disorder, and a dependent personality disorder with histrionic characteristics and paranoid traits were diagnosed. (Tr. 324-325.) Halas assigned a global assessment of functioning ("GAF") score of 45.3 (Tr. 325.) He opined that Guntner would not have significant problems with performing simple, one-to-two step instructions/directions/tasks. Id. However, he found that Guntner was markedly limited in relating to others including peers, supervisors, and the general public, and in withstanding the stresses and pressures associated with most day-to-day work settings. Id.

On July 27, 2006, state reviewing psychologist John Waddell, Ph.D., completed a psychiatric review technique form and a mental residual functional capacity ("RFC") assessment. (Tr. 222-239.) Dr. Waddell identified affective, anxiety, and personality disorders as severe impairments imposing moderate difficulties in social functioning and in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (Tr. 222, 232, 237.) Dr. Waddell gave Mr. Halas' opinion less weight, finding it inconsistent with Dr. Cogan's statements and with Guntner's activities of daily living. (Tr. 238.) In November, 2006, Roseann Umana, Ph.D., reviewed the psychological evidence and affirmed Dr. Waddell's finding. (Tr. 326.)

On August 10, 2006, consultative examining physician Eulogio Sioson, M.D., noted that Guntner walked normally and was able to do heel/toe walk. (Tr. 246.) He was able to grasp and manipulate with each hand and had normal muscle strength. Id. While he had some decrease in range of motion in his neck flexion/extension and in his shoulders, he had no neck tenderness, and only complained of stiffness. (Tr. 241, 246.) He had minimal lower back tenderness with negative straight leg raising both in the sitting and lying positions. (Tr. 246.) Dr. Sioson's impression was that, despite complaints of dyslexia and depression, Guntner was able to maintain attention and concentration. Id. He appeared to be able to read well and fill out forms appropriately. Id. Dr. Sioson concluded that Guntner's only limitation was pain. Id. A lumbar x-ray was obtained and revealed osteoarthritis with slight L5-S1 disc space narrowing, osteophyte formation and facet sclerosis. (Tr. 244.)

On August 21, 2006, state agency reviewing physician Charles Derrow, M.D., relying on Dr. Sioson's assessment, opined that Guntner could perform medium level work (occasionally lift 50 pounds, frequently lift 25 pounds, stand/walk about six hours in an eight hour workday, and sit about six hours in an eight hour workday). (Tr. 248-255.) In December, 2006, state agency reviewing physician Sarah Long, M.D., concurred with Dr. Derrow's assessment. (Tr. 262.)

Although Guntner stopped seeing Dr. Cogan in June, 2006, the Bureau of Disability Determination requested another report from him. On November 17, 2006, Dr. Cogan indicated that Guntner's alleged disability was based upon anxiety, depression, migraines, dyslexia, and lumbar strain. (Tr. 261.) Dr. Cogan, however, noted that he could not comment with clarity or certainty regarding Guntner's mental health as such a determination should come from a consultative psychiatric evaluation. Id. Dr. Cogan opined that as of the last office visit in June, 2006, he did not believe that Guntner's lumbar strain was, by itself, disabling. Id.

In January, 2007, at the request of counsel, Dr. Cogan examined Guntner and prepared physical and mental RFC assessments. (Tr. 269-272; 274-275.) Based upon patient history, he reported that Guntner was restricted to lifting/carrying ten pounds, standing/walking for one hour without interruption and two to three hours total out of an eight-hour workday, and to sitting for one to two hours without interruption and six hours total out of an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 269.) He also found that Guntner needed a sit/stand option and had moderate pain. (Tr. 270.) Regarding mental abilities, Dr. Cogan determined that Guntner had a good or fair ability to perform many mental work-related tasks, but had poor or no ability to function independently without special supervision, work in coordination with or in proximity to others, deal with work stresses, complete a normal workday and work week, and relate predictably in social situations. (Tr. 271-272.)

In February, 2007, Guntner began mental health treatment with Thomas Svete, M.D., who noted Guntner to be over-talkative and anxious, but also alert, cooperative, and with normal thought content. (Tr. 266.) Dr. Svete's impression was possible type 2 bipolar disorder, possible ADHD, a possible reading disorder, and a mixed personality disorder. (Tr. 267.) He prescribed Zoloft. Id.

Guntner saw Dr. Svete four more times in 2007 (Tr. 277-281) and eight times throughout 2008 and 2009. (Tr. 337-339; 388-392.) While the treatment notes are largely illegible, in November, 2007, Guntner reported that he felt good. He also reported more activities, including swimming and running. (Tr. 278.) While there were office visits where Dr. Svete found Guntner to be depressed or anxious, there were other visits where he observed Guntner to demonstrate appropriate affect, normal thought content/processing, and normal psychomotor activity. (Tr. 277-281; 337-339; 388-392.) Dr. Svete refined Guntner's diagnoses to generalized anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder type 2, a learning disability reading disorder, a personality disorder and possible ADHD. (Tr. 277-284.)

