KATHLEEN B. BURKE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Kristen A. Matejka ("Plaintiff" or "Matejka") seeks judicial review of the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental social security income ("SSI"). Doc. 1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(1).
The ALJ failed to explain why she did not incorporate in her Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") determination a limitation based on the opinion by Matejka's counselor that she cannot persist at tasks. The ALJ's failure to explain how she resolved the direct conflict between the RFC and a medical source opinion deprives this Court of the ability to conduct a meaningful review. Accordingly, the Court should
Matejka filed her applications for DIB and SSI on November 3, 2011, and January 14, 2013, respectively. Tr. 118, 141. In her applications, Matejka alleged a disability onset date of June 27, 2011. Id. She alleged disability based on the following conditions: four cervical surgeries, including three cervical fusions; degenerative disc disease; anterior and posterior cervical hardware (plate, rods, screws); osteoarthritis; thyroid disease; interstitial cystitis (bladder); anxiety disorder; cervical stenosis; numbness in hands, fingertips, shoulders, back, and left leg. Tr. 165. After denials by the state agency initially and on reconsideration (Tr. 44, 59, 76, 84, 88), Matejka requested a hearing (Tr. 42). A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Susan G. Giuffre on January 9, 2013. Tr. 30. Brett L. Salkin, an impartial vocational expert, also appeared at the hearing. Tr. 65-72. In her February 15, 2013, decision (Tr. 30-39) the ALJ denied Plaintiff's DIB claim. The ALJ determined Matejka was capable of performing some of her past relevant work and, thus, was not disabled. Tr. 39. Subsequently, Matejka's SSI claim was escalated to hearing level and associated with her DIB claim. Tr. 13. Accordingly, the ALJ issued an amended decision on June 11, 2013. Tr. 13-23. In her amended decision, the ALJ determined again that Matejka was capable of performing some of her past relevant work and, thus, was not disabled.
Matejka requested review of the ALJ's June 11, 2013, decision by the Appeals Council. Tr. 24-25. On August 5, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Matejka's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. 6-8.
Matejka was 44 years old at the time of the administrative hearing. Tr. 765. Matejka testified that she completed one year of college and obtained her certificate in medical assisting. Tr. 766. Matejka last worked as a medical assistant for Lake Hospital System. Tr. 769.
An MRI performed on May 19, 2010, revealed "[p]ost-operative changes at C4-C7 with some bony prominence as well as some slight disc bulging at C6-C7 but no focal herniation or cord compression." Tr. 351. On October 15, 2010, it was noted that Matejka experienced a postoperative change of the cervical spine and mild scoliosis of the thoracolumbar spine. Tr. 387, 416. A June 29, 2011, CAT scan showed that solid bony fusion across the disc spaces had not occurred but noted that alignment and spinal canal diameter were normal. Tr. 377.
Dr. Hart recommend a C4-C7 posterior fusion. Id. Matejka indicated that she wanted to wait several months to get the procedure done. Id. Dr. Hart stated that she could wait to get the procedure done because she "has no neurological compromise." Id. On July 6, 2011, Dr. Hart performed the posterior fusion of C4-C-7 on Matejka. Tr. 420. Postoperative radiology revealed stability. Tr. 429.
Matejka returned to Dr. Hart for a post-surgical follow-up visit on August 22, 2011, where she reported a significant improvement in her pain but numbness in her upper extremities. Tr. 554. Dr. Hart stated that she was approved to return to work and that Matejka's employer agreed to allow her to return on a light-duty basis with no strenuous physical activity or lifting. Id. On October 27, 2011, Dr. Hart noted that Matejka took a turn for the worse after going back to work. Tr. 555. Matejka reported burning and stabbing pain in her back and tingling in the third, fourth, and fifth fingers of her left hand. Id. Matejka stated that she planned on resigning from her job. Id. Dr. Hart prescribed physical therapy and stated that he believed a lot of what Matejka was experiencing was related to muscle spasms. Id. On February 9, 2012, Matejka returned for a follow-up with Dr. Hart noting an improvement in her pain symptoms although she was still dealing with burning across the backs of her shoulders, neck, and upper back area. Tr. 568. Dr. Hart also noted that Matejka had good range of motion on flexion while her extension was severely limited. Id.
In June 2011, Matejka reported numbness and locking up of her hands. Tr. 477. In October 2011, Matejka reported burning in her shoulders and stiffness and cramps in her hand. Tr. 476. In December 2011, Matejka reported numbness in her hands and reported that she had balancing problems when her back pain was bad. Tr. 475. By March 2012, Matejka reported that she was doing well, but still had high "pain scores" most days. Tr. 643. Dr. Pahr recommended use of a Flector patch. Matejka returned to Dr. Pahr in May 2012 indicating that her hands were locking up and cramping. Tr. 718.
