NANCY A. VECCHIARELLI, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Wayne Hanft ("Plaintiff"), challenges the final decision of Defendant, Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying his applications for Period of Disability ("POD"), Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, 1381 et seq. ("Act"). This case is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the consent of the parties entered under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED.
On May 10, 2013, and May 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed his applications for POD, DIB, and SSI, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2010. (Transcript ("Tr.") 9.) The claims were denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). (Id.) On August 19, 2014, an ALJ held Plaintiff's hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff participated in the hearing, was represented by counsel, and testified. (Id.) A vocational expert ("VE") also participated and testified. (Id.) On September 3, 2014, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 21.) On December 4, 2014, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision, and the ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision. (Tr. 1.)
On January 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed his complaint to challenge the Commissioner's final decision. (Doc. No. 1.) The parties have completed briefing in this case. (Doc. Nos. 15, 16.)
Plaintiff asserts the following assignments of error: (1) The ALJ failed to provide good, specific, and supported reasons for discounting the opinions of the treating and examining physicians; and (2) the ALJ erred by failing to consider Plaintiff's strong work history when determining his RFC and assessing his credibility.
Plaintiff was born on June 12, 1957, and was 55-years-old on the alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 20.) He had at least a high school education and was able to communicate in English. (Id.) He had past relevant work as a fast food and short order cook. (Id.)
During March 2012, Plaintiff underwent an x-ray of his right ankle. (Tr. 251.) The x-ray showed subchondral cysts. (Id.) The reviewing radiologist concluded that the findings could be post-traumatic, but the unusual appearance suggested the possibility of asynovitis or, in the alternative, erosive arthritis, which was less likely. (Id.) The radiologist recommended correlation with clinical and laboratory data. (Id.)
On September 14, 2012, Plaintiff treated with primary care physician Carolyn Kuerbitz, M.D. (Tr. 348.) Plaintiff reported that he resided alone in public housing, smoked one pack of cigarettes each day, and walked "a lot." (Tr. 350.) A physical examination showed clear lungs and no edema. (Id.) Plaintiff had recently been diagnosed with diabetes, and Dr. Kuerbitz prescribed Metformin and Glipizide. (Id.) For further diabetic care, the doctor referred Plaintiff to a nutritionist, an optometrist, and a podiatrist. (Id.)
Plaintiff returned to Dr. Kuerbitz on October 23, 2012, with complaints of sinus and chest congestion. (Tr. 308, 310.) Dr. Kuerbitz noted a marked improvement in Plaintiff's blood sugar readings and that Plaintiff had adjusted his diet. (Tr. 310-11.) Later that month, during treatment with podiatrist Jonathan Logan, D.P.S., Plaintiff reported occasional numbness in the little toe on the left foot, but otherwise denied pain. (Tr. 312.) Dr. Logan documented Plaintiff's complaints of decreased sensation, but a physical examination was otherwise normal. (Tr. 315.)
On June 5, 2013, Plaintiff reported right ankle pain to Dr. Kuerbitz. (Tr. 271.) Plaintiff explained that years ago, during his tenure with the Navy, he jumped over a ten foot fence and fractured his right leg. (Id.) Although an ankle injury was never documented, Plaintiff believed he injured his ankle based on the way he landed on his foot. (Id.) He complained of constant daily ankle pain, which had begun over the past few months. (Id.) Plaintiff did not drive and had to walk everywhere he went. (Id.) Now, he could not walk more than three blocks without ankle pain. (Id.) There was no obvious swelling in the ankle upon physical examination. (Tr. 272.) Plaintiff's lungs were clear, and he indicated he was not ready to quit smoking. (Id.) Dr. Kuerbitz prescribed Diclofenac for Plaintiff's ankle pain. (Id.) During this visit, Plaintiff asked Dr. Kuerbitz to fill out a form related to his disability application. (Id.). The doctor asked Plaintiff about his ability to lift, and Plaintiff reported that he had a hernia and was afraid to do much lifting. (Id.) When asked about bending and twisting, Plaintiff stated that the activity caused muscle cramps. (Id.)