Beginning in August, 2007 and continuing through July, 2008, Guntner received counseling services from therapist Glenda Kupersmith, LISW. (Tr. 328-336.) Notes indicate that Guntner had a job as an umpire throughout this time and his presentation was "unremarkable." (Tr. 328, 336.) At the sessions, Ms. Kupersmith focused on Guntner's poor social judgment and the negative effect it had on his interactions. (Tr. 328, 333, 336.) She considered Guntner's progress to be slow. (Tr. 328-330, 332-334, 336.) In November, 2007, Guntner reported that he felt better on medications, but expressed concerns related to his social security disability application. (Tr. 334.) In February, 2008, Guntner again expressed concerns about his disability application and brought in a disability form. (Tr. 332.) The treatment notes indicate that Ms. Kupersmith gave Guntner feedback relating to his functioning, but it appears that she did not complete the disability form. Id.

On January 25, 2008, Guntner was again examined by Dr. Cogan. No clinical examination findings were made with respect to Guntner's physical functioning. (Tr. 287-288.) In February, 2008, Dr. Cogan provided an updated physical RFC assessment, setting Guntner's limitations as follows: lift/carry ten pounds, stand/walk for one hour without interruption and two to three hours total out of an eight-hour workday, sit for one to two hours without interruption and six hours total out of an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 290-291.) A sit/stand option was reported as necessary. Id. Again, Dr. Cogan's notes show that these restrictions were "per patient history." (Tr. 290.)

In October, 2008, Dr. Cogan, in a handwritten letter, stated that Guntner was "disabled from regular work," due to his recurrent prostatitis, recurrent back pain, migraine headaches, and based upon anxiety, depression, and mood disorder. (Tr. 340.) Dr. Cogan examined Guntner that day for his complaint of diffuse low lumbar tenderness, but the doctor made no clinical findings with respect to Guntner's functioning. (Tr. 341.)

Hearing Testimony

At the hearing, Guntner testified as follows:

III. Standard for Disability

In order to establish entitlement to DIB under the Act, a claimant must be insured at the time of disability and must prove an inability to engage "in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment," or combination of impairments, that can be expected to "result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.130, 404.315 and 404.1505(a).4

A claimant is entitled to a POD only if: (1) he had a disability; (2) he was insured when he became disabled; and (3) he filed while he was disabled or within twelve months of the date the disability ended. 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(2)(E); 20 C.F.R. § 404.320.

Guntner was insured on his alleged disability onset date, April 15, 2006, and remained insured through December 31, 2011. (Tr. 15.) Therefore, in order to be entitled to POD and DIB, Guntner must establish a continuous twelve month period of disability commencing between those dates. Any discontinuity in the twelve month period precludes an entitlement to benefits. See Mullis v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 994 (6th Cir. 1988); Henry v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir. 1967).

IV. Summary of Commissioner's Decision

The ALJ found Guntner established medically determinable, severe impairments, due to degenerative disc disease, migraine headaches, generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, and personality disorder; however, his impairments, either singularly or in combination, did not meet or equal one listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Guntner was found incapable of performing his past work activities, and was determined to have a Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") for a limited range of medium work. The ALJ then used the Medical Vocational Guidelines ("the grid") as a framework and VE testimony to determine that Guntner is not disabled.

V. Standard of Review

This Court's review is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's findings of fact and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Elam v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 348 F.3d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 2003) ("decision must be affirmed if the administrative law judge's findings and inferences are reasonably drawn from the record or supported by substantial evidence, even if that evidence could support a contrary decision."); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983). Substantial evidence has been defined as "[e]vidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).

The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772-3 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mullen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also Her v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999)("Even if the evidence could also support another conclusion, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge must stand if the evidence could reasonably support the conclusion reached. See Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997).") This is so because there is a "zone of choice" within which the Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference. Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545 (citing Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)).

In addition to considering whether the Commissioner's decision was supported by substantial evidence, the Court must determine whether the proper legal standard was applied. Failure of the Commissioner to apply the correct legal standards as promulgated by the regulations or failure to provide the reviewing court with a sufficient basis to determine that the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards are grounds for reversal where such failure prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives a claimant of a substantial right. See White v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 2009); Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2006).

VI. Analysis

Guntner contends that the ALJ erred in his analysis of the medical source opinions relating to his physical and mental functioning.

Under Social Security regulations, the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to controlling weight if such opinion (1) "is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" and (2) "is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record." Meece v. Barnhart, 192 F. App'x 456, 560 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). "[A] finding that a treating source medical opinion . . . is inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record means only that the opinion is not entitled to `controlling weight,' not that the opinion should be rejected." Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-2p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 9 at *9); Meece, 192 Fed. App'x at 460-61 (Even if not entitled to controlling weight, the opinion of a treating physician is generally entitled to more weight than other medical opinions.) Furthermore, "[t]reating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 and 416.927." Blakley, 581 F.3d at 408.5

Nonetheless, the opinion of a treating physician must be based on sufficient medical data, and upon detailed clinical and diagnostic test evidence. See Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1993); Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406 ("It is an error to give an opinion controlling weight simply because it is the opinion of a treating source if it is not well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record.") (quoting SSR 96-2p).