On September 9, 2012, and September 12, 2012, Matthew M. Keum, M.D., administered an epidural nerve block after an August MRI revealed minimal disc bulging. Tr. 721, 726.
Dr. Pickholtz again performed a psychological examination of Matejka on February 2, 2012. Tr. 593-601. Matejka reported treatment through medication from Dr. Davis for anxiety and depression. Tr. 597. Dr. Pickholtz opined that Matejka's ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; maintain concentration, persistence, and pace; perform simple tasks; and respond to supervision and coworkers in a work setting, were not impaired. Tr. 600. Dr. Pickholtz opined that Matejka's ability to respond to work pressures was slightly impaired. Id.
On April 2, 2012, state agency physician Elizabeth Das, M.D., completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment and concluded that Matejka could occasionally carry 20 pounds; frequently carry 10 pounds; stand or walk for 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; occasionally climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and could occasionally stoop, crouch, or crawl. Tr. 54-55. Dr. Das reviewed the opinion of Ms. Belew and stated that the opinion "relies heavily on the subjective report of symptoms and limitations provides by the individual, and the totality of the evidence does not support the opinion." Tr. 56. Dr. Das also noted that Matejka's brief treatment relationship with Ms. Belew was too short to allow a longitudinal picture of Matejka's impairments. Id.
On July 28, 2012, state agency psychiatrist Todd Finnerty, Psy.D., reviewed the record and opined that Matejka had no restrictions of daily activities; mild difficulties maintaining social functioning and concentration, persistence or pace; and no repeated episodes of decompensation. Tr. 69. He also opined that Matejka's symptoms were well controlled with medication and her mental health symptoms were not severe. Id.
On August 6, 2012, state agency physician Leslie Green, M.D., reviewed the record and affirmed Dr. Das's opinions. Tr. 70-72. Dr. Green also reviewed the March 22, 2012, opinion of Ms. Belew and stated that "the totality of the evidence does not support the opinion." Tr. 73. Dr. Green stated that Ms. Belew had only a brief treatment relationship with Matejka and Ms. Belew's opinion relies heavily on Matejka's subjective complaints. Id.
Matejka presented four third party questionnaires for review. On August 7, 2012, Mr. Robert Bland, Matejka's husband at the time, signed a questionnaire noting that he sees Matejka in constant, severe pain on a daily basis. Tr. 200-01. On August 8, 2012, one of Matejka's daughters, Cierra Matejka, signed a third party questionnaire indicating that her mother was unable to do anything for more than five minutes without pain. Tr. 206-07. She further stated that she helps her mother with showering, dressing, eating, and some driving. Id. On August 9, 2012, a third party questionnaire was signed by another of Matejka's daughters, Brenna Matejka. Tr. 204-05. Brenna stated that her mother's hands and arms don't work right and that Matejka can't turn her neck. Id. She further stated that she helps her mother clean the house, do laundry, wash the dishes and assists with other things she needs. Id. Finally, there is also a third party questionnaire signed on August 9, 2012, by Zivana Vidosevic, a former co-worker, who observed Matejka in severe pain at work and stated that Matejka was severely limited in her activities. Tr. 202-03.
At the administrative hearing, Matejka was represented by counsel and testified that she is unable to work due to rods, screws, and plates in her cervical spine. Tr. 773. She stated that she had limited mobility, limited range of motion, and loses the ability to grasp things with her hands. Id. Matejka testified that she cannot sit or stand for long. Tr. 774. Matejka stated that she has a left drop foot and uses a cane a few times a month when she feels off balance. Tr. 777.
Vocational Expert Brett L. Salkin ("VE") testified at the hearing. Tr. 784-790. The VE testified to the exertional and skill level of Matejka's past work as follows: her job as a medical assistant job was light and skilled; her job as a home health aide was medium and skilled; her job as a collections agent was sedentary and skilled; and her job as a waitress was light and semi-skilled. Tr. 786-87. The ALJ then asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual of Matejka's age, education, and past work experience, with a capacity for light work who could climb ramps and stairs occasionally but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; who could balance, stoop, crouch, and crawl occasionally; and who is able to perform overhead work with either upper extremity on an occasional basis. Tr. 787. The VE testified that such a hypothetical individual could perform Matejka's past work except for her work as a residential care aide. Tr. 788.