On June 26, 2013, Plaintiff treated with Dr. Logan. (Tr. 263.) Plaintiff complained of occasional numbness in the little toe on the left foot. (Id.) During a physical examination, Plaintiff reported pain in the lateral right ankle and Achilles tendon. (Tr. 267.) Dr. Logan diagnosed possible degenerative joint disease (DJD) or tendinitis. (Id.) He prescribed rest, ice, compression, and elevation (RICE) therapy and orthotics. (Id.) In August 2013, Plaintiff was fitted for orthotics due to tendinitis. (Tr. 523.)
On October 23, 2013, Dr. Kuerbitz diagnosed chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). (Tr. 417.) The doctor prescribed Albuterol as needed and advised Plaintiff to stop smoking. (Id.) During a session with his nutritionist that day, Plaintiff reported walking a few times per week, as well as riding a stationary bike five to ten miles. (Tr. 419.)
Plaintiff presented to Dr. Logan on November 7, 2013. (Tr. 405.) During a physical examination Plaintiff reported pain in the medial right ankle. (Tr. 410.) Dr. Logan modified Plaintiff's right orthotic, prescribed Diclofenac, and noted that he "may want to order an ankle brace." (Tr. 411.)
On November 8, 2013, Dr. Kuerbitz completed a medical source statement describing Plaintiff's physical limitations. (Tr. 602-04.) She listed Plaintiff's diagnoses as diabetes, hypertension, depression, emphysema, and right ankle pain. (Tr. 602.) Dr. Kuerbitz reported that Plaintiff could walk three city blocks without rest. (Id.) He could continuously sit for a total of six hours and stand or walk for a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday. (Id.) Plaintiff could occasionally lift up to 20 pounds, and frequently lift 10 pounds or less. (Tr. 603.) He could bend or twist for 25 percent of an eight-hour workday. (Id.) He needed to avoid exposure to fumes, odors, dust, and gas. (Tr. 604.) He could occasionally twist, stoop, crouch, and climb stairs, but never climb ladders. (Id.) Dr. Kuerbitz concluded that Plaintiff's impairments were not likely to cause good and bad days, but that Plaintiff would likely be absent from work more than twice per month. (Id.)
On February 5, 2014, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Logan and reported that his right ankle pain was "much better" after the modification of his orthotic. (Tr. 682.) Dr. Logan opined that Plaintiff's tendinitis was resolved. (Tr. 687.)
In March 2014, Plaintiff told Dr. Kuerbitz that he was "feeling fine" and was exercising on a stationary bike and skiing machine. (Tr. 672.) He planned to lose weight and would like to stop using some of his medication. (Id.) Plaintiff still smoked and used his inhalers a few times each week. (Id.) Dr. Kuerbitz advised smoking cessation and weight loss, continued Plaintiff on his current medications, and recommended follow up in four months. (Id.) Plaintiff also saw his nutritionist that day and reported that he had not been active lately due to cold weather. (Tr. 673.) He was using his stationary bike 30 minutes per day and planned to increase activity. (Id.)
On September 20, 2012, Plaintiff initiated mental health treatment with the Department of Veterans Affairs. (Tr. 376.) Plaintiff reported that Pathways Clinic had prescribed Zoloft and Abilify, which had stabilized his depressive symptoms. (Id.) Plaintiff had fleeting suicidal thoughts about once a month, but had never made any suicide attempts. (Id.) A mental status examination was generally normal. (Tr. 374.) Nurse Laura Martin diagnosed depression and recommended medication management. (Tr. 376.)