Moreover, the ALJ is not bound by conclusory statements of a treating physician that a claimant is disabled, but may reject such determinations when good reasons are identified for not accepting them. King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984); Duncan v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 855 (6th Cir. 1986); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 391 (6th Cir.1984). According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1), the Social Security Commissioner makes the determination whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability. This necessarily includes a review of all the medical findings and other evidence that support a medical source's statement that one is disabled. "A statement by a medical source that you are `disabled' or `unable to work' does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled." Id. It is the Commissioner who must make the final decision on the ultimate issue of disability. Duncan, 801 F.2d at 855; Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985); Watkins v. Schweiker, 667 F.2d 954, 958 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1982).

Guntner asserts that the treating physician's opinions were not properly weighed, especially the January, 2007 and February, 2008 reports in which Dr. Cogan found Guntner was restricted to lifting/carrying ten pounds, standing/walking for one hour without interruption and two to three hours out of an eight hour workday, and to sitting for one to two hours without interruption and six hours in a day. (Doc. No. 12 at 10-11.) Guntner further contends that the ALJ misinterpreted Dr. Cogan's belief that Guntner was "disabled from regular work." (Doc. No. 12 at 11.) He contends that Dr. Cogan's report actually identified physical restrictions consistent with sedentary functional capacity. Id. This, he argues, is reversible error as Guntner's vocational profile, combined with a sedentary RFC, would result in a finding of disabled under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Rule 201.14.6 (Doc. No. 12 at 11-12.)

Regarding mental limitations, Guntner asserts that he is more restricted than what the ALJ recognized. (Doc. No. 12 at 13-14.) Specifically, Guntner contends that the medical evidence does not support a finding that he could interact with others or deal with work stress and pressure sufficiently to sustain work activity. (Doc. No. 12 at 14.)

The Commissioner maintains the ALJ properly weighed the evidence, including Dr. Cogan's opinions, to determine that Guntner was not disabled (Tr. 340.)

The ALJ, after discussing in detail Dr. Cogan's statements and questionnaires regarding Guntner's disability, concluded as follows:

(Tr. 22-23.)

In addition, the ALJ discussed Mr. Halas' July 2006 evaluation, giving it less weight after finding it was inconsistent with the evidence as a whole. "Mr. Halas's opinions that Mr. Guntner has marked limitations in relating to others and withstanding stress is inconsistent with Mr. Guntner's own reports that he is able to drive, shop, attend basketball games at the local high school, go to the bookstore and meet people, and umpire softball games during the season (Exhibits 3E and 11E and Mr. Guntner's testimony during the December 2008 hearing)." (Tr. 23.)

After reviewing the other medical evidence, the ALJ found Guntner's RFC to be as follows:

(Tr. 23.)

The ALJ, applying the factors found in §404.1527(d)(2), determined he would not give great weight to Dr. Cogan's opinions. The ALJ found that they were inconsistent with the record as a whole and lacked objective data to support them. When completing the questionnaires, Dr. Cogan provided no medical data to support his conclusions, other than to generally cite to Guntner's past history. As expressed by the ALJ, Dr. Cogan's earlier medical notes do not support his opinions. The ALJ further noted that Dr. Cogan was not qualified to assess Guntner's mental capacity. See Harris, 756 F.2d at 435; Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347-48; Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406 ("It is an error to give an opinion controlling weight simply because it is the opinion of a treating source if it is not well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record.") (quoting SSR 96-2p). Moreover, the ALJ did not need to accept Dr. Cogan's statement that Guntner was "disabled from regular work." See Duncan, 801 F.2d at 855; Harris, 756 F.2d at 435.

Regarding Guntner's mental restrictions, the ALJ properly concluded that Guntner's own statements and conduct contradict his assertion that his impairments are disabling. The ALJ gave less weight to Mr. Halas' opinion as it was inconsistent with the other evidence. The ALJ gave full weight to Drs. Waddell and Umana, the state reviewing physicians, who found Mr. Halas' opinion was inconsistent with Guntner's reported activities of daily living. The ALJ described Guntner's daily activities as follows:

(Tr. 25.)

Additionally, although Guntner's therapist Ms. Kupersmith, found his progress to be slow in terms of social judgment and interactions, she never completed a disability form on his behalf. (Tr. 328, 332, 333, 336.)

Guntner argues that the ALJ's opinion was not supported by substantial evidence. A claimant does not establish a lack of substantial evidence merely by pointing to evidence of record that supports his position. The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772-3 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mullen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also Her v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Even if the evidence could also support another conclusion, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge must stand if the evidence could reasonably support the conclusion reached. See Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997).") This is so because there is a "zone of choice" within which the Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference. Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545 (citing Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)). Therefore, Guntner must demonstrate that there is insufficient evidence in the record to allow a reasoning mind to accept the ALJ's finding. Guntner cites medical information of record that he suggests supports a finding that he is disabled, but he has failed to draw this Court's attention to any actual deficiency in the ALJ's reasoning or a lack of evidence supporting the ALJ's position. As such, Guntner's arguments are without merit.

VII. Decision

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds the decision of the Commissioner supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.