Then the ALJ asked if Matejka's past work could be performed by the same individual referenced in the first hypothetical with an additional limitation that the individual could only occasionally use her hands for handling, feeling, and fingering. Tr. 787-88. The VE testified that the hypothetical individual could not perform Matejka's past work but could perform work as a hostess (360 regional jobs; 1,200 Ohio jobs; 70,000 national jobs) and usher (250 regional jobs; 1,500 Ohio jobs; 74,000 national jobs). Tr. 788-89. Matejka's attorney then asked the VE if the usher or hostess job would be available for an individual who has to take a five minute break every twenty minutes. Tr. 789. The VE responded, "no." Id. Matejka's attorney then asked if those jobs would be available to a person who is absent two or more times per week. Id. The VE again responded, "no." Id. Finally, Matejka's attorney asked if those jobs would be available to a person who is off task 15 percent of the time. Tr. 789-90. The VE testified they would not. Id.
Under the Act, 42 U.S.C § 423(a), eligibility for benefit payments depends on the existence of a disability. "Disability" is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Furthermore:
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2).
In making a determination as to disability under this definition, an ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis set out in agency regulations. The five steps can be summarized as follows:
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920;
In her June 11, 2013, decision, the ALJ made the following findings:
The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Acting Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied review on August 5, 2013. Tr. 6-9.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not considering whether she meet Listing 1.02B (Major dysfunction of a joint). Doc. 17, pp. 10-12. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not properly address the medical opinion of Ms. Belew. Id. at 12-13.
In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ correctly found that Plaintiff did not meet a listing and appropriately addressed the medical evidence. Doc. 18, p. 8-13.
A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2003). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Besaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 966 F.2d 1028, 1030 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Brainard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (citations omitted)). A court "may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility." Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).
Relying on Reynolds v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 424 Fed. Appx. 411 (6th Cir.2011), Matejka claims that the ALJ erred at Step Three because the ALJ did not specifically address her impairments under Listing 1.02(B). Doc. 17, pp. 10-12. Listing 1.02(B) provides:
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. The Commissioner responds that Plaintiff has never before argued that she met or equaled the requirements of Listing 1.02B and contends that Plaintiff presented no evidence to establish meeting the listing. Doc. 18, p. 9. In Plaintiff's brief she argues that she met Listing 1.02B because "[t]he record is replete with evidence of her inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively following four cervical fusions." Id. at 11.
At the third step in the disability evaluation process, a claimant will be found disabled if her impairment meets or equals one of the listings in the Listing of Impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); Turner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 381 Fed. Appx. 488, 491 (6th Cir.2010). The Listing of Impairments, located at Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations, describes impairments the SSA considers to be "severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any gainful activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work experience." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). In other words, a claimant who meets the requirements of a Listed Impairment will be deemed conclusively disabled, and entitled to benefits. Reynolds v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App'x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011).
"[I]t is the claimant's burden to show that he meets or medically equals an impairment in the Listings." Todd v. Astrue, 2012 WL 2576435, * 9 (N.D.Ohio 2012) (internal citations omitted). Relying on Reynolds, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred at Step Three because the ALJ did not specifically address her impairments under Listing 1.02(B). Id., 424 Fed. Appx. 411; Doc. 19, pp. 10-11. Matejka also cites various opinions of this Court for the same proposition. Doc. 19, p. 1. Shea v. Astrue, 1:11CV1076, 2012 WL 967088 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2012) report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Shea v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 1:11CV1076, 2012 WL 967072 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2012); Keyes v. Astrue, 1:11-CV-00312, 2012 WL 832576 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2012). In Reynolds, Shea, and Keyes, the ALJ made conclusory statements that the mental and physical impairments of the respective claimants did not meet or equal a Listing and proceeded to discuss, in detail, only the claimant's mental impairments, not the claimant's physical impairments. Reynolds, 424 Fed. Appx. at 415-16; Keyes, 2012 WL 832576 *6; Shea, 2012 WL 967088 *9. In all three cases it was determined that the Step Three evaluation of the claimants' physical impairments was insufficient because an evaluation of the evidence was necessary to facilitate meaningful judicial review. Id. Here, the ALJ did review Matejka's physical impairments in detail; however, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed Matejka's impairments under Section 1.04,
The above cited cases and the social security regulations do not require the ALJ to address every listing. In the normal course, the ALJ need not discuss listings that the applicant clearly does not meet, especially when the claimant does not raise the listing before the ALJ. Sheeks v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 544 F. App'x 639, 641 (6th Cir. 2013). If, however, the record "raise[s] a substantial question as to whether [the claimant] could qualify as disabled" under a listing, the ALJ should discuss that listing. Id. Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 925 (6th Cir.1990).
