JAMES S. GWIN, District Judge.
In this social-security disability benefits case, Plaintiff Osamede Brown objects to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, which recommends affirming the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") denial of benefits. Because the ALJ had substantial evidence supporting his decision, the Court
On May 10, 2011, Brown filed applications for Supplemental Security Income. She alleged a January 1, 2010 disability onset date. After her applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, Brown requested a hearing before an ALJ.
Brown appeared with counsel at a hearing before ALJ Michael Kaczmarek.
Vocational expert Brian Womer ("VE") testified that there would be work available for a hypothetical individual the same age as and with the same education and work history as Brown who has an Residual Functional Capacity with no exertional limitations but with the following limitations: can never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; must avoid all exposure to hazards such as inherently dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights; must avoid concentrated exposure to environmental irritants, such as fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and areas of poor ventilation; and no commercial driving.
The VE indicated that if an individual would be absent from work two days per month, the individual would not be able to maintain the jobs the VE identified and there were no additional jobs that the VE could identify.
On August 6, 2013, the ALJ determined that Brown was not disabled within the meanings of the Social Security Act. Magistrate Judge Burke summarized the ALJ's findings as follows:
Brown filed this complaint, and the Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Kathleen B. Burke. Magistrate Judge Burke issued a Report and Recommendation, finding that the ALJ's determination was supported by substantial evidence and recommending that the Court deny Brown's appeal.
Brown now objects to the R&R.
In reviewing an ALJ's disability determination under the Social Security Act, a district court is limited to reviewing whether the ALJ's decision is "supported by substantial evidence and is made pursuant to proper legal standards."
To establish disability under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must show that she cannot engage in any substantial gainful activity because of a "medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months."
First, Brown argues that the ALJ's stated reasons for discounting the weight assigned to Dr. Kinast's and Dr. Bavis' opinions did not constitute "good reasons." However, this Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ did substantiate his decision with "good reasons."
Under the treating physician rule, "treating source opinions must be given `controlling weight' if two conditions are met: (1) the opinion `is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques'; and (2) the opinion `is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record."
However, an ALJ is allowed to give a treating source's opinion less controlling weight so long as he gives "good reasons" for doing so. "Good reasons" are reasons that are sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight given to the treating physician's opinion and the reasons for that weight.
In deciding the weight to be given to the treating physician's opinion, the ALJ must consider factors such as (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of the examination, (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) the supportability of the opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record as whole, (5) the specialization of the source, and (6) any other factors that tend to support or contradict the opinion.
First, the ALJ explained his decision to give little weight
Further, the ALJ cited two emergency room visits made by Brown in 2012. On February 28, 2012, Brown presented to Mercy Medical Center's emergency room for a seizure. The emergency room physician noted that Brown, "admitted that she has been cutting back on her benzos because she was feeling dizzy and so she thought it was part of the Dilantin."
On April 4, 2012, Brown had a seizure while visiting her sister at Mercy Medical Center. Brown's Dilantin levels were recorded as less than 0.4 mh/L, and the emergency room physician's diagnosis of seizure noted a belief that Brown had a seizure because of noncompliance and stress.
The ALJ did not err in not considering Brown's metabolic or absorption rates as a possible explanations for her subtherapeutic anticonvulsant levels. A finding that an individual's specific issues with absorption or metabolism of the drug is the cause of subtherapeutic levels "must be based on specific descriptive evidence provided by the treating physician."
Here, the treating physicians presented no such evidence. In fact, Dr. Kinast did not answer a question on the physician questionnaire related to any recent subtherapeutic levels.
Further, the ALJ did not err in not re-contacting Dr. Kinast for clarification of his opinion because the ALJ was able to reach a determination regarding Brown's disability upon examining the whole record.
Moreover, the ALJ's other stated reasons for discounting Drs. Kinast and Bavis' opinions constitute "good reasons." The ALJ noted that examining the entire record revealed that most of Brown's seizures occurred at nighttime, thus undermining Dr. Kinast's opinion that Brown's seizures would likely disrupt co-workers at work.
Finally, although the ALJ did note the possibility of bias on the part of Dr. Kinast, that was not the ALJ's sole reason for discounting Dr. Kinast's testimony.
Accordingly, the ALJ properly concluded that Brown is capable of performing a limited range of work.
Because Plaintiff objected to the Report and Recommendation in whole, this Court assumes that Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that the ALJ properly assessed Brown's credibility. This Court agrees with the R&R on this point.
A reviewing court may not "try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility."
This Court finds that the ALJ's explanations for partially discrediting Brown's credibility are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record. Here, the ALJ considered a number of factors including: the aforementioned medication compliance issue, discrepancies between Brown's testimony and her mother's testimony as to the length of the seizures, the limited number of grand mal seizures, Brown's daily activities, and Brown's prior work history.
For these reasons, the Court
IT IS SO ORDERED.