Plaintiff treated with psychiatrist Laura Garlisi, M.D., in November 2012. (Tr. 304.) Upon mental status examination, Plaintiff was cooperative, appeared relaxed and in good spirits, had good eye contact, had psychomotor activity within normal limits, had normal speech, had grossly intact cognition, had a coherent and goal-directed thought process, and denied hallucinations and suicidal ideation. (Tr. 305.) Dr. Garlisi also observed that Plaintiff's mood was euthymic, his affect was appropriate, and he displayed good insight and judgment. (Id.) In terms of substance use, Plaintiff reported smoking marijuana until 2011, heavy daily alcohol use ending two to three years prior, using synthetic marijuana in 2011, using cocaine until 2009, and some prior use of hallucinogens. (Id.) Dr. Garlisi diagnosed depressive disorder with psychotic features in remission and assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 68.
In January 2013, Plaintiff told Dr. Garlisi that he was "feeling well" and had been looking for a job. (Tr. 477.) Plaintiff indicated that smoking artificial marijuana and alcohol withdrawal may have caused his previous hallucinations. (Id.) Plaintiff's last auditory hallucination occurred approximately four months prior to his visit. (Id.) Dr. Garlisi decreased Plaintiff's prescription of Risperidone and assigned a GAF score of 70. (Tr. 479.)
During April 2013, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Garlisi that he was doing well. (Tr. 282.) Plaintiff had self-stopped Risperidone one week after his January 2013 appointment. (Tr. 282-83.) He experienced no hallucinations and again stated his belief that drug use and withdrawal may have caused his past hallucinations. (Id.) Plaintiff was sleeping well, even when he skipped Trazodone. (Tr. 283.) He had made some friends where he was living. (Id.) During a mental status examination, Plaintiff exhibited a relaxed and cooperative demeanor, normal psychomotor activity, intact cognition, a normal thought process, an euthymic mood, an appropriate affect, and good insight and judgment. (Id.)
In August 2013, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Garlisi that he felt "a bit down" due to right ankle pain and inability to find a job. (Tr. 440.) Dr. Garlisi noted a mildly dysphoric mood due to pain, but otherwise, Plaintiff was alert, was relaxed, was engaged, and had a normal affect. (Tr. 441.) She assigned a GAF score of 68 and advised Plaintiff to continue Sertraline and Trazadone. (Tr. 442.)
On November 8, 2013, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Garlisi that he was "a little depressed." (Tr. 402.) Plaintiff stated that he had a history of frequent job losses, frequent arguments with others while on the job, and difficulty getting along with others. (Id.) He also explained that he was unable to carry out some work procedures because he "took shortcuts." (Id.) Dr. Garlisi opined that "clinically [Plaintiff] does not seem able to work based on previous behaviors and mood." (Id.)
Dr. Garlisi completed a medical source statement that day. (Tr. 611-13.) She opined that Plaintiff had "poor or no ability" to do the following: maintain attention for two hour segments; sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; work in coordination with or proximity to others without being unduly distracted; complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; deal with normal work stress; carry out detailed instructions; and deal with the stress of semi-skilled and skilled work. (Id.) In support of these limitations, Dr. Garlisi made the following comments: Plaintiff lost jobs for taking "shortcuts," lost jobs for arguing, and could not carry out detailed instructions because he tried shortcuts. (Tr. 612-13.) Dr. Garlisi further explained that besides mood problems, Plaintiff also seemed to have problems with judgment, because he repeated behaviors that caused him to lose jobs, such as arguing and not following directions. (Tr. 613.) She opined that Plaintiff would miss work more than twice per month due to his mental impairments or treatment. (Id.) Regarding Plaintiff's use of drugs and alcohol, Dr. Garlisi explained that Plaintiff was not drinking and had not used drugs since early 2013. (Id.)
During March 2014, Plaintiff told Dr. Garlisi that he had been "feeling pretty good for the last few weeks," he was sleeping well, his energy was good, and his ankle pain had improved. (Tr. 621.) He denied suicidal thoughts and alcohol or drug use. (Id.) Plaintiff said he had not been using Trazodone regularly but still slept about seven hours every night. (Id.) Dr. Garlisi observed that Plaintiff was relaxed and pleasant. (Tr. 622.) His speech was organized, his affect was normal, and his mood was euthymic. (Id.) Plaintiff's judgment and insight were fair and his cognition was within normal limits. (Id.) Dr. Garlisi instructed Plaintiff to continue Sertraline and Trazadone and return in 12 weeks or sooner, if needed. (Tr. 623.)