In Sheeks, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the question of when a claimant raises a "substantial question" as to whether claimant met a listing in order to justify remand. Sheeks, 544 F.App'x at 641. In this case, the Sixth Circuit noted that claimant made only a tenuous case for meeting Listing 12.05(C):
Id. at 642. Similarly, here, Matejka makes only a tenuous case for meeting listing 1.02. Matejka points to various pieces of evidence in support of her argument that she has an inability to perform fine and gross movements effectively including: complaints of numbness and weakness in her extremities and cramping and locking up of her right hand. Doc. 17, p. 11; Doc. 19, pp. 4-5. However, like the plaintiff in Sheeks, Matejka does not flag any record evidence suggesting that she meets the other required criteria of the listing such as "findings on appropriate medically acceptable imaging of joint space narrowing, bony destruction, or ankylosis of the affected joint(s)."
Matejka also contends that the ALJ erred because she made no mention of the opinion of Kate Belew, M.A., LPCC,
"An ALJ is bound to adhere to certain governing standards when assessing the medical evidence in support of a disability claim." Gentry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 723 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir.2004)). "Chief among these is the rule that the ALJ must consider all evidence in the record when making a determination, including all objective medical evidence, medical signs, and laboratory findings." Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(b); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513). The Regulations provide that the Commissioner "will always consider the medical opinions in . . . [a claimant's] case record together with the rest of the relevant evidence . . . receive[d]." 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(b). Further, "[u]nless a treating source's opinion is given controlling weight, the administrative law judge must explain in the decision the weight given to the opinions of a State agency medical or psychological consultant or other program physician, psychologist, or other medical specialist, as the administrative law judge must do for any opinions from treating sources, nontreating sources, and other nonexamining sources who do not work for us."
An ALJ can consider all the medical opinion evidence without directly addressing in her written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party. See Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App'x 496, 508 (6th Cir.2006). However, if a medical source's opinion contradicts the ALJ's RFC finding, an ALJ must explain why she did not include the medical source's limitation in her determination of a claimant's RFC. Social Security Ruling 96-8p provides, "The RFC assessment must always consider and address medical source opinions. If the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted." 1996 WL 374184 at *7. Courts in this District have held that an ALJ's failure to comply with this regulation requires reversal. See Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F.Supp.2d 875, 881 (N.D.Ohio 2011) (ALJ's failure to address a medical source's opinion which conflicted with RFC constituted reversible error); Thompson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 1:12-CV-2372, 2014 WL 356974 at *4 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2014) (case remanded because ALJ failed to explain why she did not adopt in the RFC a conflicting limitation assigned by medical sources); Moretti v. Colvin, 4:13-CV-01344, 2014 WL 37750 at *10 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2014) (case remanded because the ALJ failed to explain why she did not include in the RFC a limitation assigned by a medical source); See also Harvey v. Colvin, 5:12-CV-2026, 2013 WL 1500688 at *8 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2013).
Matejka argues that the ALJ violated SSR 96-8p by failing to explain why she excluded Ms. Belew's opinion that she could not persist at tasks due to pain in her neck and shoulders. Doc. 17, p. 13. The Commissioner responds that any error on the part of the ALJ is, at most, harmless because the record establishes sufficient reasons for the rejection of the counselor's opinion. Doc. 18, p. 13. In support, the Commissioner notes that the ALJ gave weight to the opinions of Dr. Pickholtz, Dr. Bergsten, and Dr. Das. Doc. 18, pp. 10-12. The Commissioner points out that Dr. Pickholtz opined that Matejka had only mild restrictions in concentration, persistence, and pace, and Drs. Bergsten and Das specifically discounted the opinion of Ms. Belew. Id.
In some cases, the Commissioner may be able to show that an ALJ implicitly resolved conflicts in the evidence based on the ALJ's factual findings as a whole. In order to make such a showing, however, the Commissioner must point to portions of the ALJ's decision itself rather than to other evidence in the record. Karger v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 414 Fed. Appx. 739, 749, 753 (6th Cir.2011). In her decision, the ALJ acknowledged Ms. Belew's opinion that "claimant was unable to persist at tasks because of pain in neck in [sic] shoulders." Tr 19. However, the ALJ did not discuss why she disregarded a limitation based on an inability to persist at tasks. In fact, although the ALJ summarily stated that Matejka was only "mildly restricted" in concentration, persistence, and pace (Tr. 16), the ALJ did not cite any evidence or otherwise explain at any point in her decision the basis for this finding. Other than the above two references, the ALJ's decision lacks any discussion of Matejka's abilities in the areas of concentration, persistence, or pace. Accordingly, it is not clear how the ALJ resolved the inconsistency between Ms. Belew's opinion that Matejka could not persist at tasks and the ALJ's determination that Matejka was only mildly impaired in concentration, persistence, or pace.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ "implicitly considered the opinion of counselor Belew" because the ALJ considered the medical evidence of Matejka's psychological impairments and the ALJ gave some weight to the opinions of Dr. Pickholtz, Dr. Bergsten, and Dr. Das. Doc. 18, pp. 10-12. The Commissioner's argument is without merit. First, as discussed above, the ALJ did not discuss medical evidence relating to the issue of concentration, persistence, or pace. Second, although the ALJ gave weight to the opinions of Drs. Pickholtz, Bergsten, and Das, the ALJ did not indicate that she gave weight to the portions of their opinions relating to concentration, persistence, or pace or the portions discrediting the opinion of Ms. Belew.