On August 27, 2013, Dorothy Bradford, M.D., performed a consultative physical examination. (Tr. 380-87.) The examination yielded largely normal findings, including a normal gait, a normal range of motion in all joints, and normal motor strength. (Id.) In particular, Dr. Bradford observed that Plaintiff's right lower extremity had no visible abnormalities and he had a full range of motion in the right foot. (Tr. 387.) The doctor indicated that Plaintiff had a small, reducible, non-tender umbilical hernia. (Tr. 386.) Dr. Bradford also opined that Plaintiff may have DJD of the right lower extremity that caused pain. (Tr. 387.) She recommended that he be restricted from standing continuously for over one hour and continuously lifting over 50 pounds. (Id.)
In September 2013, state agency reviewing physician John Mormol, M.D., conducted assessed the record to evaluate Plaintiff's physical limitations. (Tr. 61-62, 71-72.) Dr. Mormol opined that Plaintiff could lift 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; stand, walk, or sit for a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday; and occasionally climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Tr. 71-72.) On November 29, 2013, state agency reviewing physician Robert Klinger, M.D., affirmed Dr. Mormol's assessment. (Tr. 85-87, 100-02.)
State agency reviewing psychologist Vicki Warren, Ph.D., conducted a review of the record in September 2013. (Tr. 70.) She opined that Plaintiff was mildly limited in his activities of daily living; maintaining social functioning; and maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (Id.) She did not assign any functional restrictions, but instead assessed that Plaintiff appeared to be doing well and had no severe psychotic symptoms. (Id.)
State agency psychologist Karla Voyten, Ph.D., reviewed the record in December 2013. (Tr. 99.) She opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in maintaining social functioning. (Id.) Dr. Voyten found that Plaintiff could perform low stress work that did require strict adherence to time or production based quotas and that he could make simple work-related decisions. (Tr. 102-03.) Dr. Voyten also recommended that Plaintiff work independently of other employees. (Tr. 103.)
Plaintiff testified that he had constant, sharp pain in his right ankle, which shot into his knee. (Tr. 36.) His ankle swelled a few times every week, usually due to walking. (Id.) Plaintiff took anti-inflammatory pills and used orthotics. (Tr. 37.) He estimated that he could walk half a mile, stand for one to two hours, and would have no trouble sitting. (Tr. 38.) Due to a hernia, he did not lift greater than 15 pounds, but was not receiving any medical treatment for the condition. (Id.) Plaintiff experienced burning in his feet every night. (Tr. 39.)
Plaintiff also suffered from depression, which interfered with his sleep and mood. (Tr. 40.) He had difficulty holding jobs in the past due to anger. (Tr. 41.) Plaintiff had argued with supervisors and coworkers and sometimes threw things. (Id.)
Plaintiff had no trouble living on his own, cooking, cleaning, performing self care, or grocery shopping. (Tr. 42-43.) He recently started taking GED classes. (Tr. 44.) Plaintiff testified that he avoided other people, but he had a friend who would drive him to the store and to his classes. (Tr. 41, 43-44.)
Debra Lee, a vocational expert, testified at Plaintiff's hearing. The ALJ asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual of Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience. (Tr. 50-51.) The individual would be able to perform medium work and occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. (Id.) The individual would be able to perform low stress work that did not require strict adherence to time or production quotas. (Id.) The individual could make simple work-related decisions, would work best independent of other employees, could work where there was no "over the shoulder" supervision, and had the ability to adapt to infrequent and easily explained changes. (Id.) The VE testified that the hypothetical individual would be capable of performing such jobs as a kitchen helper, industrial cleaner, and linen room attendant. (Id.)
A claimant is entitled to receive benefits under the Social Security Act when he establishes disability within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 416.905; Kirk v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981). A claimant is considered disabled when he cannot perform "substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a).