With regard to Dr. Pickholtz, the ALJ stated she gave "significant weight" to this opinion because
Tr. 21. The ALJ did not state or imply that she gave weight to the portion of Dr. Pickholtz's opinion in which Dr. Pickholtz opined that Matejka was only mildly limited in concentration, persistence, or pace.
In her decision, the ALJ also gave "significant weight" to the opinion of Dr. Das, stating that the medical consultants, including Dr. Das, "determined that claimant could do light work activity. She could never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. She could occasionally climb stairs, stoop, crouch, and crawl. She was limited in overhead reaching with both arms (Exs. 2A, 41A). On January 15, 2013, the claimant still complained of some neck pain. She continues to receive conservative treatment (Ex. 35F)." Tr. 22. A review of the record reveals that Dr. Das considered and discounted Ms. Belew's opinion because Dr. Das found that Ms. Belew's opinion relied heavily on subjective reporting of symptoms; it was not supported by the totality of the evidence, and the treatment relationship between Ms. Belew and Matejka was too short. Tr. 56. The ALJ did not state or imply that she gave weight to the portion of Dr. Das's opinion that discounted Ms. Belew's opinion.
Finally, the ALJ gave "some weight" to Dr. Bergsten's opinion, stating, "The updated evidence did not change the assessments. As indicated earlier in this decision, the claimant does not have a severe mental health impairment." Tr. 21. A review of the record also shows that Dr. Bergsten reviewed and discounted Ms. Belew's opinion because it was based on subjective complaints and because Ms. Belew considered pain, something that Dr. Bergsten believed she was unqualified to provide an opinion on. Tr. 54. The ALJ did not state or imply that she gave weight to the portion of Dr. Bergsten's opinion that discounted Ms. Belew's opinion.
Even when an ALJ accords "significant weight" to a medical opinion, the ALJ is not required to adopt every opinion expressed by the medical expert. Schulte v. Colvin, 4:13-CV-01521, 2014 WL 1654129 at *5 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 2014) ("an ALJ is not required to adopt every opinion expressed by a non-examining medical expert, even when an ALJ overall accords that opinion great weight").
As stated earlier, in order to find that an ALJ implicitly resolved conflicts in the evidence based on her factual findings as a whole, the Court must look to the ALJ's decision itself rather than to other evidence in the record. Karger, 414 Fed. Appx. at 749, 753. Looking only at the ALJ's decision itself, there is nothing to show that the ALJ implicitly resolved conflicts between Ms. Belew's opinion and the RFC. If the Court were to rely on information in the record that the ALJ does not discuss in her decision, i.e., the full opinions of Drs. Pickholtz, Das, and Bergsten, in order to explain the ALJ's decision to omit the limitation suggested by Ms. Belew, the Court would be engaging in the post hoc rationalization that case law prohibits. Moretti v. Colvin, 4:13-CV-01344, 2014 WL 37750, *11 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2014) (citing Berryhill v. Shalala, 4 F.3d 993, *6 (6th Cir. Sept.16, 1993) (unpublished opinion) ("[A] simple but fundamental rule of administrative law . . . is . . . that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action.")).
The ALJ's failure to discuss the conflict between Ms. Belew's opinion and the RFC deprives this Court of the ability to conduct a meaningful review of this issue. Accordingly, remand is appropriate. On remand, the ALJ should either adopt the limitation assigned by Ms. Belew or explain her decision not to adopt the limitation.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1
There is no evidence the severity of the claimant's musculoskeletal impairments meets or medically equals any of the criteria described in Section 1.04 as discussed below in the residual functional capacity. The medical evidence does not reveal significant disorganization of motor function into extremities and no muscle weakness or atrophy. The claimant was not prescribed and does not use ambulatory aids. The claimant does not use a walker, two crutches, or two canes.
Tr. 17.