The Commissioner reaches a determination as to whether a claimant is disabled by way of a five-stage process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) and 416.920(a)(4); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). First, the claimant must demonstrate that he is not currently engaged in "substantial gainful activity" at the time he seeks disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) and 416.920(b). Second, the claimant must show that he suffers from a "severe impairment" in order to warrant a finding of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c). A "severe impairment" is one that "significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." Abbot, 905 F.2d at 923. Third, if the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the impairment meets a listed impairment, the claimant is presumed to be disabled regardless of age, education or work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d). Fourth, if the claimant's impairment does not prevent him from doing his past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f) and 416.920(e)-(f). For the fifth and final step, even if the claimant's impairment does prevent him from doing his past relevant work, if other work exists in the national economy that the claimant can perform, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c), and 416.920(g).
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
(Tr. 11-21.)
Judicial review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards. Ealy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010). Review must be based on the record as a whole. Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). The court may look into any evidence in the record to determine if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, regardless of whether it has actually been cited by the ALJ. Id. However, the court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations, or weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989).
The Commissioner's conclusions must be affirmed absent a determination that the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standards or made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. White v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Brainard, 889 F.2d at 681. A decision supported by substantial evidence will not be overturned even though substantial evidence supports the opposite conclusion. Ealy, 594 F.3d at 512.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide an adequate basis for assigning less than controlling weight to Plaintiff's treating physicians, Drs. Garlisi and Kuerbitz. The Commissioner disagrees.
"An ALJ must give the opinion of a treating source controlling weight if he finds the opinion `well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques' and `not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record.'" Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)) (internal quotes omitted). If an ALJ decides to give a treating source's opinion less than controlling weight, he must give "good reasons" for doing so that are sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight given to the treating physician's opinion and the reasons for that weight. See Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (quoting S.S.R. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (S.S.A.)). This "clear elaboration requirement" is "imposed explicitly by the regulations," Bowie v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 539 F.3d 395, 400 (6th Cir. 2008), and its purpose is to "let claimants understand the disposition of their cases" and to allow for "meaningful review" of the ALJ's decision,
During November 2013, treating psychologist Dr. Garlisi completed a medical opinion questionnaire. (Tr. 611-13.) Dr. Garlisi opined that Plaintiff had "poor or no useful ability" to perform at least eight different work activities, including the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms. (Id.) In assessing Dr. Garlisi's opinion, the ALJ wrote:
(Tr. 19.)
Plaintiff asserts that each of the reasons the ALJ provided as grounds to discount Dr. Garlisi's opinion are factually inaccurate or otherwise insufficient to support her treating source analysis. With regard to Dr. Garlisi's reliance on Plaintiff's past functioning, the evidence does not indicate that Plaintiff's substance abuse caused or contributed to his prior work issues or behavior. Nor is it clear that Dr. Garlisi based her opinion entirely on these behaviors. Additionally, the ALJ's observation that Dr. Garlisi's opinions were not supported by the medical evidence and Plaintiff's current presentation is too conclusory for the Court to adequately assess without further explanation from the ALJ. If this were all the ALJ had said about the evidence, the case could require remand.
In this case, however, the ALJ's opinion, taken as a whole, thoroughly evaluates the evidence and indicates the weight the ALJ gave it. This provides a sufficient basis for the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Garlisi's opinions, see Nelson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 195 F. App'x 462, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2006), and affords this Court the opportunity to meaningfully review the ALJ's opinion. In Nelson, the ALJ failed to discuss the opinions of two of the plaintiff's treating physicians, and the plaintiff argued that this failure constituted a basis for remand. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, concluding that "the ALJ's evaluation of [the plaintiff's] mental impairments indirectly attacks both the supportability of [the treating physicians'] opinions and the consistency of those opinions with the rest of the record evidence."
Here, the ALJ provided a substantial discussion and assessment of the evidence before evaluating the opinions of Dr. Garlisi. (Tr. 15-18.) For example, the ALJ discussed the following evidence, which implicitly rejects Dr. Garlisi's opinions regarding Plaintiff's mental limitations:
Had the ALJ discussed the aforementioned evidence immediately after stating that she was rejecting Dr. Garlisi's opinion, there would be no question that the ALJ provided "good reasons" for giving Dr. Garlisi's opinion less than controlling weight. The fact that the ALJ did not analyze the medical evidence for a second time (or refer to her previous analysis) when rejecting Dr. Garlisi's opinion does not necessitate remand of Plaintiff's case. "No principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different result." Shkabari v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir.1989)). See also Kobetic v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 114 F. App'x 171, 173 (6th Cir. 2004) (When "remand would be an idle and useless formality," courts are not required to "convert judicial review of agency action into a ping-pong game.") (quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766, n.6 (1969)). Accordingly, Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ violated the treating physician rule as to Dr. Garlisi is without merit.
During November 2013, Dr. Kuerbitz completed a medical source statement. (Tr. 602-04.) The physician opined that Plaintiff could walk three blocks without resting; stand or walk two hours of an eight-hour workday; sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; occasionally lift and carry 20 pounds and frequently lift and carry ten pounds; bend or twist for 25 percent of a workday; and should avoid exposure to pulmonary irritants. (Id.) Dr. Kuerbitz also opined that Plaintiff would be absent from work more than twice a month due to his impairments or treatment. (Id.)
Plaintiff takes issue with all but one of the reasons the ALJ provided for assigning less weight to Dr. Kuerbitz's opinion. To begin, Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Kuerbitz properly considered Plaintiff's subjective complaints as part of her assessment. The ALJ discredited Dr. Kuerbitz because the physician solicited Plaintiff's input regarding some physical abilities. (Tr. 17, 271.) It is not clear, however, that Dr. Kuerbitz based her opinion solely on Plaintiff's complaints, rather than her own assessment. As a result, the Court is hesitant to conclude that this constituted good reason to discredit Dr. Kuerbitz.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ incorrectly found that Dr. Kuerbitz did not provide a basis for her physical restrictions. Plaintiff maintains that Dr. Kuerbitz based the physical limitations on diagnoses of diabetes, hypertension, depression, emphysema, and ankle pain, which the doctor listed on the medical opinion form. (Tr. 602.) The medical source form did not prompt Dr. Kuerbitz to provide a basis for the limitations assigned, aside from listing diagnoses. (Id.) These facts somewhat call into question the ALJ's reasoning. The ALJ, however, correctly observed that Dr. Kuerbitz provided no specific support for the limitations assigned, such as the results of medical imaging or physical examinations. (Tr. 17.)
Nevertheless, the ALJ provided other good reasons for assigning less weight to the Dr. Kuerbitz's opinion. In addition, earlier in her opinion, the ALJ provided a thorough discussion of the evidence relating to Plaintiff's physical impairments, which implicitly rejects Dr. Kuerbitz's limitations. The ALJ's opinion contained the following grounds for discounting Dr. Kuerbitz's limitations:
Thus, as the ALJ explained, the evidence surrounding Dr. Kuerbitz's opinion did not support the limitations she identified. As a result, the ALJ met her burden of offering good reasons to support her decision to assign less than controlling weight to Dr. Kuerbitz. Given that the ALJ's treating source analysis is substantially supported, remand is not appropriate.
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to consider and discuss his work history prior to his alleged disability onset date while formulating the RFC and evaluating credibility. Plaintiff maintains that remand is required for further consideration of this evidence.
Credibility determinations regarding a claimant's subjective complaints rest with the ALJ, are entitled to considerable deference, and should not be discarded lightly. See
When a claimant complains of disabling pain, the Commissioner must apply a two-step test known as the "Duncan Test" to determine the credibility of such complaints. See
Here, a review of the ALJ's decision reveals that the ALJ did not discuss Plaintiff's work history
As, the ALJ discussed most of the relevant factors, which substantially support the decision to discount Plaintiff's credibility, Plaintiff's second assignment of error does not present a basis for remand.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's final decision is AFFIRMED.
